Capitalism and Crime: The Criminogenic Potential of the Free Market

By Mark Horsley[1]

Abstract

This dissertation discusses the neo-liberal capitalist hegemony that exists in the Anglo-American nations and its implications for national crime rates. It elaborates upon the tendency of neo-liberal nations to have dramatically higher crime rates than nations governed by other ideologies. It discusses the problems associated with the widespread adoption of values like competitive individualism, the rise of consumer culture and other factors like rising social inequality. These problems are backed up by case studies of the USA, Japan and the Scandinavian Nations. It concludes that although neo-liberalism may not lead directly to higher crime rates some of its effects are hardly conducive to a peaceful society.

Acknowledgements

This dissertation was originally supervised by Professor Steve Hall (now at Teesside University) and benefited greatly from his advice and support. I'd also like to thank Don Crewe and Simon Winlow for encouraging me to submit old pieces of writing instead of leaving them sitting on a hard drive.

[1] This is a first class undergraduate dissertation submitted in May 2006 for the Degree of BSc (Hons) Criminology, Division of Sociology and Criminology, Northumbria University (Awarded Final Mark of 78)

Introduction

> "Western observers… eager to learn from the Japanese economic miracle… found another miracle: a falling *crime rate* [original emphasis]. Increases in the crime rate had been taken in the Western countries to be the inevitable consequences of industrialization and urbanization" (Komiya, 1999: 369).

With the spread of capitalism and neo-liberalism across the surface of the globe now all but complete and most forms of real opposition almost gone, perhaps now is the time to ask where we are going and what we can expect as the 'free market' moves towards worldwide dominance? This dissertation aims to shed light upon the effects of neo-liberal ideology on national crime rates by looking at where many post-industrial nations are likely to be headed as they abandon their welfare states, stop subsidising their industries and put an end to other policies outside the free market ideal. It seems important that we understand the implications of this shift in global power away from the hard won social ideal of the post-war era back towards the upper classes.

The first chapter of this dissertation focuses its attentions on neo-liberalism, its origins and aims, looking specifically at how it has spread, from where it draws its power and how it compares to other forms of capitalism. Using the European Social Democratic model, which usually has more in common with a vaguely Keynesian approach to economic regulation and tends to embed corporations within society using legislation and redistribution to restrict market freedoms, as a means of comparison it explores the implications of different forms of capitalism. It then turns its attention to the type of society created under neoliberal governance with particular emphasis on the rise of a 'consumer culture' and what this means for personal identity in western society. By mounting a comparison of recorded crime rates neoliberal societies with others of a more social democratic bent it explores possible reasons why the former broadly seem to have higher rates of recorded crime. This includes a discussion of factors such as free-market capitalism's tendency to create a hyper-competitive society producing a Hobbesian 'war of all against all', increasingly polarised social inequality, erosion of informal social control, tacit promotion of the competitive individual and general demoralising effects of neo-liberalism's advance. Finally it attempts to apply theory to the real world, using case studies of the USA, Japan and Northern Europe as examples of how we might apply the ideas explored throughout the dissertation.

A Utopian Ideology

Neoliberalism is a utopian form of political ideology that, at its simplest, expresses a belief in the social beneficence of near total reliance on the workings of the free market. Since the late 1970's it has moved into the political mainstream on both sides of the Atlantic until "with the aid of economic theory, [it has] succeeded in conceiving of itself as the scientific description of reality" (Bourdieu, 1998). It is a modern revival of classical liberalism, which first put forward the idea that "market forces will bring prosperity, liberty democracy and peace to the whole of humankind" (Scholte, 2000: 34). The aims of the Neo-liberal enterprise can best be expressed as a "theory of political economic practices that proposes that human well-being can best be advanced by liberating individual entrepreneurial freedoms… within an institutional framework characterized by strong private property rights, free markets, and free trade" (Harvey, 2005: 2).

Within this framework the role of the state is to guarantee free market conditions then to interfere minimally when such markets are up and running, the reasoning behind this being that the state cannot possibly possess enough information to second-guess market signals (ibid.). In guaranteeing the functioning of the market the state must create legal mechanisms and institutions that protect integral property rights, including appropriate defence, legal and policing organisations as well as guaranteeing to abide by the sanctity of currency and exchange.

