THE ARAB SPRING:
THE RISE OF HUMAN SECURITY AND THE FALL OF DICTATORSHIP

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Abstract

This work was conducted to determine the impact of human security concerns within security policies of, the dictatorships of Tunisia, Egypt and Libya upon the Arab Spring and the fall of the regimes in the region of Northern Africa in 2011-12. Academic literature tells us that the concept of security is changing from a state focussed realist concept in the colonial period to a human focused paradigm in the post-colonial period; and, although it discusses the threats posed to the moral values of an abstract ‘international community’ through human security issues such as poverty or human rights abuses, it does little to discuss the importance of the human security on stability of state institutions. Discussion of this change aids an exploration of realist security policies adopted by Tunisian, Egyptian and Libyan authorities during the 20th century post-colonial state-building period. What emerges from this is a discussion of how an ignorance of human security within continually realist security policies eventually led to the downfall of the dictatorial regimes when the legitimacy of those regimes was challenged by a changing international political and economic situation. This work shows that an analysis of media coverage, political statements, academic and NGO reports reveals negative citizen-state relationship where the regimes’ frequent human rights abuses damaged the human security of the general population, leading to the citizens rebelling and ultimately overthrowing the regimes. The work therefore concludes that a state’s recognition of human security is of paramount importance in ensuring its own legitimacy and state security.

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Introduction

Beginning in 2010, it was a period of unexpected political upheaval, social unrest, protests and demonstrations that rapidly spread across the Arab world, bringing a revolutionary spirit of political change that came to be known as ‘the Arab spring’. The rallying cry for many protesters and rebels across the Middle East and North Africa: *Ash-sha'ab yurid isqat an-nizam!* – "The people want the fall of the regime" (Abouzeid, R. 2011), has for some been realised with the dictators who shall be the focus of this work, Ben-Ali in Tunisia, Mubarak in Egypt and Gaddafi in Libya, being removed from power.

Various attempts have been made to explain the phenomenon of so many states facing revolution in such a concentrated geographical area within a short period of time, comparable only to the fall of the communist regimes in Eastern Europe in 1989. For example Anderson (2011:3) suggests, ‘The timing of the popular revolts – so sudden and almost simultaneous – suggests that the similarities these autocracies shared, from their aging leaders and corrupt and ineffectual governments to their educated, unemployed, and disaffected youth, were sufficient to explain the wave of revolutions’. What this explanation omits to identify is what could be considered to most prominent similarity; these states have been described as ‘sultanistic’ dictatorships which have ‘no purpose apart from maintaining the leader's personal authority’. They were regimes in which the ‘leader of a country has managed to gain control of all the levers of state power’, where ‘no one has any secure rights, and the leader rules with absolute authority’ (Goldstone cited in Freeland, 2011). As such it is important to explore how the policies employed to maintain state, and by extension regime security, contributed to the popular revolutions and downfall of three dictators. The concept of security at a national and international level is changing, with its focus shifting from state security to the emerging concept of ‘human security’. The security of the individual has always been under contest from various age old violent and non-violent threats: hate crime, disease, natural disasters, poverty, human rights abuses. But the new idea of human security is not simply to re-instate that fact but to fundamentally change the priority of collectives’ security, and de-organised it around prioritising the security of the individual, even if that clashes with the priorities of traditional state security. As Axworthy (2001:20) states, ‘Human security today puts people first and recognises that their safety is integral to the promotion and maintenance of international security’.

Focussing on the cases of the Tunisia, Egypt and Libya’s revolutions of 2010/2011, this work explores how the human security concept is better suited to explain the initiation of the Arab Spring and the eventual downfall of the regimes than the state security concerns of the regimes developed along traditional realist paradigm. It will first discuss how human security has emerged more recently on the basis of a rising human centred political thinking, starting with the adoption of an international human rights regime since the end of the Cold War and finishing with the challenge the traditional security thinking and associated state sovereignty. This is followed by an exploration of the development of the states security policies in Tunisia, Egypt and Libya with a focus on their similar colonial history and state-building in the post-colonial period in which their dictatorships emerged. The third chapter identifies
similarities in the academic, journalistic and eye-witness accounts of the uprisings in those three states and their context, i.e. their individual social, economical and political situation prior to the uprisings. This is done with the intention of drawing a general conclusion as to extent to which human security issues played a role in the Arab Spring.

The analysis in this work is based on data from secondary sources such as governmental and non-governmental organisation (NGO) reports, newspaper and other journalistic articles as well as academic publications. The main benefit of conducting a research based on secondary sources for this work is that the events surrounding the Arab Spring have enjoyed wide media coverage and official debates and there is an abundance of up-to-date information, the quality and reliability of which exceeds what one could achieve through conducting primary research. Also, given the international scale of the Arab Spring, primary research would be unfeasible due to the time and monetary constraints of carrying out such research in the referent states – a problem that can be avoided by conducting secondary research (McQueen & Knussen, 2002:15). There are however a number of disadvantages to using secondary material. For example, journalistic material follows a formula of saleability and so is likely to be subjective and focus on certain aspects of the Arab Spring, such as violence, whilst ignoring less ‘newsworthy’ issues (Cotter, 2010:56) which decreases the validity of the information (Brighton & Foy, 2007). However, a certain degree of validity will be ensured by the method of ‘triangulation’, or supporting the journalistic accounts with the other sources described (Gorard & Taylor, 2004:43). As these were popular revolutions, led from below, accounts from the media and non-governmental organisation (NGO) reports can explain the immediate causes, i.e. popular dissatisfaction, and although there may be other factors that contributed to this dissatisfaction it is beyond the focus of this work to discuss them.
Chapter 1- Literature Review

An analysis of the relationship between the rise of human security and the fall of dictator regimes must start with a discussion of key dilemma inherent in the idea of security, or the prioritisation of the security of the individual versus the security of the collective. The contradiction between the two is clearly expressed in the opposition between the human security idea and the traditional concept of state or national security. This chapter charts the development of the discipline of security studies through the analysis of its dominant theoretical perspectives in order to assess the growing prominence and influence of human security issues.

Walt (1991:213) traces the birth of security studies to the period prior to World War II when the discussion of strategic and military affairs was ‘primarily limited’ to the interest of the professional military and scholarly study ‘on military issues was confined to military and diplomatic history’. However, the horrifying human costs of World War I (WWI) and the subsequent analysis of its causes pointing at a disconnection between politics and the military led to the development of the opinion that ‘war was too important to be left to the generals’, paving the way for extensive civilian discussion and involvement in military planning during World War II (WWII) (Walt, 1991:214). Wider participation led to the establishment of a framework consisting of four questions from which Buzan and Lene (2009:10) suggest all discussion and debate of the topic of security, particularly international security, has been based upon since the late 1940s. This framework consists of the following questions: should the state be the referent object; should possible threats include internal as well as external sources; should security expand beyond the military sector and the use of force and finally should security be inextricably tied to a dynamic of threats, dangers and urgency?

