A critical insight into fraud and corruption, and its facilitators, in global sporting organisations in a Western European and North American context

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Abstract

‘In the subfield of criminology, deviance and social control, sport is rarely considered seriously despite the many varied controversies, corruptions and illegalities out there’

(Groombridge, 2012, p.1)

Criminology as an academic discipline is becoming increasingly aware that crime and deviance within sport is by no means trivial, yet to date there is a paucity of literature in what has been dubbed as ‘sports criminology’ (Groombridge, 2012). Through the utilisation of secondary sources, this library-based dissertation seeks to bridge the gap in knowledge, to gain a critical insight into fraud and corruption, and its facilitators, within global sporting organisations, such as FIFA. Thus, seeking to be a preliminary piece of work allying the disciplines of criminology and sport together.

This dissertation argues that not only does the self-governing and self-regulating nature of global sporting organisations, facilitate fraud and corruption, but also, that the commercialisation of sport more generally has been a catalyst for the occurrence of fraudulent and corrupt practices. Whilst there are a number of individual-level criminological theories which aide the explanation of fraud and corruption conducted on an individual basis, it has been found that the nature and extent of fraud and corruption within GSOs is best explained by Messner and Rosenfeld’s (1994) institutional anomie theory. However, ultimately this dissertation took a similar stance to that of Hall and Winlow (2015), proposing that it is timely that criminology needs to expand the zemiological study of harm to become better able at explaining harms in today’s neoliberal era, in order for crime and deviance within sport to not be disregarded or trivialised.

Key words: corruption; crime; deviance; football; sports criminology; governance; FIFA; fraud; global sports organisations; oligarchy; sport; zemiology
List of acronyms and abbreviations

AFC- Asian Football Confederation
BBC- British Broadcasting Company
CONCACAF- The Confederation of North, Central American and Caribbean Association Football
CPI- Corruption Perceptions Index
E&W- England and Wales
FA- Football Association
FIFA- Fédération Internationale de Football Association
FIFA ExCo- Fédération Internationale de Football Association Executive Committee
GAR- Global Accountability Report
GBP- Great British Pounds
GSO- Global Sporting Organisation
IAAF- International Association of Athletics Federations
ICVS- International Crime Victims Survey
ISL- International Sport and Leisure
IOC- International Olympic Committee
INGO- International Non-Governmental Organisation
NTU- Nottingham Trent University
ONS- Office for National Statistics
PSG- Paris Saint-Germain
SCONUL- Society of College, National and University Libraries
TRIC- Transnational Research Institute on Corruption
UEFA- Union of European Football Associations
US- United States
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‘Sport is dirty: episodes of dishonesty have tainted it. If there was ever any purity in sports- and there’s no way of knowing conclusively whether there ever was- it was when amateur ideas reigned supreme. As soon as money became involved, corruption followed with the same inevitability’ (Cashmore, 2013, p.503).
1. Introduction

1.1 Sport as an analogy for business culture
Sharing many of the same core characteristics with business corporations, sport is indeed a global business (Brooks et al., 2013). Given that the sporting industry is, too, characterised by oligarchical structures of governance and power (Hoehn, 2006) and motivated by values pertinent to the business world (Andrews, 2004; Robinson, 2010), Brooks et al. (2013) argue that the sporting industry is as susceptible as ‘traditional’ businesses to breed the conditions that enable fraud and corruption to flourish. Given that global management consultancy firm A.T. Kearney (2011) has estimated that the global sporting industry is now worth between $480 and $620 billion US dollars, there is evidently a wealth of capital to be extorted illegitimately, as well as illegally, within the sector, for example in ‘payroll fraud, procurement fraud, vote-rigging, tax evasion’ (Brooks et al., 2013, p.4).

This dissertation seeks to gain a critical insight into fraud and corruption within, and affiliated to, global sporting organisations (GSOs), for example: Fédération Internationale Football de Association (FIFA), the International Olympic Committee (IOC), and the International Association of Athletics Federations (IAAF), as these are ‘the supreme organs of governance in sport whose authority is global’ (Forster, 2006, p.72), and are therefore in the most powerful positions in the governance of sport. Whilst the third chapter of this dissertation seeks to discern the nature and extent of fraud and corruption within GSOs more generally, a multiple case study research design is employed in chapter five, looking in-depth at the organisational structure, activities and scandals of FIFA.

Importantly, however, this dissertation seeks to demonstrate that fraud and corruption within GSOs is not simply just about illicit and illegitimate monetary acquisition, as will be evident in chapter four, but instead to understand the importance of GSOs in playing an important ‘collective social, political and cultural role’ (Brooks et al., 2013, p.2) on the world stage, therefore holding a wealth of power which can be abused on an unprecedented scale. As a result, both fraud and corruption, and activities associated with ‘white-collar crime’ (Sutherland, 1940), are not just contained within GSOs but can also extend to those they are affiliated with too. Put simply high-level fraud and corruption within GSOs also extends to politicians, sponsors, business corporations, and other stakeholders (Transparency International, 2009), with a vested interest in exploiting a relationship for some form of personal, political or monetary gain, thus creating ‘chains of interdependency’ (Elias, 1994/2000) in both facilitating, and concealing, evidence of high-level fraud and corruption (Adamoli et al., 1998).

Due to focusing on GSOs and the word restriction of this dissertation, analysis of fraud and corruption in sport is to be discussed with a particular focus on the voting for, and the hosting of sporting ‘mega-events’, in particular the men’s FIFA World Cup. By this merit, the term ‘mega-events’, are regarded as ‘large scale cultural (including commercial and sporting) events, which have a dramatic character, mass popular appeal and international significance’ (Roche, 2000, p.1).

1.2 Aims of the dissertation
The main aim of this dissertation is to acknowledge, and overcome, the paucity of social-scientific literature in the topic area by taking a multi-disciplinary approach to understanding and explaining fraud and corruption within GSOs. Although ‘there is a growing interest in professional sports as a site for various forms of financial crime, fraud and related misconduct’ (Yar, 2014, p.5, emphasis added), aside from Brooks et al.’s
(2013) text on fraud, corruption and sport which deploys a criminological perspective, there is not yet any published academic literature which applies any kind of criminological theoretical framework to understanding and explaining fraud and corruption in sport, not least GSOs, in the same way that has been done for corporations and businesses within the realm of critical criminology (Box, 1983, 1987; Braithwaite; 1984; Mars, 1982; Swartz, 1975). Yar (2014: 2) claims that whilst ‘criminology and allied disciplines are no strangers when it comes to sport…it’s study remains a rather marginal and somewhat neglected area’, this is affirmed by Jennings (2011: 1), who proposes that there is a ‘gap between the polished public face and the sordid reality’ of GSOs, which needs to be understood.

The gap, which both Yar (2014) and Jennings (2011) highlight, is likely due to a failure from academics, practitioners, and professionals alike in perceiving sport as being fundamentally the same as businesses organisationally, which means that when allegations of ‘wrong-doing’ emerge they are naively defended and/or downplayed as being ‘different’. Therefore, when the scale of the allegations of fraud and corruption are made public they have the potential to gravely damage the integrity of both the sport and the governing body, as was found recently in the case of FIFA in May 2015 (BBC, 2015a).

The second aim of this dissertation is to understand how and why the self-governance and self-regulation of GSOs is problematic, not least for facilitating fraud and corruption, but also for serving as barriers to academic researchers understanding what has been occurring, and continues to occur, within these organisations. In terms of the governance and regulation of sport, whilst GSOs are not a homogenous group, they do however, typically serve to direct, control and regulate sport through a system of organisational, or corporate, governance (Hoye and Cuskelly, 2007). As a result, they are themselves responsible for:

- ‘The creation and maintenance of the laws and rules of a sport and its competitions;
- The global development of a sport at all levels;
- The development and governance of the athletes within a sport;
- Arbitration and/or resolution of disputes within a sport;
- Holding of global events, such as world championships, within the sport;
- Maintenance of relationships with sporting bodies within a sport especially affiliated national associations within the sport;
- Maintenance of relationships with governments, regulatory authorities and those sporting bodies outside the sport; and
- Maintenance of relationships with commercial entities such as sponsors’.

(Forster, 2006, p.73)

1.3 Theoretical framework for analysis

In order to posit the study of fraud and corruption with a theoretical framework, in chapter six a criminological theoretical framework will be applied to explaining fraud and corruption within, and affiliated to, FIFA. Given that critical criminology has already sought to understand and explain crime and deviance of the powerful in the capitalist-driven business world (Box, 1983, 1987; Braithwaite; 1984; Mars, 1982; Swartz, 1975), this dissertation instead serves to demonstrate that powerful individuals within GSOs can act similarly to criminals and deviants in the worlds of business and politics, for example, in terms of financial mismanagement, money laundering, and evading punishment and reprimand.
As this dissertation focuses on gaining an insight into global sporting organisations, it is critical to understand the impact globalisation has had on facilitating fraud and corruption, and other forms of crime and deviance, in the governance of sport since the latter half of the twentieth century. In this post-modern condition, the boundaries between what is now typified as that of crime, and that of deviance, have become increasingly blurred (Hopkins Burke, 2014), as evident in the nature and extent of the kinds of activities affiliated with the notion of ‘white-collar crime’ (Sutherland, 1940):

‘Misrepresentation in financial statements of corporations, manipulation in the stock exchange, commercial bribery, bribery of public officials directly or indirectly in order to secure favourable contracts and legislation, misrepresentation in advertising and salesmanship, embezzlement and misapplication of funds, short weights and measures and misgrading of commodities, tax frauds, misapplication of funds in receiverships and bankruptcies’ (Sutherland, 1940, p.2-3).

1.4 Re-occurring themes

Throughout this dissertation three re-occurring themes will underpin analyses, particularly in chapters five and six, providing a further framework for analysis, these are:

1. The role of powerful individuals, collectively and individually, within and affiliated to, GSOs, a theme deriving from Sutherland’s (1947) differential association theory, which is posited within critical criminology;

2. ‘Chains of interdependence’ (Elias, 1994/2000) in forming deviant subcultures, and in facilitating and concealing high-level fraud and corruption (Adamoli et al., 1998);

3. The emergence of commercialisation as a catalyst for the occurrence of fraud and corruption (Paoli and Donati, 2014), and the implications this has not just for fraud and corruption, but also other crimes, such as human rights abuses including forced labour (Institute for Human Rights and Business, 2013).

1.5 Structure of the dissertation

The following chapter discusses the methodological trajectory of this dissertation, commencing with a rationale for conducting a library-based dissertation. Given that chapter five takes the form of a case study approach to exploring fraud and corruption within, and affiliated to, FIFA, the methodology chapter explores the strengths and weaknesses of utilising a multiple case study research design utilising secondary sources. The chapter concludes by critically appraising the methodological trajectory of this dissertation.

Chapter three, a taxonomy of fraud and corruption, seeks to fulfil three functions, firstly to disentangle conceptual confusion around what fraud and corruption is, as well as secondly, providing examples of what can typify fraud and corruption within the highest levels of the governance of sport. The chapter then concludes by highlighting the difficulties of estimating the extent of fraud and corruption given the difficulties of quantification.