Neo-liberal economics replaced the social ideal of the post war years that was informed by Keynesian economic theory. In opposition to neo-liberal theory Keynesianism preaches the central role of the state in managing the economy and limiting the negative effects of the market including protecting those who lose out in the competitive world of capitalist society, thus validating measures like a strong welfare state. One of the main roles of the state was "ensuring the stability of production by guaranteeing consumption" (Dean, 2005). This was done by careful oversight and interventions that stimulated demand and kept businesses going when a free market outlook might have allowed them to flounder. Such government action supposedly protects jobs, livelihoods and ultimately society from the impermanence of *laissez faire* (free market) economics. There are a number of differing explanations for the decline of Keynesian economics including the Neo-Marxist account put forward by Susan George (1999) which emphasises the efforts of the upper classes, including big business, public relations and academics to endlessly publicise neo-liberal doctrine.

Although wholesale acceptance of the Neo-liberal ideal has been largely confined to the Anglophone nations, the withdrawal of the state from economic regulation, increasing privatisation and the general role back of the welfare state have become common across the world (Harvey, 2005: 3). Even some of the old social democracies such as the Scandinavian nations have begun to bend to neoliberalism, either voluntarily or as a response to coercion.

The major questions that need to be answered here are how and why has neo-liberalism become so widely accepted and how is it spreading across the globe? The movement toward a neo-liberal utopia originates from within the upper classes and is made possible by the 'politics of financial deregulation' (Bourdieu, 1998). One of the most salient examples being the Multilateral Agreement on Investment from the mid 1990's which was designed to protect foreign corporations from the control of nation states (Ibid.). Neo-liberalism draws its power from the fact that it serves the interests of society's elites, of stockholders who are attracted by high short-term profits at the expense of long-term viability, businesspersons and prominent politicians who almost invariably come from the upper class. This can be seen in the published records of MP's outside interests, many sit on the managerial boards, own shares in companies and have roles that could, conceivably, conflict with their primary role of democratic representation.

That said, Neo-liberalism is also extremely attractive to the public because one of its stated aims is to enable entrepreneurial competition, which allows individuals unprecedented levels of personal freedom, giving them the opportunity to set up businesses and achieve what, for the want of a better term, can only be called the

'American Dream'. Furthermore, Gray (1998) makes a distinction between what he calls 'good' and 'bad' capitalism. 'Good' capitalism appears to be founded in social democratic nations where "the social costs which businesses carry… enable them to function as social institutions without undermining the cohesion of the larger societies in which they operate" (Gray, 1998: 79). These social costs are carried through the higher taxes that companies pay in social democratic societies. By contrast companies born of the free market, neo-liberal model have fewer social obligations, consequently pay less tax and almost float free of the societies in which they operate. This limits the ability of companies born of socially embedded markets to compete with those of free markets.

Up to this point this section has been somewhat critical of neo-liberalism, but it is important to realise that there are a number of benefits to the neo-liberal enterprise. The freedom it affords the individual allows them, at least in theory, to fulfil their entrepreneurial potential, chase ambitions and generally pursue their own interests for individual betterment. Through its emphasis on privatisation it drives competition within markets allowing consumers more choice and driving those who do not listen to the consumer out of business. By facilitating competition it drives down prices and supposedly gives the consumer a better deal. An apposite example might be the UK energy industry, which, when under the control of the state, effectively could not be challenged with anything short of a general election. Twenty years after privatisation, however, we have a number of energy companies vying to offer their customers the 'best' deal with the most expensive or those with poor service potentially coming off worse in the battle for market share. Ohmae (1990) has also argued that what he calls 'the borderless world', by which he means a world without trade barriers operating at the whims of a totally free market, will help create equality and provide greater life chances for a greater portion of the world population. He cites the example of Malaysia, which, after opening itself up to foreign investment, became "the largest exporter of semiconductor chips in the world" (Ibid: 174). This, as it is not difficult to imagine, created much more wealth for the general population than simply exporting abundant natural resources. Thus, neo-liberalism does have its positive aspects, many of them rather persuasive.