As a product of civilian participation and development in military and strategic discussion, it is not surprising that the concept of security has focussed on the security of the state, i.e. national/state security. Buzan, Waever and de Wilde (1998) point out that while the word security itself is old, only during the mid-1940s did the concept of security come to prominence. During this period, the USA began adopting the concept of ‘national security’ as what Yergin (1977:195. cited in Buzan & Waever 1998) describes as ‘the commanding idea’ of US nation building. This became the standard term to describe a field which had once encompassed various topics like war, foreign policy, defence, or military policy (Buzan & Waever, 1998). This early security agenda shaped two key aspects of security: firstly that the state should be considered the main referent object, the thing to be secured; and secondly that the military are the key providers of security. This relationship between the military and the state is encompassed in the traditional realist theories of security. It is the realist assumption that, ‘in the world there is a real possibility or risk that other states may either attack one’s country or, by the threat of attack, coerce it into situations contrary to its

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2 Walt (1991:213) states the exception of studies of arms races by Richardson (1960), the causes of war by Wright 1 (942) and the geopolitics of U.S. grand strategy by Skypman. (1942).
interests’; in order to fulfil their own imperial or ‘expansionist ambitions’ or pursue other interests such as the ‘projection of values’ (Dower, 2009:44). Realism would therefore, up until the end of the colonial period, remain the dominant security ‘policy’ adopted by states both looking to militarily defend their empires or defend their state from expansionist imperial powers.

In international relations, the recognition of the state as the referent object of security has long been dominant: firstly because in international affairs states have always been the central actors and secondly, security has always been considered or recognised as the state’s main concern (Morgan, 2007:14). Morgan (2007:14) claims that focusing on states ‘makes sense’ because they:

‘(1) developed through the fierce pressures of international politics – more than other political institutions they were shaped by international politics, particularly its security-related features; (2) are unique concentrations of power; (3) remain the ultimate focal points of most people’s loyalty and sense of identity; and (4) have created or embody the largest, most powerful, and most effective human communities’.

If the state and by extension, during the colonial period, the empire is to be identified as the referent object, by what criteria can this security be measured and when can a state be considered ‘secure’? Wolfer (1952:496) suggests that the level of security is variable and can change in reaction to ‘the presence or absence of aggressive intentions on the part of others’, again asserting that the military play a vital role in state security. In seeking to, in some way, establish some empirical measurement, Wolfers (1952:485) argues that a state of security should, in the subjective sense be defined as ‘an absence of threats to acquired values’, defining it in the objective sense as ‘the absence of fear that such values will be attacked’. Yet the value test poses even more questions as to which values to be prioritised. Baldwin’s (1997:13) for example points out that, as social actors, states have many values including ‘physical safety, economic welfare, autonomy, psychological well-being, and so on’. He asserts however that the concept of national security has prioritised political independence and territorial integrity as the key values to be protected (Baldwin, 1997).

The dominance of the realist theory up until the end of the colonial period is largely down to its legitimacy in the conduct of international politics and indeed, its principle beliefs reflected the imperial political dynamics of the time which came to be defined as ‘power politics’. Realism holds that people (and therefore states), are naturally ‘driven to compete with others for domination and self-advantage’ (Kegley & Blanton, 2011:32). The colonial period was characterised by this drive for expansion in the name of state dominance and self interest. As Kegley and Blanton (2011:32) assert, a state’s security was based upon its ability to pursue its own interests both in its own expansion and its ability to defend from those expanding. As such they argue that it is the primary obligation of the state to pursue its own interests and therefore must acquire power to do so. As states acquired such power through increasing their military strength, under the time honoured maxim of “might makes right” they adopted a Darwinian understanding of security and survival, i.e. survival of the fittest (Duiker & Spielvogel, 2007:581). As such militarisation for defence of the state from others increasing in “might” held position as the dominant security policy.
The state’s military obsession during the colonial period would inevitably lead to the fall of their colonial power that may even be explained from a realist theory perspective. Realism holds that when all or many states seek to maximise their power, stability is maintained through the shifting or reformation of alliances in order to restore the balance of power (Kegley & Blanton, 2011:33). In 1914 during WWI and 1939 during WWII the balance of power would be restored through allies going to war which for various reasons, would bring about the end of colonial power and imperial interests.

However, with the advent of the Cold War in 1945, realism remained dominant in the security paradigm of the European and Western powers as, with the threat of nuclear war with Soviet Russia looming, defence from military attack was of paramount importance. Dower (2009:44) suggests the realist response to this threat was very simple: the development of a strong military to serve the state’s security agenda. This military had three roles: to act as deterrence against attack and coercion from other states; secondly to deal with and repel an attack if it does occur; finally a tool to threaten attack or indeed attack in the name of securing the interests of ones own state. The state was to remain the referent object, as defending the state in the bi-polar Cold War world, could have been seen ‘as the best way of protecting other referent objects’ (Buzan & Hansen, 2009:11) such as the nations’ capitalist identity in the West and its communist identity in the East. In the Cold War environment, the state remaining as the referent object symbolised the symbiotic relationship, with regards to mutual security, of the nation and the state: ‘the nation supported a powerful state which in turn reciprocated by loyally protecting its society’s values and interests’ (Buzan & Hansen, 2009:11). It therefore enforced state sovereignty, created a strong national identity and internal legitimacy within the developed world powers, reflecting the concept of a ‘social contract’ between government and governed described by Rousseau (1973:173-175).

The realist paradigm was also adopted by the newly forming states emerging from the end of colonialism. Morgan (2007:14-15) has essentially refined the values identified by Baldwin (1997:13), by defining four key elements or values which fit into the realist paradigm which are seemingly essential in post-colonial state building: ‘safety, autonomy, development and rule’. During the post-colonial state building period, understandably, the importance lay in safety from external aggression on a “new state” and defending their newly drawn borders which often did not coincide with the cultural-tribal identities of the local population and were therefore prone to contestation. Autonomy, or the ‘freedom from having to take orders from and be controlled by others’ (Morgan, 2007:14), is an obvious concern of the post-colonial state. Indeed, Morgan claims that regimes and leaders often believed that without autonomy from external bodies the state would not exist and therefore its defence is vital to the survival of the state. The third value, national development is defined as economic, social, educational and political improvements (Morgan, 2007:15). Such improvements are often (though not exclusively) sought through the acquisition of resources which can be use to improve military strength, living standards, etc. Finally the security to ‘rule one’s own domain’ (Morgan, 2007:15), is to be considered as ‘having the power, reach, and legitimacy to gain obedience and quell disobedience’; a concept, that with autonomy, can be closely linked with the idea of state sovereignty which is often at the forefront of security studies debate.
The legal doctrine of state sovereignty, the Treaty of Westphalia of 1648, defines the ‘liberty of states as their independence from foreign control and coercion’ (Bealey, 1999:306. cited in Haynes, 2001:144 & Walzer, 2006:89). Sovereignty also entails the state maintaining a monopoly on the use of force within its borders (Morgan, 2007:17). Therefore a state can not be legitimate if it does not secure its sovereignty from foreign influence; an obvious concern of the post-colonial new state which, as will be discussed in chapter 2, often remains under the influence of its previous colonial master after independence. However integral these factors are to state building, realism lost credibility as a security policy for new states largely due to the substantial increase in the number of intra-state conflicts within developing countries during the post-colonial period. It would appear that many of the causes of these intra-state conflicts relate to problems with this realist perception of state building, authority and legitimacy. Santos (2012:219) states that, ‘The origins of these conflicts are mostly power issues at national or international level, related to territory, autonomy, secession, ideological and religious systems, and natural resources’. This shows the difficulty of consolidation of power internally and establishing legitimacy through a realist framework, especially if external interference and influence from international bodies remains strong.