Chapter four, the industrification of sport, is split into three sections and highlights the changes which have impacted sport and its governance since the late twentieth century and the corrupting consequences it has typically had on GSOs. As such, the chapter begins by looking at the influence of four key trends in society and sport since the 1900s before gauging the impact globalisation has had on sport. The chapter concludes by discussing the impact globalisation has had on the governance of sport specifically.
Chapter five, *FIFA’s death knell?*, employs a multiple case study research design highlighting cases past and present of fraud and corruption, within and associated with FIFA. However, before the chapter engages in any kind of in-depth analysis, the chapter commences with the history, origins and workings of FIFA. Three case studies then follow: the case of International Sport and Leisure (ISL), England’s failed 2018 World Cup bid, and, the Qatari World Cup 2022, before finishing on a discussion of current FIFA President Joseph ‘Sepp’ Blatter.

Chapter six, *applying a theoretical framework to explaining fraud and corruption within, and affiliated to, FIFA*, is the last substantial chapter before the conclusion. The main aim of this chapter is to add another level of analysis to the chapter previous by positing fraud and corruption on the spectrum of deviance. The chapter highlights the paucity of knowledge on ‘sports criminology’ (Groombridge, 2012), and thus attempts to make some headway in bridging the gap between sport and criminology by applying individual level criminological theories to Joseph ‘Sepp’ Blatter before shifting the discourse from a ‘bad apple’ to a ‘bad barrel’ (Wilson, 2015). The chapter concludes by looking at the future for critical criminology and highlights its need to pursue new directions to be able to better explain the zemiological harms of the neoliberal era (Hall and Winlow, 2015).

Chapter seven, *the final whistle*, concludes the dissertation by providing an overview of what has been discussed in the chapters previous to provide some comprehensive conclusions before looking at the potential future directions for the governance, and the study of, GSOs. The chapter, and the dissertation, finishes by exploring the potential for a PhD project following the completion of this dissertation.

2 **Methodology**

This chapter discusses the methodological approach of the dissertation, commencing with a rationale for conducting a library-based dissertation. Given that chapter five takes a case study approach to exploring fraud and corruption within, and affiliated to, FIFA this chapter explores the strengths and weaknesses of utilising a multiple case study research design of secondary sources before concluding by critically appraising the overall methodological trajectory this dissertation has taken.

2.1 **Rationale for conducting a library-based dissertation**

As succinctly stated by Oakley (1999: 247) ‘research methods are a matter of rational choice: it is the research question, or problem, which ought to dictate the method to be used’, by the researcher. By this merit, it is *rational*, or appropriate, that this dissertation takes the form of a library-based dissertation. Utilising an interpretivist epistemological position and a constructivist ontological perspective (Crowther Dowey and Fussey, 2013), analysis of ‘an existing data set with the aim of addressing a research question distinct from that for which the data set was originally collected’ (Hewson, 2006, p.274), is conducted in order for original and novel interpretations and conclusions to be generated.

In comparison to conducting primary research, the methods and the trajectory of this dissertation are rational, for multiple reasons, not least because:

‘While the more established areas of social inquiry have developed methods of research specifically suited to the situation in which their research is done, the sociology of sport has not yet reached this stage of development’ (Jonassohn, 1981, p.179).
However, the three main topic-specific reasons for conducting a library-based
dissertation emanate from those identified by Brooks et al. (2013) for the lack of research
into the study of fraud and corruption in sport, these being:

1. The difficulty in being able to empirically measure fraud and corruption
emanating from definitional issues;
2. Individuals within the sporting industry being unwilling to participate in primary
research, due to having a vested interest in protecting the image of their GSO
and the sport they represent;
3. Corrupt individuals equating to being a ‘hard to reach’ population to research,
and thus the recruitment of participants problematic.

These issues therefore made it unsuitable for primary research to be conducted for
the purpose of this dissertation. However, arguably the issues identified by Brooks et al.
(2013) are issues not delimited to student dissertations but also to experienced researchers
too, with many researchers viewing ‘sport as a hermetically sealed world of its own’
(Horne et al., 2013, xiv), resilient to being researched from the ‘outside’ world.

However, whilst there is a lack of primary research and literature into fraud and corruption
within sport, there is a wealth of literature, in particular textbooks, on the sociology of
sport and sport policy (Coakley and Dunning, 2000; Cashmore, 2010; Henry and Ko,
2014; Houlihan, 2008, Jarvie and Thornton, 2008), most of which dedicate chapters to
exploring the governance of sport and lex sportiva (sporting law), sport as a business, as
well as, the impact of globalisation and commercialisation on sport, all of which are
crucial topics to consult when understanding and investigating fraud and corruption in
GSOs. Likewise, there are nine journal collections associated with the sociology of sport
and sport policy covering such topics, which are important gateways in finding sources
in the process of conducting this dissertation: *International Review of the Sociology of
Sport, European Sport Management Journal, Sociology of Sport Journal, Journal of
Sport and Social Issues, Sport in Society, Sport, Education and Society: Cultures,
Commerce, Media and Politics, Leisure Studies, Society and Leisure, International
Journal of the History of Sport, Sport in History and Soccer in Society.*

As an aim of this dissertation is to apply a theoretical framework to the study of fraud and
corruption within GSOs the most comprehensive criminological text by Hopkins Burke
(2014) is consulted throughout as it continues to be the most contemporary criminological
theory text. In addition, the following journal collections are gateways to accessing
theoretically informed literature required for this dissertation, and thus accessed
accordingly: *Criminology, Critical Criminology, Theoretical Criminology, The British
Journal of Criminology, Criminology and Criminal Justice, European Journal of
Criminology, The Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology, Criminology & Public

2.2 **Case study analysis**

Chapter five utilises a multiple case study research design by drawing on secondary
sources. According to Keddie (2006), case study research is an investigation into current
social phenomenon using a variety of data sources, with the aim to ‘understand how the
subject operates or functions’ (Rutterford, 2012, p.119). FIFA has been chosen as the *case*
to undergo intense critical analysis as FIFA meet two of Yin’s (2014) types, or elements,
of case study, as it represents, or exemplifies, the broader category of GSOs as well as
having the ability to be able to be studied longitudinally through the retrieval and analysis
of archival sources dating back to 1904 when FIFA was established (FIFA, 2015d). As a
result, it is possible to assess how FIFA has been affected by the following key trends
throughout the past century: professionalisation, medicalisation, politicisation, and commercialisation (Paoli and Donati, 2014).

Indeed, even though Durkheim (1982) suggests that all social analysis is comparative, in line with Yin’s (2014) suggestion that a multiple case study research design is preferential to presenting a single case, a multiple case study research design is employed in chapter five, as the evidence put forward from multiple cases is more compelling, and allows for the proposition of more comprehensive conclusions. Given the methodological challenges of researching fraud and corruption, there is a litany of scholars who also approach the topics of fraud, corruption and governance through comparative analysis by employing multiple case study research designs too (Brooks et al., 2013; Forster, 2006; Henry and Ko, 2014; Hough, 2013; Tricker, 2012).

2.3 Critical appraisal of the methodological trajectory

Whilst this dissertation was always to take the form of a library-based dissertation, it was anticipated early on that Nottingham Trent University (NTU) may not have the wealth of resources required to complete this dissertation. Given that NTU does not teach any courses or modules on the sociology of sport, this would thus be reflected in the literature available. However, whilst it was found, and appreciated, that NTU does have a sufficient quantity of introductory texts on the sociology of sport, the library does not host a vast array of literature on the field required for this dissertation. Therefore, by recognising the potential issue early, an application was made, and approved, in December 2014 to the Society of College, National and University Libraries (SCONUL), for SCONUL Access in order to be able to borrow and use books and journals from other university libraries (SCONUL, 2015). The SCONUL scheme grants access to Loughborough University’s library, which was beneficial for this dissertation as the university is within close proximity and teaches extensively on the sociology of sport and thus have a wealth of texts available and subscribe to all of the relevant sport journals required.

The issue of a lack of texts was also overcome through the utilisation of NTU’s ‘Your Books, More Books’ pilot scheme which allows for the retrieval of the most recently published books which otherwise would not have been able to be accessed, even through the inter-library loan system. By recognising the benefits of SCONUL Access and the ‘Your Books, More Books’ scheme, as well as the more typical gateways to literature such as Google Scholar and Library OneSearch, a library-based dissertation was to be able to be conducted successfully enough to be critical of GSOs with reference to fraud, corruption and their governance.

However, it was unanticipated that on the 27th May 2015, the world would be greeted to media headlines, such as ‘FIFA Corruption Inquiries: Officials Arrested in Zurich’ (BBC, 2015a). Whilst the media revelations of May were to have profound ramifications for the trajectory of this dissertation, it also was for the availability of literature too, for two reasons. Firstly, whilst the study of fraud and corruption in GSOs was arguably limited prior to this point (Yar, 2014), FIFA became the topic of academic discussion and critical appraisal instantaneously due to the nature and extent of the allegations facing FIFA. For the first time criminology became concerned with explaining what was occurring within GSOs. Renowned criminologists such as Professor David Wilson (2015) began questioning ‘can criminological theory explain FIFA?’, whilst even stating ‘let me explain that I am not a football fan and so please do not think that I have some specialist sports-related knowledge’ (Wilson, 2015). With Wilson sparking criminological debate on FIFA, a wealth of literature was anticipated to emerge even by criminologists who had, prior to May 2015, not yet turned their academic attention to crime and deviance within sport, let alone GSOs.
On the contrary, prior to the watershed moment in the study of fraud and corruption in GSOs, the investigation into FIFA and the IOC in particular was predominately undertaken by investigative journalists, such as Andrew Jennings (Jennings, 1996, 2006, 2011, 2014; Jennings and Sambrook, 2000; Simson and Jennings, 1992), Clare Sambrook (Jennings and Sambrook, 2000), Heidi Blake and Jonathon Calvert (2015). Therefore, when the nature and extent of the allegations emerged around FIFA, investigative journalist Andrew Jennings, who had dedicated his life’s work to investigating corruption in FIFA and the IOC, placed an embargo on the retrieval of his work in order to ‘block parasites stealing my work for their articles and book proposals’ (Jennings, 2015). As a result, this withdrawal of a lot of quality publications were unable to be accessed for the duration of this dissertation.

In terms of utilising a multiple case study research design, as well as for the analysis of secondary sources in general, it was anticipated to be relatively time consuming for a solo researcher to undertake, due to the vast amounts of literature to be analysed, a criticism of conducting secondary-research acknowledged by Rutterford (2012). However, the timely nature of analysing secondary sources was counter-balanced by the strength of case study research, namely the ability to gain a critical understanding of individuals, events, social activities, groups, organisations, and institutions (Keddie, 2006), which was to be required to gain an in-depth understanding of the facilitators of fraud and corruption within FIFA. Therefore, the research methods utilised in this dissertation are rational, or appropriate, to the research problem (Oakley, 1999).

2.4 Chapter summary
In summary this chapter has found that:
- In line with Oakley’s (1999) line of argument on research methods it is rational, or appropriate, that this dissertation takes the methodological trajectory of a library-based dissertation as research methods are a matter of rational choice;
- FIFA is the most appropriate GSO to undergo intense critical analysis in chapter five as FIFA meet two of Yin’s (2014) types of case study being representative of the broader category of GSOs as well as having the ability to be able to be studied longitudinally given that FIFA was established in 1904 (FIFA, 2015d);
- Whilst the availability of literature was a concern, it was outweighed by FIFA’s governance being a current issue in the global media receiving the attention now it has warranted for decades for allegations of corruption (Edwards, 2015).