Margaret Thatcher, like many of neo-liberalisms key proponents, thought there was "no alternative" (Harvey, 2005: 40) to going down their chosen path if Britain wanted a happy, prosperous future. However, as hinted thus far, there does appear to be at least one competing model even if we travel no further than continental Europe in our search. It is an alternative that rests not in radical socialism or anything to do with revolution at all but simply in a slightly different form of capitalism more embedded in the social structures it exists to serve. Social Democracy exists not only in the fevered imaginings of a marginalised political left, it is alive and if not well then working in parts of northern Europe.

Neo-liberal economists have espoused the death of European social democracy ever since British and American unemployment rates started to fall during the early 1990's while Continental Europe's remained relatively high. This, it is argued, is "the price… [of] ignoring the injunctions of *laissez faire* economics and persisting with their inflexible labour markets and rigged capital markets" (Hutton, 2002: 237). This is not to suggest that European nations are ignoring neo-liberalism in its entirety, many have implemented policies like welfare state retrenchment because of budgetary concerns

and policies that include re-evaluating the tax and benefit systems to make going back to work more worthwhile for the long term unemployed (Ibid. 238). However, they also have better working relationships between the public and private sectors, evidenced by Sweden's recent commitment to have an oil free economy, including private sector, by 2020 (Vidal, 2006).

Furthermore, there are a number of companies that although European in origin exist in the global marketplace competing with neo-liberal capitalism on its own terms. Finland's Nokia, for instance, is one of the worlds leading mobile phone companies and yet it must deal with Finland's high tax levels, a highly unionised workforce and paying relatively high wages to the fifty percent of its workforce that live and work in Finland. This is not the profile of a company on the verge of going bust, despite neo-liberal assertions that it should be struggling in an increasingly competitive global market. For the purposes of this dissertation, however, the most important aspect of these societies is their consistently lower recorded crime rates than those common to their neo-liberal counterparts. This disparity is discussed in great detail in subsequent sections.

Neo-liberalism has moved into the mainstream in the last few decades but far from being a new ideology it appears to be a revival of classical liberalism. At its simplest it proposes that human needs are best served by liberating individuals to pursue personal entrepreneurial ambition in a supportive environment. It is, for a number of reasons, a very attractive proposition, however, it may not be as beneficial for the long-term viability of our society as it might appear at first glance.

Neoliberalism, Consumer Culture and Identity

The rise of neo-liberalism has been accompanied by a comparably rapid expansion of consumer culture and broad changes in how we relate to our society and to each other. With this in mind it seems important to discuss the development of consumer culture as a parallel trend and its role in the formation of personal identity in neoliberal cultures. With the decline of a widely accepted class and community structures following social and political changes caused by the transition to neoliberalism coupled with the promotion of an ideal of personal social mobility, the population of western societies have had to find other ways of creating a sense of belonging. The way we seem to do this appears to be by engaging with consumer culture, or as Hayward puts it "the distinction between having and being has become somewhat confused as individuals increasingly construct identity through the commodities they consume and display" (2004: 160). Thus personal identity appears to be "influenced by the symbolic meaning of [our]… possessions" (Lury, 1996: 8).

The preoccupation of modern consumer theory is, to put it crudely, explaining why we 'want' or why "Contemporary man has an unlimited hunger for more goods" (Campbell, 2000: 49). The standard explanation of "Increased demand stemming from a new outburst of social emulation, coupled with strenuous attempts at manipulation of consumer wants by producers" (Ibid. 48) may not pay enough attention to some of the other changes in society, specifically the prevalence of neo-liberalism and the ideal of over-riding individual freedom. The 'Veblenesque perspective' proposes that people 'want' because commodities signify personal wealth and status (Veblen, 2000), thus implying that the primary motivation behind

human action is at least presenting a façade of personal wealth. If we couple this idea with the prevalence of the 'American dream' and growing social inequality in western societies (Toynbee, 2003), it is not inconceivable that people who do not have legitimate means of gaining the upwardly mobile identity that supposedly everyone can achieve within our commodity-oriented environment may seek other means of reaching this goal.