The collapse of the Soviet Union and the conclusion of the Cold War triggered a major shift in the strategic landscape and ‘security analysts naturally seized on the opportunity to critically think about the meaning and implications of the end of the Cold War for the study of international security studies’ (Dannreuther, 2007:13). Dannreuther (2007:1) claims that during the Cold War period the direction of international security scholars had been clearly defined; there was a defined enemy; ‘the threat was of the use, or the threat of use, of deadly military force; the fear was of the uncontrolled escalation of military conflict to a nuclear level’ and as such the study of security was ‘synonymous with military strategy and statecraft’. However, with the dissipation of the threats posed during the Cold War and the increase of intra-state wars within developing countries, such clarity in the security studies field would be lost and some of the key realist understandings of the concept created during its development would be debated and challenged. Krause and Williams (1996:230) argue that the traditional neo-realist framework, with its focus on ‘safeguarding the core values of a state from military threats emanating from outside its borders is no longer adequate (if it ever was) as a means of understanding what (or who) is to be secured, from what threats, and by what means’.

Commentators such as Axworthy (2001:19) suggest that the meaning of the word security has changed in the post-Cold War world because of the emergence of the ‘human element’, which makes the human or individual the referent object of security; challenging the supremacy of military-state complex within security theorising and making the security of the individual, ‘the ultimate goal, to which all instruments and peripheral actors are subordinated’ (Tadjbakhsh & Chenoy, 2007:13). In the human security paradigm there is the issue of definitional clarification. One definition of human security was given in the 2003 report of the Commission of Human Security (CHS) as follows: ‘Human security means protecting fundamental freedoms—freedoms that are the essence of life. It means protecting people from critical (severe) and pervasive (widespread) threats and situations’ through a strategy of protection and empowerment (2003:4). The CHS (2003:4) states, ‘It means using processes that build on people’s strengths and aspirations. It means creating political,
social, environmental, economic, military and cultural systems that together give people the building blocks of survival, livelihood and dignity, whilst protecting them from various ‘threats and situations’. It also encompasses aspects of political and social life such as access to education and healthcare, the assurance of good governance and protection from poverty and conflict. The 1994 Human Development Report, an annual publication of the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) (1994:23), suggests that, ‘Human security can be said to have two main aspects. It means, first, safety from such chronic threats as hunger, disease and repression. And second, it means protection from sudden and hurtful disruptions in the patterns of daily life, whether in homes, in jobs or in communities’. Paris (2001:89) criticises the lack of clarity in the later definition and other similar to it, describing them as ‘laundry lists’ that ‘do little to clarify the meaning or boundaries of the human concept’ (2001:21).

Clarification may be found in the importance of human rights to the human security agenda. Boyle and Simonsen (2004:5) categorically state that human rights and human security should not be considered the same thing or even ‘overlapping concepts’, as both are ‘separate ideas with separate functions’. However, they claim that ‘strong conceptual links’ can be made between them. Indeed Boyle and Simonsen (2004:5–6) cite the 2003 CHS report Human Security Now, in order to explain how human rights and human security complement each other when it states:

‘Human rights and human security are … mutually reinforcing. Human security helps identify the rights at stake in a particular situation. And human rights help answer the question: How should human security be promoted? The notion of duties and obligations complements the recognition of the ethical and political importance of human security’.

This quote raises two reoccurring questions: what is to be protected?, the promotion of human security and who should provide protection?, the notion of duty and obligation.

The association of human security with human rights has an important utility in clarifying which elements of human life or society are to be protected and included in the human security agenda. Boyle and Simonsen (2004:7) suggest that the objects to be protected in the human security paradigm are those rights described by international human rights law: ‘This edifice of human rights law provides legal guarantees that address, among many other rights, the rights to food, health, education, housing, and protection of the family. It extends protection to culture, democracy, participation, the rule of law and access to justice. It offers protection against enslavement, torture, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment, freedom of thought and belief as well as the right to freedom of opinion and expression’. As such Boyle and Simonsen believe that human security should ensure that all individuals have the freedom to enjoy the rights described by human rights law.

In seeking to find an answer to whom should provide human security one is again turned to the state as the primary provider. Indeed Landman (2005:1) claims that the security role of the state does not diminish with the practice of human security as the threats posed to human can effect the security of the state. Accordingly the state is, ‘the main organ with the capacity to provide the necessary institutions for realizing human security’, through the recognition of human rights. (Landman, 2006:13).
Indeed the concept of human security does not promote the exclusion of the state because of the states role in its implementation. States that do not implement these rights can themselves pose a threat to human security; a threat Buzan and Hansen (2009:25) suggest can emerge through two scenarios. Firstly the state may simply be too weak in terms of political stability, wealth etc, to provide the promised security. More relevant to this study however, is the suggestion that undemocratic states ‘often threaten their own citizens not only by making arbitrary, harmful decisions (like going to war or allowing pollution), but also directly prosecuting them, detaining them or murdering them…’. Such actions by the authoritarian state are often carried out in the name of the undemocratic regime’s sovereignty, using force to suppress popular resistance internally and maintain their authority. As will later be discussed Middle Eastern Authoritarian/ Dictatorial regimes often justified such suppression of internal dissent with the traditional realist security requirement to fight a foreign enemy such as the state of Israel or Islamists, apparently at the cost of the basic rights of their citizens which can damage the state’s legitimacy and therefore its security. Human security challenges this requirement for state security by placing the security of the individuals it represses above it (Tadjbakhsh & Chenoy, 2007:13); indeed ‘Security policy requires a holistic approach that views human security as a critical linchpin to building state capacity and legitimacy…’ (Jebb, Hummel, Rios & Medalfia, 2009:52).

The emergence of the human security agenda is a direct challenge to the traditional realist understanding of security. Although relevant in the colonial period, state-centred realist theorising has failed to take into account the increasing number of states which are failing to fulfil their social contract to protect people (Tadjbakhsh & Chenoy, 2007:18), largely through realist violent and repressive security policies designed to secure the state. Human security denies the state the position as referent object, enshrining human beings as the ‘fundamental basis of security’ (Tadjbakhsh & Chenoy, 2007:18). The rising prominence of the human security agenda can be traced to international concerns as threats to human security can lead to wider international security concerns. Indeed Robinson states (2008:96), ‘Oppressive governments, poverty and injustice can lead to terrorism, migration and other threats to international security’. Therefore international security depends on the security of not individual states, but on the security of individual people as the ‘weakest links’ in the international system (Tadjbakhsh & Chenoy, 2007:18), suggesting that greater attention should be paid to human security to ensure national and international security.
Chapter 2- Security during post-colonial state building and the rise of dictatorship in Northern Africa

This chapter explores the post-colonial growth of Egypt, Tunisia and Libya with two purposes. Firstly, it is an attempt to trace the role of the military in the struggle to gain sovereignty in the colonial and post-colonial period and the subsequent development of realist security policies. Secondly it explores the conditions and political environment which paved the way for the establishment of dictatorships. The aim of the chapter is to demonstrate that the close link between realist security and authoritarianism but also show the complex external and internal conditions in which this relationship developed, which perhaps allowed for the regimes in Northern Africa to stay in power for decades.

Tunisia

Before the presence of European empires in North Africa, Tunisia had been a province of the Ottoman Empire since 1574. However due to its peculiar political structure, the Ottoman Empire exercised little direct control over its provinces and Tunisia was effectively self-ruling. The French, who during the colonial period held a maritime empire whose scale was second only to that of the British, showed interest in Tunisia which neighboured their Algerian territory; interest manifesting in the establishment of financial institutions in Tunisia, lending money to the Beys and ‘investing extensively as the first step towards building an African empire’ (Shaw and Shaw, 1977:192). Under the pretence of disciplining Khrumir tribes men for raids into Algeria a French cavalry detachment crossed the Algerian-Tunisian border into Tunisia and in May of 1881, and with the signing of the Treaty of Bardo 1881, Tunisia became a French protectorate (Chamberlain, 1998:7).