3 A taxonomy of fraud and corruption
According to Brooks et al. (2013: 21) fraud and corruption in sport is ‘a systematic problem (part of the structure and culture)’ of global sporting organisations (GSOs), by this merit the issues discussed in this chapter are intended to be representative of many GSOs. This chapter serves three chief functions, firstly to disentangle conceptual confusion around what fraud and corruption is, as well as also providing some examples of what typifies fraud and corruption at the highest level in the governance of sport. The chapter then concludes by highlighting the difficulties of estimating the extent of the problem, given the issue of quantification of fraud and corruption.

3.1 Defining fraud and corruption
Given that GSOs typically take the form of non-profit international non-governmental organisations (INGOs), FIFA and the IOC included (Chappelet, 2014), they are primarily tasked with governing their own organisation and sport, by this merit, GSOs such as FIFA
and the IOC are organisationally self-governing and self-regulating. However, paradoxically, GSOs are still under the legal jurisdiction of their respective headquarters with FIFA’s and the IOC’s headquarters being located in Switzerland (The IOC, 2015), they thus both govern under Swiss law. Therefore, what their constitution, statutes, and codes of ethics identify as fraud and corruption within their organisation may be antithetical to jurisdictional definitions, therefore making external policing of GSOs even more so problematic.

Even with the establishment of internal codes of conduct, externally fraud and corruption are often assumed to be synonymous and thus used interchangeably, as ‘fraud is part of corruption, but corruption will not necessarily entail fraud’ (Brooks et al., 2013, p.15). Therefore, it is unsurprising that fraud and corruption are conflicted with definitional issues irrespective of the GSO, country, jurisdiction or legal system in which they are defined. Whilst it is problematic to those tasked with maintaining the integrity of sport globally and the respective policing bodies, definitional loopholes are advantageous to those committing acts of fraud and corruption transnationally. As a result, those chiefly at the top hierarchically, the oligarchy, within GSOs, typically executive committees, whose governance is global, are likely to have the means to be able to export ‘illegal behaviour to where it is legal or at least where laws are not so rigorously enforced’ (Hopkins Burke, 2014, p.248). Exporting illegal behaviour can be facilitated by the fact that, for example whilst fraud is criminalised in some jurisdictions such as England and Wales (E&W) under the Fraud Act 2006 and in the United States under U.S. Code, 18 U.S.C §47 Fraud and False Statements, in France and Ireland there are no legal definitions of fraud (Brooks et al., 2013), therefore, there is scope for a kind of ‘crime tourism’. In 2010, there was a case of ‘crime tourism’ with regards to money laundering emerged, whereby FIFA Executive Committee (ExCo) members had been exploiting Liechtenstein’s ‘traditional status as a tax haven’ (BBC, 2015b) to filter money through Liechtensteinian companies to their own personal bank accounts (FIFA’s Dirty Secrets, 2010).

Definitions of fraud, both legal and non-legal, range extensively, most undercutting what it entails centring it on deception for financial gain (Spencer Pickett and Pickett, 2002; Gottschalk, 2010). Taking out the issue of legality, most definitions ignore the highly organised nature of how fraud and associated activities are facilitated and concealed, the platform where it’s conducted, and the non-financial motivations behind it. Therefore, the utilisation of a working definition for this dissertation is problematic, especially given the context of the globalised nature of the governance of sport in which it is to be discussed. As a result, instead of a working definition, elements which comprise fraud work better as a framework instead, these being: ‘deception with the intention of securing some advantage’ and ‘depriving a third party of honest services and benefits’ (Brooks et al., 2013, p.18).

Whilst fraud is jurisdictionally dichotomous in terms of its legality, corruption does not share this characteristic as the notion can contain illegal acts, for example bribery, as well as legal acts deemed unacceptable practices (Johnston, 2005). Therefore, in comparison with fraud, corruption is instead situated on the spectrum of deviance; given that collective syndromes of corruption emanate from initial individual acts of deviance (Wellen, 2004). Interestingly, however, most scholars metaphorise corruption with disease, suggesting that it slowly kills the moral fibre of an organisation and is associated with other kinds of organisational ills (Wolfensohn, 1996; Akindele, 2005; Giulianotti and Robertson, 2009). By this merit, corrupt organisations are perceived as breeding grounds for more malignant crimes of fraud and organised crime to flourish. Like fraud, corruption has a lack of ‘definitive and universalistic conceptualisation’ (Akindele, 2005,
Therefore, the definition of corruption is impinged with a lack of conceptual consensus, and thus definitions are often reductionist, centring it on an official receiving a financial incentive, or bribe, from a party with a vested interest in an outcome of a decision (Henning, 2001).

3.2 Examples of fraud and corruption in GSOs

Given the complexities in defining fraud and corruption, this issue is also reflected in the identification of what can be typified as fraud and that of corruption. As such this is not an issue de-limited to sport or indeed GSOs, however it is an issue identified by Brooks et al. (2013: 4) who state that ‘it is an area in need of specialist attention and research’.

As the purpose of this dissertation is not to categorically define what fraud and corruption is, but instead to illustrate that sport is a business and thus not immune to fraud and corruption, the following examples of fraud and corruption are not categorised as being indefinitely an example of fraud or corruption, and instead are to be understood as illustratory examples of fraud and corruption that occur within, and affiliated with, GSOs:

‘Bribery [inducements], collusion [secret arrangements], conflict of interest, embezzlement [theft], extortion [extraction through coercion], cronyism/nepotism [favouritism], fraud [deception], gifts and hospitality, lobbying [influencing in favour of an outcome], money-laundering [concealment of illegal and/or illegitimate funds], revolving door [exploiting connections in both public and private sectors], abuse of authority, trading in influence [returning favours], illegal disclosure of information and vote-rigging [controlling elections]’ (Brooks et al., 2013, Pp.5-7).

Whilst interestingly these examples draw parallels to those highlighted in chapter one as examples of white-collar crime, they support the notion that sport should be perceived as a business, and as such are as susceptible to fraud and corruption as businesses. This line of thought is supported by Transparency International (2009: 1) who state that ‘whenever there is money, competition or power involved, corruption is a constant threat. The sporting industry is not immune from this reality’.

3.3 The extent of fraud and corruption in GSOs

Quantification of fraud and corruption, across all sectors, not just in GSOs, is problematic for reasons highlighted in the two sections prior, which thus make it methodologically arduous to gauge the extent in any sector, but especially within GSOs. Given that in England and Wales (E&W), fraud is a criminal offence it should lend relatively easily to quantification, however the Office for National Statistics (ONS, 2015) claim that ‘the extent of fraud is difficult to measure because it is a deceptive crime’, whilst the National Statistician’s Review of Crime Statistics for E&W state that fraud is ‘one of the known significant gaps in the crime statistics’ (Government Statistical Service, 2011).

Given that measuring fraud is met with great difficulty, it is unsurprising that the issue of measurement is true of corruption whereby some aspects of corruption are illegal and others deemed more unacceptable practices (Johnston, 2005). Transparency International (2015) in particular claim that the issue of measurement surrounding corruption is due to its complex nature, and therefore ‘the scale of corruption is impossible to measure with complete accuracy’. By this merit, corruption in particular gives way only to be researched qualitatively through perceptions and experiences, although, they can then be quantified through the utilisation of indices primarily through survey method. Whilst international surveys of fraud and corruption cover perceptions mainly of the public and private sectors, as evidenced by the following, the absence of sport from these suggest the inability for the sporting sector to be perceived as a business: the Corruption

Nevertheless, there are few smaller surveys estimating fraud and corruption in sport more generally (Gorse and Chadwick, 2010, 2012; PKF, 2011; Transparency International, 2010), however, none have been done on fraud and corruption in the global governance of sport and thus GSOs are left relatively unscathed. However, the Global Accountability Report (GAR) on behalf of Think Tank ‘One World Trust’, conducts ‘an annual assessment of the capabilities of 30 of the world’s most powerful global organisations including intergovernmental (IGO), nongovernmental (NGO) and corporate sectors to be accountable’ (Lloyd et al., 2008, p.5), thus including GSOs. In 2008 the International Olympic Committee (IOC)\(^2\) was at the bottom of a table of ten international nongovernmental organisational (INGOs) (Lloyd et al., 2008), and in the report a year prior, FIFA assumed the same position (Lloyd et al., 2007). Whilst the aim of the GAR is simply ‘to examine the capabilities of global actors to be accountable’ (Lloyd et al., 2008, p.5), it is impossible to gauge the extent of fraud and corruption within these organisations. However, it is possible to state that given that the four dimensions used to measure accountability: ‘transparency, participation, evaluation, and complaints handling’ (One World Trust, 2015), led to both the IOC and FIFA assuming the bottom position for accountability, suggests that GSOs are highly susceptible to fraud and corruption. As evidenced by the IOC’s non-compliance in the research, it is of little wonder that:

‘Fraud, like all crime, and especially corruption, are nonetheless difficult to measure, and this is compounded by the fact the lack of interest and limitations that sporting bodies have in recognizing and then dealing with this problem’ (Brooks et al., 2013, p.30).

3.4 Chapter summary

In summary this chapter has found that:

- There is much conceptual confusion around what fraud and corruption is, not least academically, but legally too;
- The types of crime and deviance which typify fraud and corruption at the highest level in the governance of sport within, and associated with, GSOs draw parallels to those identified by Sutherland (1940) as examples of ‘white-collar crime’;
- Difficulties associated with estimating the extent of the problem of fraud and corruption within GSOs emanate from the issue of being unable to categorically quantify fraud and corruption.

4 The industrification of sport

This chapter, the industrification of sport, is split into three sections and seeks to highlight the changes which have impacted sport and its governance since the late twentieth century and the corrupting consequences they have typically had on global sporting organisations (GSOs). As such, this chapter begins by looking at the influence of four key trends in

\(^2\) The IOC was asterixed in the global accountability report as being non-compliant in the research process in 2008
society and sport since the 1900s before gauging the impact globalisation has had on sport since the turn of the twenty-first century. The section, and chapter, concludes by discussing the impact globalisation has had on the governance of sport.

4.1 The influence of key trends in sport and society
As identified by Paoli and Donati (2014) four broad overarching trends have affected sport in the past century, professionalisation, medicalisation, politicisation and commercialisation. According to Masters (2015: 111) each of Paolo and Donati’s trends have had a ‘corrupting effect on what is generally perceived as a past ‘golden age’ of sport’. Whilst Cashmore (2010) suggests that the professionalisation of baseball, in the 1850s, led to the first major corruption scandal in 1919 of the World Series as this dissertation focuses on management corruption at GSO level (Maennig, 2005) it is the politicisation and commercialisation of sport, which is of particular significance as those trends have contributed to corrupt practices such as host bribery, at the highest level in the governance of sport. Given that at stake this year, PwC (2011) projects that the entire ‘private sports market consisting of sponsorship, gate revenues, media rights and marketing, is to exceed USS141 billion’ (Masters, 2015, p.117), it is evident that there is an undeniable wealth of capital at the hands of those in charge of governing sport ready to be extorted, embezzled and laundered, a figure which has rose increasingly since the early 1990s with the embrace of globalisation (Houlihan, 2004).