Karl Marx refers instead to 'commodity fetishism' (Lee & Newby, 1983: 131) seeing commodities taking on a fetishistic quality. This 'fetishisation' arose because of the alienation of workers from both the products of their labour and, perhaps more importantly, from the processes of production. The increasing reliance on mechanisation and automation in capitalist production means that work ceases to be an outlet for human creativity and instead becomes a "dehumanising, meaningless activity" (Ibid.). In this way labour becomes a purely instrumental activity and a means to some other end rather than an end in itself, thus the individual must find other ways of finding and displaying an identity. Marx argues that, in this eventuality, the commodity is imbued with "nonessential and imaginary meanings and attributes" (Marx, 2000: 10), which can in turn imbue those who engage in consumerism with a surrogate sense of social significance. This supposedly hastened the development of capitalism by creating a competitive individualist society in which we all compete to display outward signs of wealth.

There appears to be considerable agreement throughout the academic community on the reasons why we consume, what is not so clear is how this element of modern society creates deviance. At this point it is possible to turn to a number of criminological theories for guidance. Katz, for example, argues that the consumer culture creates deviance because it "offers the perpetrator a means of 'self transcendence', a way of overcoming the conventionality and mundanity typically associated with the banal routines of everyday… life" (quoted in Hayward, 2004: 149).

In this context there have been attempts to update anomic theory. At its simplest, strain theory expresses the idea that where there is a gap between the expectations of the individual in terms of personal wealth, security and life chances and the reality of social context, deviance and non-conformity may result (Burke, 2001). It is not difficult to see that this gap is a very real constituent of everyday life – we must only look to our society's preoccupation with fame, to the explosion of 'reality' television and to other elements of popular culture. But perhaps the prime example is the underlying ethos of much of today's popular music, including that of 'hip hop' which is best summed up by the rapper 50 Cent's 2002 album *Get Rich, or Die Tryin'*. It is possible that popular culture gives many young people the idea that they can be rich and famous too, the question that strain theory may be useful in answering is what happens when they realise that they are not going to achieve this by legitimate means.

This perhaps relates to neo-liberalism because "the neo-liberal economy doesn't provide symbolic identities, that is, sites from which we see ourselves. Rather it provides opportunities for new ways for me to imagine myself" (Dean, 2005). In other words, instead of giving us concrete social identities that come with our place in society, neo-liberalism seems to leave space only for fleeting identities based on our involvement in consumer culture potentially replacing communitarian security with

imaginary ideals. These 'imaginary ideals' become inculcated into an individual's superego and gradually begin to take the place of any pre-socialisation, unless, of course, the individual in question has been socialised into these imaginary ideals. The result of this is an individual whose conscience tells them to enjoy life at the expense of deferred gratification. This is supported by Žižek, "*symbolic* prohibitive norms are increasingly replaced by *imaginary* ideals… the lack of symbolic prohibition is supplemented by the re-emergence of ferocious superego figures [original emphasis]" (1999: 368). This psychological explanation arises from the psychodynamic model of the human psyche. According to this model the psyche is made up of three sections the 'Id', the 'Ego' and the 'Superego', which acts as our conscience (Cardwell et al, 1996: 417-418). From this basic explanation of psychological theory we might imagine that someone whose conscience adopts the values of consumerism may not be the most stable, self-satisfied of people.

Thus the way we define ourselves in our post-industrial societies may not be through identification with communitarian groups or solidarity with compatriots but by adopting the 'transcendental' consumerist ideals of the 'American dream' in which self arises out of our capacity to display cultural literacy. This ideal potentially replaces any pre-socialisation and may in some cases create individuals who will do almost anything to realise unattainable dreams, including, possibly, resorting to criminality.

Crime and the Consequences of Neoliberalism

In this section we explore the possible impact of neoliberalism's place at the heart of our national politics looking specifically at differences in crime rates between societies and the factors that might contribute to these differences whilst also offering an appraisal of their associations with the neoliberal advance. These factors include the breakdown of the civilising process (Elias, 1994) leading on to rising instrumentality and the Hobbesian 'war of all against all', the marginalisation of the lower classes and increasing polarised social inequality. Finally it offers an attempt to answer a long-standing question: if large sections of the population are demoralised and marginalised by modern capitalism, why aren't more of us willing to resort to crime.