The concept of a protectorate is understood as a method of an ‘informal Empire’ by which European powers could exercise control over both the internal and external relations of a ‘protected people’ (Lindley, 1969 cited in Anghie. 2004:90). It is a way of holding flexible control over a territory whilst distinguishing between political and economic control, and a method of exploiting and acquiring the raw materials and developing new markets whilst enabling the ‘protected’ country to maintain political control and sovereignty (Anghie, 2004:89). Abun-Nasr (1987:293) argues however that the protectorate system enabled France to ‘…exercise direct control over all vital aspects of [the Tunisian] government. Although the Bey (King) maintained ‘semblance’ of authority, in reality the Resident-General was the highest authority in military and government administration (Abun-Nasr, 1987:293).

In 1912 there were a number of civil disturbances in response to the French domination and the substantial French settlements in the better agricultural areas (Chamberlain, 1998:155). The French continued to face ‘nationalist ferment’ especially as the white minority of 250,000 in Tunisia resisted and succeeded against political reform which led to widespread violence (Meredith, 2006:50). In 1919 the Destour (constitution) Party was formed which, ‘sought a modern constitutional state, with the franchise confined to Tunisians, who would be admitted to all administrative offices, and the buying out of French settler property’ (Chamberlain, 1998:155).
During the 1930’s members of the Destour party formed a more radical French revolutionary-inspired Neo-Destour Party led by Habib Bourguiba, an energetic thirty one year old, Paris-trained lawyer (Meredith, 2006:50).

As the French employed a strategy of suppression, Tunisian resistance enjoyed more influence during the French administration of the sympathetic Popular Front government of 1936-38 (McKenna. 2010: 160 & Chamberlain. 1998:157). With the collapse of the Popular front government in 1938, the old repressions returned leading to violent clashes and disobedience during which Bourguiba was arrested and deported to France in 1939 at the outbreak of WWII. A year later France would be defeated and occupied by Germany and Bourguiba released from imprisonment.

The post WWII environment was one of ‘continental reconstruction and global realignment’ (Betts, 1998:29) and the French attempted to maintain the status quo of global order by ‘restoring previous control’ and reforming previous policies (Betts, 1998:29). Although Tunisians were given great hope for independence in the post-war period the French government, in fear of the growing discontent amongst French settlers who had gained the French army’s support, suspended negotiations (Chamberlain. 1998:156). In 1951 Bourguiba rejected the French Voizard reforms which called for a Franco-Tunisian co-sovereignty, instead opting to mobilize a guerrilla movement against the French leading to terrorist attacks (Chamberlain, 1998:158).

Gradually, through the signing of various agreements, Tunisia was declared independent on the 20th March 1956. Although Bourguiba had achieved Tunisian sovereignty, it was not secure as he lacked the charisma required to maintain political stability and drive Tunisia forward into the modern world, in the face of political opposition and the continuing French threat (Moore, 1965:46). Bourguiba’s only defence lay in political cohesion and in the first three years of independence Bourguiba consolidated power into what has been described as a ‘presidential monarchy’ (Moore. 1965:71). The Tunisian Constitution, established in 1959, confirmed Bourguiba’s presidential supreme authority and in 1964 the Neo-Destour Party was renamed the Socialist Destourian Party (Cavendish. 2007:1227). Indeed this was to be the only political party in Tunisia as a one-party regime was established and other parties suppressed. Cavendish (2007:1227) describes how Bourguiba’s powers continued to increase and in a constitutional amendment in 1957 he was named president for life.

Egypt

The importance of Egypt to colonial powers had long been recognised. During his exile on the island of St Helena, Napoleon Bonaparte considered Egypt to be the most important country in the world. Turner (2006:10) evaluates, ‘It was no delusion…Egypt was the national trade junction of the three continents – Europe, Asia and Africa’. In 1882, Britain occupied Egypt and in 1914 made it a protectorate to safeguard its interests in the Suez Canal – a vital trade route and link to the British Empire. The relationship between the imperial power and the protectorates population became strained and ‘a desire for independence had already become fixed’ (Zunes & Laird. 2011).
In 1922 that Egypt ceased to be a British protectorate and was declared a sovereign and independent state in its own right. However Britain maintained control in Egypt regarding ‘(a) the security of the British empire in Egypt (that is communications), (b) the defence of Egypt against all foreign aggression or interference, direct or indirect, (c) the protection of foreign interests and minorities in Egypt, and (d) the Sudan’ (Chamberlain, 1998:114). The British also asserted their military presence in Egypt. This would be challenged by the Anglo-Egyptian Treaty of 1936 which outlined the withdrawal of British troops to the Canal Zone as well as the Sinai peninsular. Britain further influenced Egyptian politics by compelling Farouk, the Egyptian King between 1936 and 1952, to accept Nahas Pasha, the leader of the Wafd Party, as Prime Minister. This compulsion was carried out with the sole purpose of satisfying the British war interests as Pasha was willing to cooperate with the Allies during WWII.

Before 1948 the Egyptian military had played little or no part in Egyptian diplomacy or foreign policy until the Egyptian government became involved in the Arab-Israeli war. The failure of the military to have a significant effect on the conflict became a point of embarrassment for the Egyptian people and the faith in Egyptian politics declined. Indeed, since the mid-1930s, Egypt’s system of party politics, know as al-hizbiyyah, was becoming defined by corruption and decadence (Gordon, 1992:14). It became apparent that Egyptian politics were destabilising, evident as four cabinets succeeded one another in the short period between January and July of 1952 (Botman, 1991:54).

During July 1952 a group of military officers known as the ‘Free Officers’ staged a coup d’état and seized power. The Free Officers abolished the monarchy, limited the power of the landlords and ended corruption in the Egyptian political system. They also changed the way Egypt dealt with British interference by successfully carrying out negotiations under the banner of Egyptian nationalism (Botman, 1991:54). With the proclamation of the Egyptian Republic in June of 1953, under the leadership of President Mohammed Neguib and his deputy Gamal Abdul Nasser, scholars such as al-Sayyid Marsot considered Egypt a truly sovereign state claiming, ‘The advent of nationalist power…seemed to inspire a belief that a purely Egyptian government operating for the well-being of Egyptians had been established’ (al-Sayyid Marsot, 1985:107).

In 1953 Nasser seized power from Neguib, and immediately stated his unwillingness to relinquish control in is booklet, *The Philosophy of Revolution* (Stephens, 1971, cited in Brooker 1995:149), paving the way for dictatorship and a one party military state. Brooker (1995: 149, citing Perlmutter, 1974) states, ‘There he argued that the military had performed the vanguard role in the Egyptian Revolution by sweeping away the old regime and then being compelled to retain power because the people were found to be unprepared to take control of their own destiny’. The Egypt rallied around Nasser and the new regime as ‘it bought dignity and self-esteem’ to its people (Botman, 1991:54). However this would come at a price of the loss of democracy, and end to political diversity and freedoms in what Botman describes as a ‘politically straitjacketed country’ (Botman. 1991:54).
Despite this loss of their political freedoms, the Egyptian people continued to support Nasser’s regime – especially during the Suez Crisis of 1956 (Chamberlain 1998:117). Considering the nationalisation of the Suez Canal as a threat to their interests the British and their allies, after unsuccessful negotiations (Varble, 2009:5), invaded Egypt on the 29th October 1956 with Israel invading first followed two days later by their British and the French allies. It was the belief of this coalition that this invasion would cause the Egyptian people to rise against the military regime however, ‘The very presence of Israel was a guarantee of popular resistance and a rallying round the leader and the army by the population at large’ (al-Sayyid Marsot, 1985:114). The events surrounding Suez in 1956 legitimised the regime whilst also securing the relationship between the military and the civilian population as they succeeded in removing the allied troops from the 23 December 1956 (Varble, 2009:8).