4.2 The impact of the globalisation of sport
Since the turn of the twenty-first century advanced capitalist societies have been immersed into an era of globalisation, or high modernity (Giddens and Pierson, 1998), which ‘is most simply understood as the internationalisation of the market economy’ according to Cantelon and Murray (1993: 275). Globalisation has not only hurled the world into a ‘morally ambiguous postmodern condition’ (Hopkins Burke, 2014, p.410), but the effects of globalisation have been pervasive, especially in industrialising sport to become the profit-orientated business (Giulianotti, 2005) it is today. Globalisation indeed has changed elite sport through ‘the global flow of images, capital, people (whether spectators or athletes) and commodities’ (Giulianotti, 2005, p.183), leading to sport becoming both commercialised, and thus commodified. Interestingly, Anderson (2010: viii) states that ‘the law (and lawyers) became interested in sport only in the last quarter of the twentieth century owing to the intense commercialisation or ‘industrification’ of sport during that period’, this is related to the fact that sport was becoming to be ‘viewed as a branch of the entertainment industry’ (Duke, 2001, p.5), and with this comes exorbitant amounts of capital to be extorted.

Sociological principles associated with the process of globalisation, are now evident in the sector of sport, in which the industry is now bound by the principles of McDonaldization (efficiency, calculability, profitability and control) (Ritzer, 2015), as a result of ‘an intensifying rationalization and globalisation process’ (Duke, 2002, p.6). However, it is the dimension of [economic] efficiency, in McDonaldization, whereby quantifiable returns take precedence over quality which is of interest especially when considering stadium construction corruption (Transparency International, 2009), which is also associated with organised crimes such as modern day slavery, as is alleged the case in the construction of stadiums in Qatar ahead of the 2022 FIFA World Cup (Pattisson, 2013). Giulianotti (2005: 184) suggests that such evidence of corruption is symptomatic of ‘disorganised capitalism in sport’, and a manifestation of the ills of profit-orientation, or as Ritzer (2015) proposes the eBayization of the McDonaldization model, whereby the chief goal is profit, above all else.
Therefore, whilst it is often framed as commendable that FIFA President João Havelange (president: 1974-1998) had a significant role in doubling the number of teams in the World Cup by 16 to 32, thus ‘globalising football on-and-off the field’ (Cleland, 2015, p.55), one has to be skeptical about the motivations behind such pursuits. The globalisation of sport for the purposes of ‘peace’ and ‘development’ can be used as a smokescreen for expanding the political economy of sport through enticing transnational commercial sponsors (Cleland, 2015), evidencing a form of radical globalisation, or globalization (sic) (Ritzer, 2004). Globalization, in such respect, being the interest of seeing power, influence and profits grow exponentially (Giulianotti, 2005). The facilitation of sports mega-events, such as the FIFA World Cup and the Olympic Games, are also important elements in the showcase of a global, or global, society (Horne and Manzreither, 2006), and with this kind of politicisation and commercialisation of sports on the world stage, comes the susceptibility for the individuals tasked with the governance of such events, such as FIFA and the IOC, to engage in fraudulent and corrupt practices.

4.3 Sports governance and the corrupting power of money

Despite sports, and more specifically sport mega-events, having international economic, political and cultural significance (Horne and Manzenreiter, 2006), GSOs are ‘subject to very little state regulation, notably on the international level’ (Chappelet, 2014, p.63). Therefore, it is understandably contentious that ‘there is significant public expenditure globally on sport’ (Masters, 2015, p.117) at the hands of officials within GSOs, typically charged with the governance and regulation of sport. The concept of governance in relation to sport at this point can be described as ‘the overall system by which all the actors associated with delivering sport are controlled, coordinated and held accountable’ (Hoye, 2014, p.332) by their respective organisational body.

However, sports governance is not entirely hierarchically top-down, one of the key globalising trends is that there is no longer as such a hierarchy of governance, but instead more of a network of governance (Holt, 2009), as since the 1980s private profit-making actors such as multinational corporate sponsors and media organisations, have entered the industry to participate in, and/or finance the system (Chappelet, 2014; Chappelet and Kübler-Mabbott, 2008). According to Henry and Lee (2004: 27) this is a systemic form of governance which draw parallels to Castells’ theory of ‘the network society’ (Castells, 1996, 1997, 1998), whereby:

‘The old hierarchical model of the government of sport, the top-down system, has given way to a complex web of interrelationships between stakeholders in which different groups exert power in different ways and in different contexts by drawing on alliances with other stakeholders’.

However, there are also two other approaches to the governance of sport which are situated in the broader framework of systemic governance (Henry and Lee, 2004), corporate governance, which is the ‘ethical conduct of processes involved in the management and direction of the GSO in the sports business’ (Brooks et al., 2013, p.71), and political governance, ‘the processes by which governments or governing bodies seek to steer the sports “system” to achieve desired outcomes’ (Ibid). According to Masters (2015) systemic governance leads to sport occupying both the private market and the public sphere, and as such raises questions about the maintenance of legitimacy in particular (Hoye, 2014), especially given GSOs persistence in maintaining autonomy with regard to their public and private partners, and state willingness to only intervene and engage in the governance of sport for the promotion of ‘national interests’ on the world stage (Chappelet, 2014). Therefore, ‘the reality is the governance of sport organisations…will always be subject to the frailties of human nature and the motives of
those who may deliberately seek to abuse their privileged position’ (Hoye, 2014, p.334), unless they become more accountable and open to external regulation. The following chapter, FIFA’s death knell?, utilises a multiple case study research design, to illustrate various case studies of fraud and corruption within, and associated with, FIFA from the 1970’s to May of this year.

4.4 Chapter summary
In summary this chapter has found that:

- The politicisation and commercialisation of sport (Paoli and Donati, 2014) have facilitated the commission of corrupt practices such as host bribery, at the highest level in the governance of sport;
- Globalisation, or high modernity (Giddens and Pierson, 1998), has not only hurled the world into a ‘morally ambiguous postmodern condition’ (Hopkins Burke, 2014, p.410), but has been a significant driver in industrialising sport to becoming the profit-seeking business it is today;
- Whilst GSOs are typically charged with the self-governance and regulation of sport (Chappelet, 2014), the globalisation and commercialisation of sport has meant that there is now more of networks of governance as opposed to a hierarchies of governance (Holt, 2009).

5 FIFA’s death knell?
As stated in the methodology chapter, this chapter employs a multiple case study research design to highlight cases past and present of fraud and corruption, in and associated, with FIFA, as according to Yin (2014) a multiple case study design is preferential to presenting a single case as it allows for the proposition of more comprehensive conclusions and insights into the future directions for the governance of football.

5.1 The history, origins and workings of FIFA
‘England gave the world football. Then, 50 years later, some guy came along and said, you’re liars, and they actually stole it. It was called FIFA’
- Sir David Richards, Premier League Chairman (BBC, 2012b)

Fédération Internationale de Football Association (FIFA), founded in 1904 (FIFA, 2015d), has been governing world football for over a century succeeding British colonisation over the game at the turn of the twentieth century (Cleland, 2015). FIFA was founded by seven European traditional footballing nations (Tomlinson, 2014) and it is a testament to FIFA, and globalisation, that FIFA currently boasts a membership of 209 member associations3 (FIFA, 2015d). As a GSO, FIFA, according to Tomlinson (2014), in many respects is a simple body, comprising of the FIFA Executive Committee (ExCo) and a Congress, largely representative of both national football associations and continental federations, otherwise known as confederations.

As a GSO, FIFA’s mission drive is to ‘develop the game, touch the world, and build a better future’ (FIFA, 2015c), which is iterated in FIFA’s official slogan ‘For the game. For the world’ (FIFA, 2007), and evidenced through the delivery of the quadrennial FIFA World Cup, which on a socio-political level, is intended to aid the facilitation of peace

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3 ‘The 209 member associations are predominantly national associations of single nation states, with exceptions including the United Kingdom’s four “home” associations, Hong Kong since its absorption into mainland China, various territories or protectorates without autonomous nation state status, and contested states such as Palestine’ (Tomlinson, 2014, p.30).
and social development (Cleland, 2015). Sociologists such as Giulianotti and Robertson (2012) highlight that sports governing bodies such as FIFA, through the power of football, can promote a global society, through the promotion of societal ideals such as social justice, responsibility, cohesion and peace, thus contributing towards both personal and community development (Giulianotti, 2011). Tomlinson (2014: 9) claims that these ‘positive elements have been a factor in the capacity of FIFA to survive, reproduce itself and continue to prosper in spite of the revelations of corruption and malpractice’. Therefore, this chapter is not intended to disregard the commendable, positive elements FIFA has had on globalising football, in Africa and Asia (Tomlinson, 2014) especially, but to remain critical of the motivations behind these positive elements questioning whether they have been smokescreen for more sinister corrupt practices, by FIFA’s oligarchy, to occur on a global scale.

The group of individuals tasked with the governance and regulation of FIFA at the highest level is the Executive Committee (ExCo), a body consisting of the FIFA president, eight vice-presidents and fifteen appointed members by the confederations and association (FIFA, 2015a). The ExCo governs by the FIFA Statutes, which forms the governing body’s constitution, providing the lex sportiva (sports law) for the facilitation of world football and its governance (FIFA, 2015a). However, on a legislative level as the FIFA headquarters reside in Zürich, Switzerland, FIFA govern under the jurisdiction of Swiss law. According to Swiss Civil Code (2014: 210, emphasis added), legally, FIFA is an association with a ‘political, religious, scientific, cultural, charitable, social or other non-commercial purpose’, and by this merit FIFA is thus both a non-governmental and non-profit organisation (Transparency International, 2011), although as this chapter will demonstrate the latter is questionable as internally, FIFA’s integrity has been called into question by a series of monetary related scandals and allegations of corruption (Cleland, 2015).

5.2 The ramifications of transforming the political economy of football: The case of International Sport and Leisure (ISL)

João Havelange (president: 1974-1998; honorary president: 1998-2013) was the first FIFA president committed to changing the political economy of football (Cleland, 2015), given FIFA was approaching bankruptcy in the 1970s (Cashmore, 2002). Therefore, Havelange sought to pursue ‘a policy direction characterised by a commitment to globalise, democratise and commercialise the game’ (Darby, 2008b, p.259), which was to become a slippery slope for the integrity of FIFA. In order to transform the political economy of FIFA, Havelange was keen to exploit FIFA’s commercial potential with the assistance of Adidas owner Horst Dassler, through the establishment of a sponsorship programme in 1974, selling sponsorship rights to multinational corporations such as Coca-Cola (Slack, 2004). Jennings (2006: 20) regards the coke deal as crucial for the commodification of FIFA, claiming that:

‘Once Coca-Cola had signed up, everyone wanted a piece of the action’, from this point, Dassler ‘wanted sports federations to sign contracts that committed their teams to wear Adidas kit. He wanted individual stars to wear the three stripes. And he wanted the world to watch on television’.