**Libya**

Before acquisition by European powers in 1912, Libya was also a dominion of the Ottoman Empire. As in Tunisia, the Ottoman Empire did not exercise full control of Libya. Indeed the three provinces of Tripolitania, Cyrenaica and Fezzan enjoyed a liberal amount of independence; none more so than Cyrenaica, largely controlled by the Islamic Sanussi Order (Wright, 1981:23). The Italians first displayed their imperial ambitions in Libya much the same way France had done in Tunisia, by establishing economic institutions, schools and settling in agricultural communities in the early 20th century through a strategy of ‘peaceful penetration’ (Simons, 2003:4). Italian parliamentary deputies claimed the Tripolitania was vital to the existence of Italy because of the trade route between the Red Sea and the Mediterranean and on the 29th September 1911 Italian forces occupied Libya and attacked the Turkish homeland. The outbreak of war between the Balkan states and Turkey in 1912 weakened Turkey and on 18th October 1912 it renounced sovereignty over Libya (Page, 2003:344).

Occupying Italian authorities amalgamated the three provinces under the classical name of Libya and claimed sovereignty over the territory. Anti-Italian violence ensued and in 1914 and with their entrance into WWI, Italy granted the Libyan people local self-rule (Page, 2003:344). During WWII, Italy’s defeat led to the Allied occupation of Libya with the British establishing a military government in Cyrenaica as did the French in Fezzan. Cyrenaica continued to enjoy a high level of autonomy and was the closest to a self governing province in Libya (Simons, 2003, Bearman, 1985). With the conclusion of the war it seemed that Libyan independence in the post-war period was under threat when in 1945 the United Nations gave Libya trusteeship status, entrusting it to the administration and control of Britain and France (Chamberlain, 1998, Simons, 2003).

This trustee status would be challenged by demands for independence from the Libyan leaders exiled in Egypt – a demand supported by the Arab League. It would not be until the creation of a diplomatic alliance between the British colonial powers in Egypt and the exiled third leader of the now defeated Sanussi, Amir Idris al-Sanussi, that Libya could expect independence – all be it an independence ‘engineered and dominated by the British’ (Amida, 2009:153). Wright (1982:56) states that, ‘Britain, in effect, unilaterally decreed that if there was to be an
independent Libyan state at all…it would take only the form that Idris, Britain and Britain’s Western allies wanted: a federal monarchy under the Sanussi crown’. On the 24th September 1951 Libya achieved full independence under the rule of King Idris (De Candole, 1990:238). Bearman (1986:1) claims that, ‘The constitution, approved on 7th October 1951, provided for a system of parliamentary democracy, symbolic of the countries subordination to the democracies of the west’. Although independent, Libya was still subject to the interests of foreign powers and ‘Libyan people stood passively on the sidelines as foreign and local rulers interests shaped their country’ (Vandewalle. 2008:1). Indeed Libya had to accept some external influence as, with its underdeveloped economy, it relied heavily on British and American subsides in order for it to survive (De Candole. 1990:238).

Despite a major economic boost in 1958 with the discovery of oil within its borders Libya would still be subject to the interests of foreign powers. This influence would be challenged by the Arab nationalism which was spreading throughout North Africa and Arab Nationalist calls from Nasser’s Egypt which. According to De Candole (1990:141), ‘at the time of the 1967 Arab/Israeli war, disorders initiated in very large part by Cairo Radio exciting mob passions and student demonstrations. It would only be fair to say that the sympathies of many of the spread of the younger Libyans, particularly in Tripolitania, lay with the spread of Arab nationalism’. Libyans were also questioning the legitimacy of the kingdom in response to a number of political incidents and the corrupt nature of the political system that had developed around King Idris (Vandewalle. 2006:77). Whilst revenue from the oil industry was flowing into Libya not all of its citizens were reaping the benefits as wealth was mostly held by government officials whilst the ordinary Libyan lived in poverty (Sullivan, 2009:26).

On the 1st of September 1969 the ‘Free Officers’ carried out a bloodless coup d’état, overthrowing the monarchy and installing their 27 year old leader, Captain Gaddafi, as the new head of state. Upon success of the coup Gaddafi and his Free Officers established the Revolutionary Command Council (RCC) as the leadership of Libya which enabled rule by a ‘suitably purged military, which claimed to be the authentic representative of the Libyan people’ (Davis, 1990:2). The new regime was avidly militant, vowing to eradicate the foreign influences which it considered to be the cause of all of Libya’s problems (Davis, 1990:2) and seizing power over the oil industry from foreign powers (Sullivan, 2009:28). On the 16th of September 1969 Gaddafi outlined his plans for the control of the new Libyan state, claiming, ‘The revolution does not claim that its leadership is the monopoly of the Revolutionary Command Council. Government must revert to the people, just as sovereignty and final decisions’ (cited in Bearman. 1986:61). Although this dispelled any ideas of a military dictatorship it did not express a will to relinquish military control. Indeed in the days proceeding the coup d’état an unwillingness to do so was expressed in a communiqué which stated that the Council of the Revolution was the sole body responsible for the control of the Libyan Arab Republic and that all government departments, officials and armed forces were at the disposal of the Council of the Revolution (Bearman. 1986:61).

Chapter Analysis
An analysis of the above narratives would identify one key similarity in the priorities of security ‘policy’ of our referent North African states – the struggle for the absolute sovereignty and autonomy of the newly formed states after the defeat and/or withdrawal of colonial powers which would reflecting a realist perspective as defined in chapter one. It appears that the most prominent influence on both the security policy and rise of dictators in North Africa is the level of influence and coercion from foreign powers once independence was achieved. Young (2003:3) argues that the transition from colony to independent state had little effect on the actual autonomy of the newly formed post-colonial states, describing it as ‘a relatively minor move from a direct to indirect rule, a shift from colonial rule and domination to a position not so much of independence as of being in-dependence’.

In all the three cases there has been ongoing ambiguity of the military-state relationship, with either force being actively used to eradicate foreign influence or for the consolidation of post-colonial power in the form of military coups and rule. This shows a clear continuation of the colonial method of establishing control and legitimacy and ultimately security through force and “might makes right” as well as political suppression at the cost of citizens democratic freedoms. Such military or, in the case of Tunisia, authoritarian rule was justified through the creation of political cohesion in the face of threats to state security such as a continuing external influence or the emergence of nationalist politics fuelling paranoia of the Israeli threat. This contributed to the legitimacy of the emerging regimes and the continuation of the traditional realist concept of securitisation of the state from external threats by force; a security policy which seems to have been maintained by the leaders ousted during the Arab Spring.
Chapter 3 - The uprisings of 2010-12: The result of the dictatorship’s ignorance of human security?

The purpose of this chapter is to identify and explore the reasons for the individual uprisings in Tunisia, Egypt and Libya by exploring the relevant data found various publications such as journalist articles, rebel statements and propaganda, as well as academic works and publications by international, governmental and non governmental organisations. As the uprisings in Tunisia, Egypt and Libya were all popular uprisings, albeit with the involvement of politicians and the military in some of the cases, the analysis is based on a selection of popular narratives that try to explain the reasons for the unrest in all of the three cases. Through indentifying similarities in those narratives, the analysis presented here attempts to draw a general conclusion as to the extent to which human security issues played a role in the Arab Spring.