Given Dassler’s assistance in establishing FIFA’s commercial potential, Havelange awarded International Sports and Leisure Marketing (ISL), a company set up by Dassler, the television and marketing rights to FIFA’s World Cup’s, including both stadium advertising rights and television contracts (Cashmore and Cleland, 2014), which would then be sold on to third parties. From 1992 up until 2000, a year before ISL was declared bankrupt in 2001 (Bond, 2013), financial investigations into ISL found that
bribes were paid by ISL to FIFA ExCo members to influence the procurement of media rights, particularly in South American territories (Bond, 2013; Cashmore and Cleland 2014). A FIFA ethics report (2013), dubbed The Garcia Report, into ‘the ISL case’, found that Havelange, as well as fellow FIFA ExCo member and son-in-law, Ricardo Teixeira, whom up until 2012 was President of the Brazilian Football Confederation (BBC, 2012a), accepted bribe money totaling £1 million GBP in connection with the exploitation of media rights, whereby payments were filtered through front companies to conceal the true recipient of the bribe (Eckert, 2013). However, the Garcia Report (2013) raises more questions than it answered. Firstly, the report has not been published publicly and instead only a condensed eight-page statement on the examination of the ISL case by the Chairman of the FIFA Adjudicatory Chamber, Hans-Joachim Eckert, is available (see Eckert, 2013), raising the question- what has been concealed? A question exacerbated by Eckert’s (2013: 8) reiteration that ‘the ISL case is concluded for the Ethics Committee’, ‘any further steps or suggestions are superfluous’ and ‘no further proceedings related to the ISL matter are warranted’. Likewise, ‘FIFA’s ethics report summary showcases a warped sense of integrity’ (Conn, 2014) and appears to be merely an attempt at window dressing by FIFA trying to appear accountable and transparent but instead raising more questions to be asked (Bond, 2013). Eckert makes brazen attempts to down-play the acceptance of bribes by those indicted in the report by calling attention to there being no FIFA Code of Ethics prior to 2004 and that it was not a criminal offence under Swiss law to accept bribe money at the time (Eckert, 2013). Given the language of Eckert in his statement in which he downplays the seriousness of FIFA officials taking bribe money, it is unsurprising that allegations of incidences of bribery surrounding FIFA were to emerge again.

5.3 Money-spinners in the business of football: England’s failed 2018 World Cup bid
As Cashmore and Cleland (2014) succinctly argue money and profit-margins take precedence over idealistic notions in sport, and indeed football, this is arguably a result of the professionalisation, medicalisation, politicisation and commercialisation of sport (Paoli and Donati, 2014). The politicisation and commercialisation of football has resulted in what Transparency International (2009: 1) describe as a ‘close-knit relationship between sporting officials, politicians, business people, sponsors and the media’, which creates a high risk context for corruption to occur. It is at this point it is important to remember that there are ‘chains of interdependency’ (Elias, 1994/2000) in engaging in deviant behaviour, facilitating and concealing high level fraud and corruption (Adamoli et al., 1998). To illustrate this, one only needs to look at England’s £21 million World Cup bid in 2010 which lost England the right to host the 2018 FIFA World Cup, to Russia (The Guardian, 2011), interestingly a day after the airing of the BBC’s Panorama programme ‘FIFA’s Dirty Secrets’ (2010).

England’s 2018 bid team consisted of a combination of business moguls such as Chief Executive of Tesco, Terry Leahy, politicians including Gerry Sutcliffe, then Minister for Sport and Tourism, as well as having royal accreditation from Prince William, among many other of England’s established great and good. England’s 2018 bid team highlighted football as England’s national sport, whilst being home to world class stadiums and host to other global sporting events such as Wimbledon, as well as having thirty million attendees at Premier League games in season 2009/10 (BBC, 2010). Therefore, England’s bid, should have been viable to secure more than two votes out of twenty-two from FIFA’s Executive Committee (ExCo). Not only the fact that England was knocked out in the first round of voting, but that Russia won the host rights regardless of the level of racism in Russian football (Rainsford, 2015) and homophobia in wider Russian society
(Luhn, 2013), raised questions of bribery and corruption in the bidding process (Hills, 2010).

Disclosed in a 2011 BBC Panorama programme, ‘FIFA: Football's Shame?’, Lord Triesman, former Chairman of England’s 2018 World Cup bid team, spoke before a British parliamentary inquiry into the governance of football in England and the failure to secure the right to host the 2018 World Cup (BBC, 2011). Lord Triesman accused four FIFA ExCo members of making improper demands to him in return for their support. Lord Triesman declared that Paraguayan Nicolas Leoz asked for a knighthood, Brazilian Ricardo Teixeira asked Lord Triesman “what can you do for me?”, with the implication being that he wanted something in return for his vote. Thai Worawi Makudi wanted the television rights for a match between England and Thailand, whilst Trinidadian Jack Warner wanted money for his legacy (BBC, 2011), all of which violate FIFA Code of Ethics, particularly article 20 (offering and accepting bribes and other benefits) and article 21 (bribery and corruption) (FIFA, 2012).

Interestingly however, ‘Triesman said the FA chose not to complain at the time for fear of jeopardising England’s bid’ (BBC, 2011), raising the question whether, had England not suffered humiliation in their first round exit, would England’s bid team Chairman of been willing to disregard the improprieties alleged by some of FIFA’s ExCo? Given that Andy Anson’s (bid Chief Executive of England 2018) response to the airing of the BBC’s ‘FIFA’s Dirty Secrets’ Panorama programme was that it was ‘unpatriotic of panorama to show the programme the day before the voting for the 2018 World Cup’ (FIFA: Football's Shame?, 2011), suggests that money takes precedence over integrity, especially when England’s 2018 bid video highlighted the economic benefits of hosting the World Cup, not shying away from boasting the prediction that fans would contribute £5 billion GBP to the British economy (BBC, 2010). At the same time, British government had already agreed to the following FIFA demands of bidding countries wishing to host the World Cup: visa rules to be quashed, workers’ rights suspended and new laws to protect FIFA’s official sponsors, including tax breaks for sponsors (BBC, 2010). As Cashmore (2010: 294) states ‘commercial organisations do not donate their money out of the goodness of their hearts, they do so to attract further business for themselves’, whilst Slack (1998) takes this argument further, claiming that that the commercialisation of football has had unprecedented benefits for commercial sponsors, but in turn has reduced benefits for the host nation’s economy.

5.4  From oil and gas to sport and tourism: The Qatari World Cup 2022

As was apparent in the previous case study on England’s 2018 failed World Cup bid, ‘no matter how technically excellent a bid may be or how persuasive the lobbying becomes, hard cash can buy crucial votes’ (Cashmore and Cleland, 2014, p.27), especially when hosting the World Cup is part of a thirty year strategy to turn the capital of Qatar, Doha, into a twenty-first century sport and tourism hub (Blake and Calvert, 2015). The fact that it was controversial that Russia won the right to host the 2018 FIFA World Cup, allegations of corruption were more so in abundance when the small gulf country Qatar was awarded the right to host the FIFA 2022 World Cup, ‘despite being unsuitable in almost every aspect’ (Cashmore and Cleland, 2014, p.27).

Whilst homosexuality is not statutorily illegal in Russia, it is in Qatar (Carroll and Itaborahy, 2015), not to mention that Qatar has ‘virtually no football tradition or infrastructure and searing summer temperatures of up to 50°C’ (Blake and Calvert, 2015). Therefore, it is unsurprising that allegations of host bribery against then billionaire President of the Asian Football Confederation (AFC) Mohammed bin Hammam were rife for buying votes from fellow FIFA ExCo members including the North and Central
Americas and Caribbean Federation (CONCACAF) President Jack Warner, among other FIFA ExCo members (Tomlinson, 2014). However, whilst the previous section focused on bid bribery, this section focuses on the criminal allegations against Qatar with regards to making the desert laden country Qatar feasible of hosting the World Cup ahead of 2022.

As discussed in the previous chapter, scholars have associated institutionally corrupt organisations as breeding grounds for more malignant crimes of fraud and organised crime to flourish (Akindele, 2005; Giulianotti and Robertson, 2009; Wolfensohn, 1996), including human rights abuses. Since Qatar was awarded the right to host the 2022 FIFA World Cup there have been allegations of ‘modern-day slavery’ (Weaver, 2015), with regards to the use of migrant labour in Qatar for the preparations, given that hosting major cultural events requires:

‘Significant investments in conference facilities, stadiums, hotels, health equipment and facilities, airports, roads, urban transportation, telecommunication, electric power, sanitation, and security infrastructure’ (The United Nations Office of Drugs and Crime, 2013, p.40).

According to the Institute for Human Rights and Business (2013: 11) in the short period ‘from June to August 2013, 44 Nepalese migrant workers reportedly died, many from workplace accidents or heart failure in intense heat, on building projects in the run up to Qatar 2022 World Cup’, with FIFA facilitating this by demanding that Qatar suspended workers’ rights and quashed visa rules (FIFA’s Dirty Secrets, 2010). As the World Cup is sponsored by multinational corporations, it is controversial that multinational corporations such as McDonalds, Sony, Coca-Cola, Visa, Adidas, Kia and Budweiser are neglecting their corporate social responsibility by continuing to sponsor the World Cup regardless (The Independent, 2015). By this merit, it could be suggested that the commercialisation and commodification of the FIFA World Cup are not only facilitators of corruption, but also of organised crime such as slavery as to date ‘1,400 migrant workers have died due to extreme weather and unsafe working conditions’ (The Independent, 2015) in Qatar.

5.5 FIFA’s ‘veteran schemer’ (Harris, 2003): Joseph ‘Sepp’ Blatter

‘I have committed some errors. If you work a lot you commit some errors. But I am not in corruption and I am not what you say, mismanagement’ (sic)

-Blatter (Newsnight, 2002)

Joseph ‘Sepp’ Blatter has been part of the FIFA family for over a third of a century (Tomlinson, 2014), starting his career as technical director (1975-1981), then later general secretary (1981-1998) for then FIFA President, João Havelange (FIFA, 2015e). During this period Blatter was described as ‘Havelange’s protégé’ (Tomlinson, 2014), before becoming Havelange’s presidential successor in 1998 (FIFA, 2015e), winning his fifth term as President on the 29th May 2015 (Gibson, 2015). Throughout his career at FIFA, Blatter has persistently ‘faced allegations of cronyism, corruption and financial mismanagement’ (Darby, 2008a, p.98) beginning with the International Sport and Leisure (ISL) scandal, with his conduct being branded as a ‘clumsy’ in the Garcia Report (Eckert, 2013, p.5), given that as a FIFA signator he ‘should have known over the years before the bankruptcy of ISL that ISL had made payments (bribes) to other FIFA officials’ (Eckert, 2013, p.4, original emphasis).

In May 2015 Adam Masters of the Transnational Research Institute on Corruption (TRIC) proclaimed that ‘2015 is a relatively quiet year for global sport’ (Masters, 2015, p.111), given that there are no global sports mega-events including any FIFA World Cups, Olympic Games or Commonwealth Games scheduled for this year. However, on the 27th
May 2015 FIFA made newspaper headlines globally (Edwards, 2015), it appeared 2015 was to become FIFA’s *annus horribilis* (‘horrible year’) (Tomlinson, 2014), especially for Blatter who was accused of running ‘a playground for the corrupt’ (Maradona, 2015). From the 27th May 2015, FIFA was engulfed with allegations of widespread corruption, with seven current FIFA ExCo members being arrested among seven other former FIFA ExCo members and associates (BBC, 2015a), for ‘corruption that is rampant, systemic, and deep-rooted both abroad and here in the United States’ (The United States Department of Justice, 2015). In a second criminal investigation, Swiss prosecutors commenced proceedings ‘against persons unknown on suspicion of criminal mismanagement and of money laundering in connection with the allocation of the 2018 and 2022 football World Cups’ (The Office of the Attorney General of Switzerland, 2015). In this second case, ten FIFA ExCo members who partook in the voting which resulted in Russia and Qatar winning hosting rights in 2010, for the 2018 and 2022 World Cup’s, respectively were being questioned (BBC, 2015a).

Whilst writing this chapter of case studies highlighting financial mismanagement, fraud and corruption at the highest level in the governance of football, it has been evident that Sepp Blatter has played a powerful role in FIFA over the past forty years, and has been involved in all of the most high profile scandals, yet interestingly has remained largely unscathed by allegations of corruption, until this year being pressured to resign as FIFA President just four days into his fifth term (Hafez et al., 2015). Most commendably throughout his presidency, Blatter has been responsible for introducing the FIFA Ethics Committee and the FIFA Code of Ethics in 2004 (Eckert, 2013), as well as in the same year awarding South Africa, the first African country, the right to host the World Cup in 2010 (Cleland, 2015). Whilst these were laudable at the time, it is now ironic that the three occurred in the same year, given that it has been recently alleged, in June of this year, that Morocco won the host rights before the votes were ‘rigged’ (Withnall, 2015). Therefore, it can be argued that, the establishment of the FIFA Ethics Committee and a Code of Ethics were merely window-dressing in an attempt by FIFA to appear both accountable and transparent, given that ‘its code of ethics could not be retrospectively applied ‘to facts that have arisen after it has come into force’ (article 2)’ (Tomlinson, 2014, p.37). As a result, those indicted by the ISL case, including Blatter, could not be retrospectively punished.

With regards to the 2018 and 2022 World Cups being granted to Russia and Qatar, respectively, they are not only both a source of great speculation as to whether the bidding processes were rigged in some way, but are also currently undergoing criminal investigation by Swiss prosecutors (The Office of the Attorney General of Switzerland, 2015). Blatter stated in 2008, before applications to host the 2022 World Cup in 2009 were even accepted, ‘we are going to bring the world cup to Qatar’ (Blake and Calvert, 2015, p.29) in exchange for bin Hammam’s personal loyalty to Blatter. Blatter then endorsed a Middle Eastern World Cup on several occasions before voting occurred (Rhys, 2010; Calvert and Blake, 2014), this is significant as, whilst President Blatter does not have a vote given his role as FIFA President, he remains influential over other ExCo members. Therefore, it is unsurprising that five years on it has emerged that Qatari football official Mohamed Bin Hammam is alleged to have made payments totalling £3 million GBP to FIFA officials in return for their support for the Qatari bid (Bond, 2014). Whilst, no such allegations have been asserted towards Russia to date, it is of interest that Russian President Vladimir Putin has become a staunch defender of Blatter and the FIFA ExCo with regards to the recent allegations of widespread corruption, claiming that ‘if there is anyone that deserves the Nobel Prize, it’s those people’ (Dearden, 2015). Therefore, it is of little wonder that Lord Triesman has accused FIFA of behaving like a
‘mafia family’, likening Blatter to Don Corleone in The Godfather (BBC, 2014). As it stands in 2015, it appears that FIFA’s death knell is imminent with Sugden (2002: 76) calling for FIFA needing to have its ‘foundations re-laid in democratic earth’.

This chapter has evidenced that FIFA, and particularly the FIFA ExCo, have ‘unprecedented reach, political clout and enormous worldwide social influence’ (Transparency International, 2011, p.2), which creates a high risk context for corruption to occur when ExCo members come into contact with politicians, business people, sponsors and the media (Transparency International, 2009) and thus the status quo is likely to remain even when Blatter abdicates. The following chapter seeks to understand whether criminological theory can explain the scandals, past and present, engulfing FIFA.

5.6 Chapter summary
In summary this chapter has found that:

- The expansion of FIFA under Havelange, to move away from its North European stronghold and be more inclusive of Africa and Asia, may have been a smokescreen for more sinister corrupt practices to occur on a global scale by those tasked with the governance and regulation of FIFA;
- João Havelange was the first FIFA President to ‘globalise, democratise and commercialise the game’ (Darby, 2008b, p.259), which became a slippery slope for the integrity of FIFA as evidenced by the ISL case;
- The commercialisation and commodification of the FIFA World Cup have been facilitators not only of corruption, but also of organised crime such as modern-day slavery;
- It has been evident that Sepp Blatter has played a powerful role within FIFA being involved in all of the most high profile scandals, yet interestingly has remained largely unscathed by allegations of corruption over the years until recently being pressured to resign as FIFA President (Hafez et al., 2015).

6 Applying a theoretical framework to explaining fraud and corruption within, and affiliated to, FIFA
Until May of this year, when the nature and extent of corruption allegations facing FIFA made global headlines (Edwards, 2015), no serious academic attention had been turned to applying a theoretical framework, criminological or otherwise, to the study of fraud and corruption within FIFA, or any other global sporting organisation (GSO). Historically, within the realm of critical criminology particularly, a plethora of research has been conducted into ‘white-collar’ crime, or simply put crimes of the powerful (Box, 1983, 1987; Braithwaite; 1984; Mars, 1982; Pearce, 1976; Sutherland, 1940; Swartz, 1975). However, sport has been neglected from criminological study, which is surprising given that Brooks et al. (2013: 4) argue that ‘sport is a business and as such it will countenance the same types of fraud and corruption everywhere’. Therefore, this chapter highlights that GSOs should not be excluded from the same level of analyses and scrutiny as multinational corporations, and thus engages with current theoretical debates in criminology by applying criminological theories to the study of fraud and corruption.
affiliated with FIFA, adding another level of analysis following on from the chapter previous.

6.1 Positing fraud and corruption on the spectrum of deviance
As chapter three highlighted the legality of fraud and corruption is dependent on the polity in which they are defined, for the purpose of this chapter they will be discussed in the context of being examples of deviance to get around this issue, however this is not devoid of problems. In order for this chapter to be fair it is important to state that the perception of deviance is polysemic, that it is subject to cultural interpretation (Hebidge, 1979). Given that the title of this dissertation situates the study of fraud and corruption in GSOs in a Western European and North American context this was purposefully done because the deviance theories applied in this chapter are posited within the European and North American contexts in which they originally emerged (Downes and Rock, 2011). Therefore, when this chapter discusses deviance, it is done so from a Western European and North American perspective.

6.2 Paucity within the discipline of criminology on ‘sports criminology’
Despite sport and criminology sharing some touchstone issues not least corruption, but also for example violence and security, the disciplines of sport and criminology have not to date engaged with each other theoretically or empirically (Kelly et al., 2016). However, criminology is starting to live up to its status as a ‘rendezvous subject’, a meeting place for ideas from a variation of disciplines to then be applied to the research ‘problem’ (Downes, 1988), with two inaugural texts being the first to explore the interface between sport and criminology set to be published in 2016 by Groombridge and Kelly et al., respectively. However, Professor David Wilson (2015) was the first to spark a public criminologically informed academic debate on sports governance questioning ‘can criminological theory explain FIFA?’ This provoked questioning of whether current theories of crime and deviance help, or indeed hinder, explaining fraud and corruption both at individual level as well as on a macro level.

6.3 Applying individual level criminological theories to Joseph ‘Sepp’ Blatter
Given that the last chapter found that the powerful current FIFA President Joseph ‘Sepp’ Blatter has been involved in all of the most high profile scandals, when looking at individual level theories, where applicable they shall be applied to Blatter. However, within this framework it is important to remember that when discussing FIFA members and associates that they are indeed rational actors with agency and choice. The theory of rational choice would therefore contend that individuals within, and affiliated to, GSOs make conscious and rational choices which they know equate to fraud and corruption, this line of argument stems from Becker’s (1968) early economist’s assumption that:

‘People will commit acts of deviance if the utility of doing so exceeds the utility of not doing so. Deviancy he argued was a matter of costs and benefits weighed by one contemplating whether to break the law’ (Downes and Rock, 2011, p.232).

By this merit, given that past scandals within FIFA have shown that FIFA ExCo members and associates have shown to believe that the utility of not adhering to the FIFA Code of Ethics, and indeed the law, exceeds the utility of doing so, Sykes and Matza (1957) would suggest that those whose behaviour deviates from adhering to the FIFA Code of Ethics employ ‘techniques of neutralisation’, especially Blatter who publicly makes light of the issues facing FIFA, neutralising the seriousness of the allegations. Tomlinson (2014: 74) claims that in 1998, ‘once in power, new FIFA President Blatter moved swiftly to neutralise his opponents and enemies’, this is what Sykes and Matza
(1957) refer to as ‘condemnation of the condemners’. Similarly, in 2002, Blatter stated ‘I have committed some errors. If you work a lot you commit some errors. But I am not in corruption and I am not what you say, mismanagement’ (sic) (Newsnight, 2002), thus evidencing the technique of neutralisation: ‘denial of injury’ (Sykes and Matza, 1957). In the same way, Cohen’s (2001) ‘states of denial’ can be applied to Blatter, as in 2010 when he was asked about the International Sport and Leisure (ISL) scandal which was closely linked to FIFA Executive Committee (ExCo) members, Blatter stated: ‘it is important to stress that no FIFA officials were accused of any criminal offence in these proceedings [referring to a Zug, Switzerland criminal court case involving the managers of ISL]’ (Jennings, 2010). Blatter was in ‘literal denial’ of any wrongdoing of his ExCo as well as not being prepared to accept that there was some form of skullduggery and malpractice at the highest level in the governance structure of FIFA. Goffman’s (1959/1990) conception of ‘the presentation of self’ can also be applied here, given that Blatter attempts to control how himself and FIFA are perceived, this was clear this year when prior to the FIFA presidential elections he remarked ‘my manifesto is the work I have done in the last years in FIFA. I am now 40 years in FIFA and I am 17 years the President of FIFA. This is my manifesto (sic)’ (Gibson, 2015). His statement alludes to his disregard to prior allegations of fraud and corruption by framing his time at FIFA as solely laudable. However, whilst Becker (1968), Sykes and Matza (1957), Cohen (2001) and Goffman (1959/1990) go some way to explain the scandals engulfing FIFA on an individual level, these individual level theories are ‘rather banal and unable to explain the sheer scale of the ‘backstage’ reality’ (Wilson, 2015). As the previous chapter evidenced, whilst Blatter has played a powerful role in FIFA over the past forty years, and has been involved in all of the most high profile scandals, it is important to remember that the scandals which have consumed FIFA since ISL’s bankruptcy in 2001 (Bond, 2013), have indicted a number of FIFA ExCo members, with the current May 2015 indictments involving a total of ‘47 charges related to an alleged bribery and kickback scheme’ (Henne, 2015, p.1). Therefore, in a proverbial sense, the problems of FIFA are bigger than a case of a few indicted bad apples, instead the problem is likely to be more the case of a bad barrel (Wilson, 2015).