*Tunisia*

The rule of President Ben Ali, who seized power from Bourguiba in 1987 (Alexander, 2010:3), is described by Alexander (2011) as one of ‘a skillful combination of co-optation and repression’, an authoritarian rule that was accepted by the Tunisian
people in return for the stability, growth and security from an historic perceived threat from Islamists that it provided. Although, at the beginning of his rule Ben Ali pledged a commitment to human rights and democracy, this was more a way of neutralizing the liberal opposition by appeasing those who supported it. However, this commitment was never put into practice and the regime’s ignorance of human rights and democracy are considered to be the sole reason for the Tunisian rebellion. Prior to the revolution concerns surrounding human rights issues in Ben Ali’s regime had been raised by various international and local human rights NGOs in response to the state of human rights in the country. However, due to Tunisia being considered an important ally of the West in the “War on Terror” there has been little criticism or desire to intervene on the basis of human rights by many foreign governments or their leaders (Sadiqi, 2011:12).

On December 17th 2010, Tunisian street vendor, Mohamed Bouazizi set fire to himself in protest of his treatment at the hands of local authorities. Due to a lack of work Bouazizi, a university graduate, had taken to selling fruit on the streets of the town of Sidi Bouzid (Whitaker, 2010). However, he did so without the relevant license leading to the local authorities confiscating his produce and beating him in public which led him to attempt his suicidal protest. This incident triggered widespread protest in Tunisia by, as described by the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights (Pillay, 2011), ‘young people determined to take the future of their country into their own hands… [inspiring] both young and old throughout the region – and beyond – to become aware of, and call for, their rights’. In a statement regarding the post rebellion elections, the UN High Commissioner described the ‘driving force behind the Tunisian revolution’ as the desire to see the realization of the adoption of principles laid out in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights which would mean access to basic rights denied by the deposed regime: democracy, rule of law, accountability, non-discrimination, gender equality, freedom of expression and freedom of religion and belief (Pillay, 2011).

The Bouazizi incident, which triggered the rebellion, highlights two aspects of human rights which are intrinsically linked to human security: economic development and repression. The Tunisian unemployment rate in 2010 was estimated to be around 13% rising to an estimation of 16% in 2011 (Whitaker, 2011). Although Whitaker points out this rate may be much higher, these estimates place the country as having the 48th highest rate of unemployment compared to other countries in the world (CIA, 2012). However the unemployment level amongst university graduates such as Bouazizi was much higher; for example in Bouazizi’s hometown of Sidi Bouzid, 25% of male graduates and 44% of female graduates were unemployed (Whitaker, 2011). It is therefore not surprising that many of the initial post-Bouazizi protesters were unemployed graduates, protesting for more jobs and against what they called ‘the self-enrichment of Tunisia’s ruling family’ (Pickett, 2012). This ‘self-enrichment’ was a common economic feature of Ben Ali’s regime in an economy which appeared to be flourishing with the praise and support of international institutions and economic powers such as The World Bank and International Monetary Fund (Sadiqi, 2011:7). However, very few Tunisian people reaped the benefits of the economy, with the concentration of Tunisian wealth being unevenly distributed through government corruption. Indeed much of the wealth was concentrated in supporting the prosperity of the dictator or those directly or indirectly linked to the regime and it is believe that minus his wife’s substantial assets, Ben Ali controlled over 40% of the economic
activity in Tunisia (Le Figaro, 2011, cited in Sadiqi, 2011:7). As such many of the initial protests were organized by trade unions and focused on unemployment and high living costs whilst other protest led to looting of property belonging to the family of Ben Ali (Noor, 2011).

Despite these economic hardships, Noor (2011) suggests that the severity of repression under Ben Ali played a more substantial part in turning peaceful protest into a widespread rebellion. Within the Tunisian constitution there were limited provisions for freedom of speech and of the press which were largely ignored by Ben Ali’s regime which, ‘restricted media freedom and severely intimidated journalists, editors, and publishers into practicing self-censorship’, as well as censoring the internet (Bureau of Human Rights, Democracy and Labour, 2011:15-19). This censorship was part of a wider strategy to abolish criticism of the regime and its human rights abuses through intimidation, harassment, imprisonment and abuse implemented by the regime’s security forces, as seen during the initial protests. The southern region of the country was full of prisons holding political prisoners justified through the threat of Islamism; a threat which was overplayed by both the Tunisian government and arguably its Western Supporters. Indeed it is argued that Ben Ali used the domestic security services to ‘cultivate’ his power base (Arieff, 2011:17). Those who openly criticised the regime, such as the protesters, were subjected to intense surveillance, unjust prosecution and in some cases torture (Amnesty International, 2011:325). Little political freedom existing under Ben Ali’s authoritarian rule; many parties opposed to the regime were outlawed with only three ‘dissident’ parties, who were considered to be kin to the regime, legally existed (Arieff, 2011:12). However the regime limited even these legal parties in the extent to which they could voice opposition (King, 1999:68) in a democratic system that opposition parties claim, Ben Ali rigged to maintain his power (Borowiec, 1998:50). Therefore the Tunisian people had little political self determination under Ben Ali’s regime. The role of the security forces in this repression is noteworthy. Murphy (1999:231) states that ‘the methods used to suppress illegal opposition have unleashed and semi-legitimised the security apparatus as a political player’. Throughout Ben Ali’s rule and during the violent attempts to squash the protests which would oust Ben Ali, the methods employed by the Tunisian security forces have shown little regard for human rights when defending the regime.

A prominent feature in many accounts or explanations of the rebellion is the idea of the restoration of self-dignity which was lost through the regimes abuse of human rights (Ki-moon, 2012, Pillay, 2011, Ghannouchi, 2012). Tolerance of the humiliation felt by the Tunisian people had now dissolved (Ghonim, 2012:131) and as such the revolution was designed to liberate Tunisia ‘from authoritarianism, corruption and reinstated [the] people's sovereignty and dignity’ (Ghannouchi, 2012).

**Egypt**

The Tunisian rebellion is considered to be the inspiration for the Egyptian people to overthrowing their leader of thirty years, Hosni Mubarak in 2011 (MacQueen, 2011, Chebib & Sohail, 2011:139). Like the Tunisians, the Egyptian people had, for decades lived under a regime that denied them certain rights. Indeed even before Mubarak, his predecessor Anwar al-Sadat had resorted to ‘authoritarian rule and out right
repression’ in the face of growing opposition to his regime (Meredith, 2006:446). The assassination of al-Sadat saw Mubarak take the presidency and he too, in the face of a number of violent challenges from militant Islamists, resorted to ‘brute repression and the use of emergency laws’ (Meredith, 2006:447), which could be considered damaging to human rights and human security. It is argued that the Egyptian rebellion was not a sudden occurrence but had been ‘10 years in the making’ and the result of a decade of Mubarak’s ‘iron fist rule’ (el-Hamalawy, 2011).

As in Tunisia, the Egyptian rebellion started in the form of peaceful protests calling for action to be taken against certain grievances, many of which can be identified as included in the human security paradigm. Wahba (2011:2), a professor at Cairo University describes these grievances as, ‘…[the]deterioration of all kinds of legal and political conditions including police brutality, state of emergency laws, lack of free elections and freedom of speech, uncontrollable corruption. Moreover the protesters focused on economic issues including high unemployment, food price inflation, and low minimum wages’. Chebib & Sohail (2011:142), attribute such grievances directly to major internal problems which were stimulated by the regime including autocracy, high levels of corruption, and poverty. As such they believe that the Egyptian rebellion was, ‘a result of accumulated misery and hardships that the Egyptians have been facing for decades’.

Despite a number of economic issues being the topic of protests, MacQueen (2011) suggests that the issues that were the catalyst for the revolution were more ‘overtly political’. This explanation is justified through the argument that the Egyptian economy has long struggled, resulting with little civil disruption taking place. Therefore MacQueen (2011) suggests that, rather that economic issues, political issues such as ‘…the increasingly heavy-handed tactics of the Mubarak regime and the efforts by the President to smooth the way for his son, Gamal, to succeed him in the coming years,’ were the catalyst for the revolution. Indeed both issues were prominent prior to the revolution.

The increasingly ‘heavy-handed tactics’ of the regime and its institutions was bought to the forefront of Egyptian attention with the death of 28 year old Khaled Said, who was dragged from a café and beaten to death by plain clothes police in the city of Alexandria (Associated Press in Cairo, 2011). Photographs of Said’s disfigured corpse were widely circulated on the internet social networking sites Twitter and Facebook, on which its popularity, gaining over 600,000 ‘likes’. This fuelled anti-government opinion and became a rally point for protesters campaigning against the Mubarak regime’s human rights abuses and police brutality in Egypt (Mainwaring, 2011, cited in Chebib & Sohail, 2011:143; Associated Press in Cairo, 2011). The death of Said was however, not an isolated incident of government violence but made public the regimes policy of violence. Amnesty International (2011:132) state that, ‘Torture and other ill-treatment of security detainees and criminal suspects were systematic in police stations, prisons and SSI detention centres and, for the most part, committed with impunity’; therefore, obvious human rights abuses were being ignored and indeed Amnesty International suggest that police often assaulted citizens in public, as if unconcerned of the consequences.

The second of MacQueen’s explanations of the revolution – ‘the efforts by the President to smooth the way for his son, Gamal, to succeed him in the coming years,’
largely reflects the undemocratic environment in which the Egyptian people resided. The regime’s utilisation of emergency law to suppress political opposition has ensured the maintenance of the personal authoritarian rule of Mubarak. Emergency law allowed the regime complete censorship over political activity through methods ranging from, ‘the monitoring of political activity to the limiting of political expression’ (Kassem, 2004:37). Mubarak (1998. cited in Kassem, 2004:37) justified the use of emergency laws stating their presence was, ‘in order to confront terrorism [and] protect democracy and stability’. Although it may have been used to counter terrorism, Kassem (2004:56) suggests it was largely used to control legitimate political activities through restricting freedom of expression and assembly. Before and during the protests, those who broke these laws through publishing anti-regime sentiments or gathering for political campaign without prior consent from the regime, were subject to arbitrary arrest and detention by the security forces. Offenders were tried in a military tribunal which, unlike the judicial system, denied the guarantee of the right to a fair trial and offered no form of appeal against its decision (OBS, 2011:534).

The Egyptian protesters made their motives for the revolution very clear in a pamphlet circulated before one of the protests, a translation of which was published by the editor of The Atlantic (Madrigal, 2011). This document stated the demands of the Egyptian people were as follows:

1. The downfall of the regime of Hosni Mubarak and his ministers.
2. The cessation of the Emergency Law
3. Freedom
4. Justice
5. The formation of a new, non-military government with the interests of the Egyptian people at heart.
6. The constructive administration of all Egypt’s resources. (Madrigal, 2011).

The achievement of these demands would mean the achievement of the human rights that Mubarak denied: the right to freedom, justice and freedom of expression and speech as well as a fairer economy free from corruption. The Egyptian revolution was a movement to gain these rights. As one protester recalls she chanted to people looking down on her from balconies, ‘Come down from the heights/come and get your rights’ (Soueif, 2011).

Libya

It is believed that the Libyan uprising began on February 15th 2011, in the city of Benghazi (Vira & Cordesman, 2011:10). As with the previously described uprisings, the Libyan uprising began with peaceful protest. This protest would soon turn into a violent riot and on 17th February, in a day labeled by activists as a “Day of Rage”, violence was spreading rapidly (Vira & Cordesman, 2011:10), which would lead to the destruction of both the regime and its leader who had ruled since 1969, Colonel Muammar Gaddafi. As discussed in the previous chapter, Gaddafi seized power from King Idris at the age of twenty seven and throughout his dictatorship Gaddafi created a nation and domestic policy based on his beliefs and ideology. He believed he embodied the states national identity; in effect he saw himself equating to the state and has claimed, ‘I am Libya’ (Shadid &Fahim. 2011:4). Initially Gaddafi utilised a strategy of better distribution of Libya’s large oil revenues to build legitimacy by...
Ensuring that the man on the street felt the benefits of Libya’s skyrocketing wealth (Kawczynski, 2010:197). However, the regime would soon turn to other means of ensuring their authority than simply legitimacy amongst the people, such as oppression and violence, which would eventually delegitimise the regime.

The motives behind the Libyan uprising are widely publicised by activists and the new Libyan authorities. Indeed, in a statement, the Libyan Interim Transitional National Council (2011) stated, ‘The Gaddafi regime has clearly proven its inability to assume its responsibility and to honor its vows in response to the demands and aspirations of the Libyan people for over four decades’. The statement goes on to ask the international community to, ‘help the Libyan people put an end to further large scale crimes against the humanity’. Further motives for the uprising can be found in an open letter from revolutionary Alaa al-Ameri to Gaddafi’s son Saif al-Islam which states:

‘I grew up in fear of your father and your family, but I'm not afraid any more. If you choose to continue to reject our rights as humans, I for one will continue to fight you with every means at my disposal for as long as it takes, until we are free. But I have an advantage. My aim is the freedom of my country and my people…’ (al-Ameri, 2011).

Although there is little doubt that the Libyan uprising and demand for the fall of Gaddafi’s regime was influenced by events in Tunisia and Egypt, the Libyan people had their own reasons for rebellion focused around dissatisfaction with the regime. One such dissatisfaction, which surrounds human rights concerns, is evident in the event that sparked the uprising. On the 15th February protesters gathered outside the city of Benghazi’s police headquarters in reaction to the arrest and detention of human rights activist Fethi Tarbel (Vira & Cordesman, 2011:10). This event is closely linked with Gaddafi’s history of human rights abuses as Fethi Tarbel, at the time of his arrest, was a lawyer working with the families of people detained in Tripoli’s Abu Salim jail. In June of 1996 this jail was the location for one of Gaddafi’s most notorious incidences of the regime’s human rights abuse when, during violent clashes, ‘Gaddafi’s troops murdered 1,200 prisoners who had dared to protest against their dirty conditions’ (Chulov & Smith, 2011). During protest and rioting activists displayed pictures of some of the dead men (Dziadosz, 2011), seemingly as a visual symbol of the violent regime they were fighting against. Gaddafi’s regime has committed further violence and ‘crimes against humanity’ in the reported use of torture by security services. There have been ‘credible reports’ of torture and mistreatment of prisoners under Gaddafi’s regime from both international and domestic human rights organisations (United Kingdom Foreign & Commonwealth Office, 2011:238). Although torture was illegal under the Gaddafi regime, it appears security forces were allowed to practice it with impunity. In response to such abuse 45 year-old activist, Hamida Muftah claimed, "We have been suffering for 41 years…Gaddafi has killed people and has taken educated people and put them in prison" (Dziadosz, 2011).