6.4 Shifting the discourse from a ‘bad apple’ to a ‘bad barrel’

In order for a better understanding of the scale of corruption within FIFA, which has been deemed ‘rampant, systemic, and deep-rooted’ by The United States Department of Justice (2015), it is essential to see corruption as symptomatic of the power held by the ‘white-collar class’ (Sutherland, 1940). As Geiss and Goff (1983) note it was the theories which followed from Sutherland’s pioneering work of the time on ‘white-collar crime’ (Sutherland, 1940), that a body of work on differential association, anomie and deviant subculture traditions emerged in the United States (US). Today, these theories are more applicable to the case of FIFA in a period of what has been deemed ‘late modernity’ (Beck, 1992; Beck, Giddens and Lash, 1994; Giddens, 1990), whereby white-collar crime and deviance remain largely unpolicied. Wilson (2015) states that ‘political and legal systems are simply not geared up to exposing and regulating corruption in such high places’, in support of this Tombs and Whyte (2008), challengers of what crime is, what it isn’t and who gets to decide in the financial world, synthesise this issue as a ‘crisis of enforcement’.

In order to apply a theoretical framework to FIFA as an institution, it is critical to perceive FIFA as a ‘total institution’ (Goffman, 1961), Goffman’s (1961) conception of a ‘total institution’ emanates from his work on asylums which critiqued institutional life of various ‘deviant’ populations (Gillespie, 2010). Some scholars research into FIFA could be liked to Goffman’s (1961) study of asylums, Sugden and Tomlinson (2002) and
Sugden (2012) for example, claim that their research into FIFA as an organisation is part of their studies into deviant/criminal subcultures, by this merit it would not be unfair to describe FIFA as a ‘total institution’ (Goffman, 1961) as FIFA is studied as an institution with a deviant population and is studied in the same way that Goffman studied asylums in the 1950s.

Posited within the criminological discourse on ‘crimes of the powerful’ (Pearce, 1976) are differential association (Sutherland, 1947) and deviant subculture theories. Sutherland’s (1947) differential association theory supposes that deviant behaviour cannot be carried out or indeed performed in isolation as the theory understands deviant behaviour to be ‘learned in interaction with other people, especially in intimate personal settings, in a process of communication’ (Downes and Rock, 2011, p.66). Therefore, it is likely that individuals within FIFA’s ExCo learn corrupt and fraudulent practices from the powerful corporate individuals they do business with. Building on from Sutherland’s (1947) differential association theory, Elias (1994/2000) claims that there are ‘chains of interdependence’ in facilitating and concealing deviant behaviour. Therefore, given the secretive nature in which fraud and corruption occurs and is concealed, it is likely that they are performed as part of a deviant subculture (Adamoli et al., 1998). With regards to not only FIFA, but GSOs and the sporting industry more broadly, there is a ‘close-knit relationship between sporting officials, politicians, business people, sponsors and the media’ (Transparency International, 2009, p.1), creating a high risk context for the creation of a deviant subculture to emerge and for fraud and corruption to occur.

Perhaps the most significant criminological theory relevant to the study of GSOs, especially FIFA, is Messner and Rosenfeld’s (1994) institutional anomie theory, a reformulation of the earlier Mertonian anomie theory (Merton, 1938). It is not straightforward enough to apply Merton’s (1938) anomie theory to the indictment of FIFA’s ExCo and affiliates and say they use ‘alternative means [corruption, fraud, financial mismanagement etc.]…to gain access to socially created needs that they are unable to achieve through legitimate behaviour’ (Hopkins Burke, 2014, p.502). Instead, the prevalence of corruption within an organisation such as FIFA is likely to be symptomatic of a societal anomie culture whereby money and profit generation dominate all else (Messner and Rosenfeld, 1994) seeping into the world of sport. However, importantly the application of institutional anomie theory to the sporting world is not intended to indict GSOs, or even FIFA specifically, but instead propose that the culture of corruption is not something unique to FIFA’s governance structure, more significantly however symptomatic of the principles of free market capitalism and the pursuit of the ‘American Dream’ (Messner and Rosenfeld, 1994) percolating into the world of sport. As a result, the cultural value placed upon materialism leaves ‘an under-emphasis on moral values that can restrain the extreme materialism’ (Karen and Washington, 2015, p.420). This inability to restrain extreme materialism is especially challenging when there is a lack of and/or a weakness of external controls to curtail the organisational susceptibility for fraud and corruption to occur.

Social control theorists such as Reckless’ (1961) theory of inner and outer containment propose that deviance occurs as a result of an absence of containment, inner or outer containment, or both. In the section prior, on individual explanations of fraud and corruption, it could have been suggested there that it is an absence of inner containment, not knowing the difference between what is morally right and wrong, which has led to FIFA possessing morally ambiguous members to govern over world football. However, given that Jennings suggests that the scale of fraud and corruption in FIFA is ‘institutional’ (FIFA: Football’s Shame?, 2011), whilst Cashmore and Cleland (2014) deems the scale ‘endemic’, it would be more fitting to suggest that it is outer containment,
the absence or lack of enforcement of a ‘set of normative, group, organisational and societal controls, including those of the law’ (Lüschen, 2000, p.466), which has historically allowed fraud and corruption to flourish not only within FIFA, but other GSOs too, such as the International Olympic Committee (IOC) (Jennings, 2011). 

For reasons discussed in chapter three, this dissertation has focused on management corruption at GSO level as opposed to competition corruption (Maennig, 2005), however much academic attention has been paid to explain the rise of drug doping in sport (Hoberman, 2001; Waddington, 1999). It has been argued by Lüschen (2000) and Kistner (2012) that the prevalence of drug doping can be explained by the weakness of external controls, for example Kistner (2012) states that ‘not even the major and richest sports federations are yet seriously committed to controlling doping’ (Paoli and Donati, 2014, p.120). Given that this is the case for competition corruption (Maennig, 2015), it is not surprising that FIFA remains the self-governing and self-regulating organisation it is, not serious about tackling internal corruption, and resilient to external control. Nelen (2015: 300) synthesises the likelihood of future external control for FIFA and Switzerland’s stance on external control for FIFA, stating:

‘It seems debatable whether external pressure can outweigh the strong self-regulated internal organisation of FIFA. Switzerland does not seem to be very keen on bringing legal proceedings to fight and contain corruption within FIFA’.

Therefore for FIFA, and the study of fraud and corruption within FIFA, the status quo is likely to remain unless major meaningful, external, independent reforms occur to systematically propel FIFA into democratic earth like Sugden (2002) calls for. However, realistically FIFA is not an abstract organisation, it is important to remember that FIFA is situated on democratic earth and thus is impacted by broader macro-level conditions as the section on institutional anomie theory sought to demonstrate. Therefore, when one discusses reforms to FIFA, one is really only seeking to treat the symptoms of disorganised capitalism (Giulianotti, 2005), this is affirmed by Cashmore (2010: 506) who states that ‘it would be too simple to interpret the whole saga of corruption as the product of human avarice and overweening power. Greed has certainly been a factor, but the conditions which the greed has fed must be noted’.

6.5 New directions for critical criminology

Whilst this chapter has sought to posit the study of fraud and corruption in FIFA within a theoretical framework with broadly critical criminological underpinnings, given that the critical criminological school of thought emerged back in the 1960s (Hopkins Burke, 2014; Yar, 2012) it is timely that ‘western criminology needs to begin working towards a new theoretical framework which provides an enhanced explanatory capability fit for purpose in today’s rapidly changing world’ (Hall and Winlow, 2015, p.1), and as such take critical criminology in new directions. In its most synthesised form, the major intellectual flaw with current critical criminology, is its traditional structural-idealist position making ‘the structural model of power too crude for criminological application’ (Hall and Winlow, 2015, p.40). In this dissertation, it was highlighted in chapter four that sports governance is not entirely hierarchically top-down but instead there is a network of governance (Holt, 2009), as the school of critical criminology currently stands it is too simplistic to explain what is currently occurring within FIFA. 

During the last few decades traditional capitalist democracies in Western Europe and North America have been propelled into a stage of advanced capitalism and with this comes cyclical changes, not only fiscally, but criminally too (Beramendi et al., 2015; Rosenfeld and Messner, 2012). For example, Tseloni et al. (2010) claim that across Europe, North America and Australia crime rates, with the exception of burglary, have
fell by roughly the same rate. However, quantitative criminologists need to be careful when doing solely statistical analyses to come to the conclusion that there has been an ‘international crime drop’ when using reported statistics from the International Crime Victims Survey (ICVS), given that as chapter three highlighted there is an absence of crime within sport from the ICVS. Hall and Winlow (2015: 1) also find that:

‘This ‘crime decline’ is a misleading concept. it applies only to specific regions and nations, and remains trapped in the empirical realm of one-dimensional legally constructed definitions of crime that ignore a huge dark figure of ill-defined, systematically ignored, misperceived, non-criminalised, unreported and unrecorded harms’.

Therefore, criminology as a discipline should not be complacent with this alleged ‘international crime drop’ and should instead be seeking to propel the discipline forward expanding the zemiological study of harm to encapsulate and explain harms in the neoliberal era.

Hall and Winlow in particular advocate for criminology’s need to start ‘carefully revising a core set of harms that should constitute the disciplines major foci in the future’ (Hall and Winlow, 2015, p.89). As a result, this should in turn be the catalyst for more theoretically informed criminological research in the future which can then be applied to explain the nature and extent of fraud and corruption within GSOs such as FIFA, thus filling the paucity of knowledge in ‘sports criminology’ (Groombridge, 2012). The following chapter concludes the dissertation as well as discussing future directions not only for FIFA, but also for the governance and study of GSOs more broadly.

6.6 Chapter summary

In summary this chapter has found that:

- Until May of this year no serious academic attention had been turned to applying a theoretical framework, criminological or otherwise, to the study of fraud and corruption within FIFA, or any other GSO;
- Despite sport and criminology sharing some touchstone issues not least corruption, the disciplines of sport and criminology have not to date engaged with each other theoretically or empirically (Kelly et al., 2016);
- Whilst Becker (1968), Sykes and Matza (1957), Cohen (2001) and Goffman (1959/1990) go some way to explain the scandals engulfing FIFA on an individual level, such theories are ‘rather banal and unable to explain the sheer scale of the ‘backstage’ reality’ (Wilson, 2015);
- By perceiving FIFA as a ‘total institution’ (Goffman, 1961) with an institutionally deviant population, theorists such as Sutherland (1947), Elias (1994/2000), Adamoli et al. (1998), Messner and Rosenfeld (1994), and, Reckless (1961) are better at explaining fraud and corruption on a more macro-level scale;
- Criminology as a discipline should not be complacent with the ‘international crime drop’ and should instead be seeking to propel the discipline forward to be able to be better at explaining harms in today’s neoliberal era (Hall and Winlow, 2015).
7 The final whistle: conclusion and potential future directions for the governance, and the study of, GSOs

Chapter seven, The final whistle, concludes the dissertation, providing comprehensive conclusions and critical insights into the future directions not only for the governance of FIFA, but also for the governance, and the study of, global sporting organisations (GSOs) more generally, as well advocating for the potential of this dissertation to be a platform for taking the study of fraud and corruption within GSOs further.