Fethi Tarbel and the Abu Salim jail are also symbolic of the lack of political freedom suffered by Libyans under Gaddafi’s rule. Abu Salim was used to detain government opponents and Islamist militants as part of a wider strategy of political repression by the regime. Gaddafi’s regime heavily restricted its people’s right to the freedoms of...
expression, association and assembly in order to quell dissent or opposition to the dictatorship. Anyone who openly criticised the regime such as the media, political parties or individuals could be subject to arrest and possibly arbitrary detention (Amnesty International, 2011:210). Critics could also face prosecution under laws which criminalised peaceful decent such as the Penal Code and Law 71 of 1972. Such laws meant that critics of the regime could, for activities described by Amnesty International (2011:10) as amounting ‘to no more than the peaceful exercise of freedom of expression and association’, face severe punishment including the death penalty. One long term critic, protestor Abdu Salem Mohamed, described how he had been protesting against Gaddafi (whom he refers to as “the devil”) since 1974 during which time he had been arrested four times (Dziadosz, 2011).

Further to these human rights abuses, Ashour (2011) suggests that a number of social and economic factors contributed to Gaddafi’s regime loosing legitimacy stating, ‘surveys conducted by the United Nations and several international organizations, development rates in Libya are deplorable as the civil, health, and educational infrastructure has proved to be unable to cater to the needs of the Libyan people’. At the beginning of his rule Gaddafi, claiming to incorporate socialism into his ideology, invested heavily in social welfare and provided universal health and education (Kawczynski, 2010:197). However, in the later years of Gaddafi’s rule Kawczynski (2010:197) claims ‘expectations rose’ but the quality of social services declined due to the ‘Timult and poor planning that have characterised the Colonel’s rule’. Faith was lost in social services, for example in health services where Ashour (2011) describes a, ‘lack of trust in the Libyan medical system especially after more than 500 children in the Mediterranean city of Benghazi were infected with AIDS because of contaminated medical tools’.

Chapter Analysis

Upon coming to power Ben Ali, Mubarak and Gaddafi, seem to have built their legitimacy upon the requirement for state/military security. All three leaders justified force and suppression of internal dissent as the primary means of securing the state, as did past leaders, by emphasising a clear threat to state security. However whereas past leaders referred to the threat from the state of Israel, the modern leaders believed that Islamist militants or fundamentalists and internal dissent posed the greatest threat. Realist security was used internally to build legitimacy rather than as part of the post-colonial independence project. As such, it appears their citizens accepted the regimes legitimacy in return for the security they provided. However the use of force would also be used for securing the interests of the regime rather than its people. One could consider the primary interest of any state to be the security to govern, practice and maintain their individual political and cultural systems. Ayoob (1995, cited in Collins 2007:3) defines such security by exploring the term insecurity, stating it is ‘defined in relation to vulnerabilities – both internal and external – that threaten or have the potential to bring down or weaken state structures, both territorial and institutional, and governing regimes’.

However one would argue that such characteristics and the techniques employed to counter the vulnerabilities of the regimes would eventually lead to their downfall. From the previous discussion one can see that the regimes, through a realist traditional security policy, initially gained legitimacy however they failed to gain long term popular legitimacy mainly through a failure to provide human security. Indeed it would seem that it was largely in the name of state security that the regimes ignored the human security needs of their citizens. In order to maintain the authority of the
state and therefore the regime, authorities employed tactics which subjected citizens to violations of the most basic requirement of human security – their basic human rights. Authoritarian regimes, through poor governance, denied them the rights to democracy, participation, justice, freedom of opinion and expression and subjected them to imprisonment, violence, torture and humiliation; all in order to purge the state of dissent and opposition to the regime. Using their authority, the corrupt regimes exploited their state’s economies and built their own personal wealth and the wealth of those close to them, whilst ordinary citizens faced poverty and inequality.

It is clear to see from the rebel, journalistic and academic statements discussed in this chapter, that the uprisings were the culmination of years of regime ignorance regarding human security in favour of a realist security policy – an ignorance which had caused the suffering and mistreatment of the citizens of Tunisia, Egypt and Libya. Therefore the failure of the regimes to establish long term good relations and legitimacy with their citizens due to their imposition of power through violence in ignorance of the human security requirements of their citizens, ultimately led to the uprisings and their eventual demise.
Conclusion

The concept of security is undoubtedly changing. Chapter one explored how the traditional concept of state security from external threats by military means was relevant and justifiable in the global political context of the colonial period. In the post-colonial Cold War period it remained, to some extent, relevant to the developed Western and non-Western states as both embarked on new political projects – weather as losing imperial power or gaining independence from it as described in chapter two, or establishing a new global role, as was the case with the US. For all of them the concept of sovereignty and independence from one another was crucial and realist security supplied the additional ideological and policy tool for this. However the failure of this model when applied to the states faced with post-colonial state building and intrastate wars throws into question the utility of the traditional concept of security in the modern world. The discussion in this work demonstrated that the suitability of the traditional realist paradigm to the practice of politics can be questioned, whereas the relevance of the human security paradigm should receive more attention. Not only has a failure to provide human security been recognised to contribute to wider international security concerns, importantly the study of the Arab Spring in chapter three has made visible the importance of human security to that of the state. Just as the protection of the state has been seen as the best way to protect other referent objects such as individuals, this study shows that providing human security can be vital to the protection of the state. The regimes of Ben-Ali, Mubarak and Gaddafi, through continuation and pursuit of state/regime security against internal threat through violent means, remained ignorant to the human security concerns surrounding their citizens; an ignorance that ultimately led to the downfall of the state under those regimes, as their citizens overthrew them. For many decades states which abuse their citizens have, through humanitarian intervention and lobbying by human rights organisations, been pressured into acknowledging the needs of their citizens. However the Arab Spring should shows the importance of placing human security into the forefront of the new Tunisian, Egyptian and Libyan government’s security policies and importantly, those of the international community as it witnesses the consequences of ignoring it.
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Appendix 1 - Extracts from a leaflet distributed during Egyptian protests

Full document available at:

![Leaflet content]

The Demands of the Egyptian People

1. The downfall of the regime of Hosni Mubarak and his ministers.
2. The cessation of the Emergency Law
3. Freedom
4. Justice
5. The formation of a new, non-military government with the interests of the Egyptian people at heart.
6. The constructive administration of all of Egypt's resources.

The Strategic Goals of Civil Disobedience

1. To take over important government buildings.
2. To attempt to win over members of the policy and army to the side of the people.
3. To protect our brothers and sisters in revolution
Steps for Carrying Out the Plan

1. Assemble with your friends and neighbors in residential streets for away from where the security forces are.

2. Shout slogans in the name of Egypt and the people's freedom (positive slogans).

3. Encourage other residents to join in (again with positive language).

4. Go out into the major streets in very large groups in order to form the biggest possible assembly.

5. Head toward important government buildings while shouting positive slogans—in order to take them over.

Some examples of signs

- The Police and the People Stand Together Against Oppression!
  Long Live Egypt!

- اخلاص الشارع والشعب مشتركة
  نحن مصري!

- الخطوات التنفيذية

1. التجمهر مع الأصدقاء والجيران في الشوارع السكنية البعيدة عن تواجد قوات الأمن.
2. الهتاف باسم مصر وحرية الشعب (اهتافات إيجابية).
3. تشجيع سكان العيادات للانضمام (بشكل إيجابي).
4. الخروج في مجموعات ضخمة إلى الشوارع الرئيسية لجمع أكبر حشد ممكن.
5. السير نحو البنية الحكومية الهامة مع الهتاف الإيجابي (بالإسناد عليها).