7.1 Reiteration of the aims and themes underpinning this dissertation

In order to gain a critical insight into fraud and corruption in GSOs a set of aims and themes set the trajectory for this dissertation and thus underpin the conclusions to follow:

- To take a social-scientific approach to understanding and explaining fraud and corruption within GSOs, applying a criminological theoretical framework to understanding fraud and corruption in sport; and
- To understand the problematic nature of the facilitators of fraud and corruption, such as the commercialisation of sport, but also the more organisational facilitators such as the self-regulating and self-governing nature of GSOs.

Likewise, in order to understand and explain fraud and corruption within, and affiliated to, GSOs three re-occurring themes ran through analyses within this dissertation:

1. The role of powerful individuals, collectively and individually, within and affiliated to, GSOs, a theme deriving from Sutherland’s (1947) differential association theory, which is posited within critical criminology;
2. ‘Chains of interdependence’ (Elias, 1994/2000) in forming deviant subcultures, and in facilitating and concealing high-level fraud and corruption (Adamoli et al., 1998);
4. The emergence of commercialisation as a catalyst for the occurrence of fraud and corruption (Paoli and Donati, 2014), and the implications this has not just for fraud and corruption, but also other crimes, such as human rights abuses including forced labour (Institute for Human Rights and Business, 2013).

7.2 Conclusions

Reinforcing the methodological problems highlighted in chapter two for the historical ‘lack of research into the level of fraud and corruption in sport’ (Brooks et al., 2013, p.44), chapter three, a taxonomy of fraud and corruption, found three, interrelated, conclusions to be true. Through analysing legal and academic definitions of fraud and corruption it is clear that there is conceptual confusion around what the notions of fraud and corruption entail, academically as well as legally. Therefore, there are also difficulties with estimating the extent of fraud and corruption within GSOs as a result of being systematically unable to categorically quantify what constitutes to that of fraud and corruption. However, given that the types of crime and deviance which were typified as examples of fraud and corruption in sport (Brooks et al., 2013) draw significant parallels to those identified by Sutherland (1940) as examples of ‘white-collar crime’, they should therefore be able to be studied in relatively the same way as businesses, although historically have not.

Chapter four, the industrification of sport, found that it has been the politicisation and commercialisation of sport (Paoli and Donati, 2014) which have been the significant drivers in industrialising sport to becoming the profit-seeking business it is today, which has led to corrupt practices such as host bribery. In terms of the governance structures of GSOs, globalisation has also meant that the external policing of fraud and corruption is
now more difficult, verging on impossible, as a result of there being now more networks of governance as opposed to traditional hierarchies (Holt, 2009). The case study chapter, *FIFA’s death knell?*, found that Havelange’s pursuit to ‘globalise, democratise and commercialise the game’ (Darby, 2008b, p.259) since his inauguration as FIFA President in 1974 was a slippery slope for the integrity of FIFA, as evidenced by the ISL scandal at the turn of the 21st century. Allegations of bribery and corruption in the bidding process have been rife ever since not least when in 2010 Russia won the host rights to the 2018 World Cup (Hills, 2010), suggesting the purchase of votes from FIFA ExCo members. The case study on the Qatari 2022 World Cup came to a similar conclusion but served more to highlight the commercialisation and commodification of the World Cup being facilitators not only of host bribery, but also of organised crime such as modern-day slavery (The Independent, 2015; Weaver, 2015). Underpinning all of the case studies discussed however was the most powerful individual within FIFA, Joseph ‘Sepp’ Blatter, having being involved in all of the most high profile scandals Blatter it is interesting that he has historically remained largely unscathed by allegations of corruption throughout his tenure.

By applying a theoretical framework to explaining fraud and corruption within, and affiliated to, FIFA, chapter six found that whilst individual-level theories such as rational choice theory (Becker, 1968), techniques of neutralisation (Sykes and Matza, 1957), and Cohen’s (2001) states of denial go some way to explain scandals on a one-by-one basis, they do not appreciate the *scale* of the scandals, current and historical, engulfing FIFA. It is, therefore, more realistic and pragmatic to perceive FIFA as a ‘total institution’ (Goffman, 1961) with an institutionally deviant population, making theories such as differential association (Sutherland, 1947), institutional anomie (Messner and Rosenfeld, 1994), and social control (Reckless, 1961) more applicable to explaining fraud and corruption on a macro-level scale. The final conclusion to be drawn from the chapter, and which leads into the future directions part of this chapter, is that criminologists should not be complacent with the rather reductionist ‘international crime drop’ proposed by Tseloni et al. (2010) and should instead, like Hall and Winlow (2015) be advocating for the expansion of the zemiological study of harm to encapsulate and explain harms in the neoliberal era, by seeking to propel criminology forward.

### 7.3 Future directions for the governance of GSOs

As chapter four found the governance of GSOs has been adversely affected by globalisation creating networks of governance (Holt, 2009), these modes of governance according to Henn (2015) have distinct hybrid arrangements, with capitalist underpinnings, which in turn complicate the task of transparency. The solution to fraud and corruption being laced in the governance structures of global sport is therefore not going to be as simple as to purge the bad apples and overthrow the president. As chapter six demonstrated with Messner and Rosenfeld’s (1994) institutional anomie theory, the prevalence of corruption within GSOs is symptomatic of a *societal* anomic culture whereby money and profit generation dominate all else. Therefore, the status quo within GSOs is likely to remain, continuing to attract criticism from the media and academics when feeble attempts to introduce codes of ethics, ethics committees and taskforces for ‘reform’ do little other than to window-dress major organisational problems. Masters (2015: 121) synthesises the issue of corruption within GSOs as being ‘as cyclical as the major events themselves’. Karen and Waddington (2015: 420) propose that ‘the theory [institutional anomie] highlights the need to strengthen the institutions of family, religion, education, and the media as counter-balancing constraints on economic materialism’.
However, this recommendation is met by numerous pragmatic issues, and is unlikely to bring about any real change within society, not least sport. With regards to FIFA specifically, on the 26th February 2016 a new FIFA President will be elected (FIFA, 2015), with UEFA (Union of European Football Associations) President, French national, Michel Platini being favourite to succeed Blatter (The Guardian, 2015). However critics such as Dan Hough suggest that Platini is a candidate for continuity not change (Hough, 2015). Given that Platini voted for the 2022 World Cup to be hosted by Qatar as well as facilitating the Qatari takeover of Paris Saint-Germain (PSG) football club in May 2011, leading to his son, Laurent, being offered the role of Chief Executive of Burrda, the Qatari owned sports clothing company (Conn, 2013), evidence shows that the status quo is likely to remain given that Tomlinson (2014: 47) claims that GSOs are ‘shaped and directed by the nature of its leadership’. Likewise, in the wake of the May 2015 FIFA scandal (BBC, 2015a) and Blatter stepping down as FIFA President (Hafez et al., 2015), on the 20th July 2015, in a meeting of the FIFA Executive Committee, in a bid for ‘better governance and greater accountability’ (FIFA, 2015b) the decision to set up a specific FIFA Task Force ‘Reforms’ was announced with the following reform topics proposed:

‘Enhanced centralised integrity checks for Executive Committee members, the introduction of term limits, higher standards of governance at all levels of football structures including confederations and member associations, as well as individual disclosure of compensation’ (FIFA, 2015b).

However, taking the first proposed reform topic of ‘enhanced centralised integrity checks’ is a likely flawed ‘solution’ given that such integrity checks have failed in preventing the recruitment of ‘corrupt’ individuals in other institutionally corrupt organisations such as the police (Sced, 2004; College of Policing, 2015). Given that on the 11th August 2015, François Carrard, former IOC Director-General, was hired to lead the FIFA Task Force ‘Reforms’ (BBC Sport, 2015), the status quo at FIFA is likely to remain, given Carrard’s family and social ties to the owner of Parmigiani watches, a company involved in a 2014 FIFA ethics inquiry, after the distribution of Parmigiani watches by the Brazilian Football Association in gift bags to a number of FIFA officials at the start of the Brazilian World Cup in 2014 in São Paulo (FIFA, 2014). Interestingly, even Platini, the candidate dubbed FIFA’s next President, a receiver of a Parmigiani watch, said ‘he would prefer not to send back his watch because it was not in his nature to refuse gifts’ (Gibson, 2014).

Brazilian footballer, Pelé, once described football as ‘o jogo bonito’ (‘the beautiful game’) during the zenith of his footballing career between the 1950s and 1970s (Pelé et al., 2007), interestingly this was before Havelange took presidency over FIFA in 1974 and sought to change the political economy of football (Cleland, 2015). Today, 41 years on from Havelange taking the reins of FIFA and global football, the days of o jogo bonito have long gone and it seems ‘the ugly game’ (Blake and Calvert, 2015) is here to stay.

7.4 Future directions for the study of GSOs

With reference to FIFA particularly, but not delimited to other GSOs, the inability to study fraud and corruption within the governance structures of global sport is likely to remain, given that sport and its governance is ‘a hermetically sealed world of its own’ (Horne et al., 2013, xiv), resilient to being researched from the ‘outside’ world, for the reasons Brooks et al. (2013) identified for the lack of research into the study of fraud and corruption in GSOs, these being:

1. The difficulty in being able to empirically measure fraud and corruption emanating from definitional issues;
2. Individuals within the sporting industry being unwilling to participate in primary research due to having a vested interest in protecting the image of their GSO and the sport they represent; and  
3. Corrupt individuals equate to being a ‘hard to reach’ population to research, and thus the recruitment of participants problematic.

Realistically, GSOs such as FIFA will not be opening their headquarters any time soon to be studied by academics, and given that sports and politics are inherently entwined (Brooks et al., 2013) GSOs are unlikely to succumb to any external pressure from politicians to accommodate researchers. As a result it is likely to remain only feasible for researchers to use secondary sources when trying to understand and explain what is occurring within GSOs and remain skeptical of GSOs such as FIFA, resilience to undergo international, independent, and external investigations, as called for by Swiss MP and former-ISL insider Roland Buechel (FIFA’s Dirty Secrets, 2010). Therefore, it is likely to be left to investigative journalists such as Andrew Jennings to ‘dig the dirt’ on GSOs such as FIFA and the IOC.

7.5 PhD proposal
As chapter six highlighted, there is to date a shortage of sports criminologists within the academic disciplines of both criminology and sport. From the onset of writing this dissertation, it was evident from both a personal and professional perspective, that the benefits of expanding this dissertation into a PhD project would be profound. In order to protect the integrity of GSOs, and indeed the sports in which they govern, a PhD project on fraud and corruption posited within the context of crime prevention following on from the preliminary work done by Iyer and Samociuk (2006) and Krambia-Kapardis (2016), could have profound ramifications for offering practical solutions to the prevention of fraud and corruption, within GSOs specifically. Through the utilisation of an evidence-based, micro and macro analysis of fraud and corruption risk and protective factors, effective fraud and corruption prevention policies and practices could be formed and in turn be provided to GSOs for implementation. Therefore, an empirical based PhD into the aetiology of fraud and corruption prevention in GSOs would ideally demonstrate how a holistic approach to the prevention of fraud and corruption within GSOs could in the future reduce the incidences of fraud and corruption.

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