We need not look far to notice stark differences in recorded crime between societies expressing different forms of capitalism. If we start by looking at relatively reliable, comparable indicators such as homicide rates (crimes of this sort tend to get noticed and reported as well as being fairly similar across cultures) the differences should become apparent. The average homicide rate in the EU was 1.59 per 100,000 between 1999 and 2001 with countries like Germany, Sweden and Austria falling below this level, this provides stark contrast to levels 5.56 per 100,000 in the USA (Hall, Forthcoming). Incidentally, Japan had a homicide rate of 1.08 offences per 100,000 in 1995 (Finch, 2001: 220), so despite being a post-industrial nation that was occupied by the Americans for a number of years Japanese murder rates resemble European levels. Thus we see pronounced differences between the areas under examination and between ideologies. What is striking, however, is the heightened criminality of the neo-liberal nations.

The idea that certain types of capitalism might influence people into deviant behaviour is not new, several theorists from the 19th and early 20th centuries (the era of classical liberalism) noticed many similar problems to those we are beginning to recognise today. Young (cited in Lea et al, 1996) provides a useful summary of Engels views on the crime problem in capitalist societies. He puts forward a four-fold distinction of individual adaptation to encroaching capitalism. Firstly, the individual can "become so brutalised so as to be, in effect, a determined creature" (Ibid), secondly, he or she can accept and engage with capitalism wholeheartedly, thirdly he or she can turn to crime or, finally, struggle for socialism. Although a little simplistic in its analysis, particularly in its assumption that the poor will 'steal the property of the rich' when today we have noticed that much crime is intra rather than inter-class, it remains useful. Brutalisation, it appears, occurs simply because of the demoralising effects of the treatment of the working class by the bourgeoisie, being treated as something subhuman may lead inexorably to criminality, at least according to Engels. Those who accept capitalism will find themselves living a life where they are separated from their fellow man in a "dissolution of mankind into monads" (Ibid, 2). Engels argued that this dissolution would breed individuals who care for nothing but personal interest and advancement. As a consequence many of these people were no longer capable of settling interpersonal differences amicably and would resort to violence and the law courts. Thus even those who accept capitalism are in Engels' view not beyond turning to crime. He even argues that rising crime under capitalism is an essential factor in stimulating a coming revolution. As the class-consciousness of the proletariat grows they leave behind many forms of crime and yet maintain the motivation, their hatred of the bourgeois hegemony. According to Engels, rising crime rates are a healthy sign, a sign that he and Karl Marx were right to predict a revolution. If we move back to the present day, we know this revolution never came about most likely because Engels underestimated the power of Victorian social reform and the levels of subscription to the bourgeois ideal and did not foresee state subscription to Keynesian economics.

Willem Bonger (2003 [1916]) also wrote on this topic during the early 20th century. He proposed that a 'favourable environment' could prevent egoistic acts but an economic system based upon exchange instead of utility "cannot fail to have an egoistic character" (ibid. 58). Bonger thought that a society based on exchange would isolate individuals from each other by "weakening the bonds that unite them" (Ibid.). The primary bond between individuals in early capitalist society was a sense of shared interest and common fate, but (neoliberal) capitalism might actually dismantle this bond by forcing people to compete with each other for work, income and social position. It seems quite obvious that this all sounds very normal in the present day and is no more than a statement of reality but we must remember that this economic type was still relatively new at the beginning of the 20th century.

Bonger's explanations for the rise of social inequality and for the demoralising effect that capitalism can have on individuals arose from the necessity of labour to capitalist production and in particular the need of the producer to purchase labour (and from the labourer's need to sell). Bonger argues that people are forced to sell their labour to avoid starvation, which, in most cases, does not enter the equation now because of the remnants of our welfare state. However, it is still the case that we need to work to provide for ourselves, thus Bonger's idea that this situation gives rise to exploitation may still be relevant. "Little by little one class of men has become accustomed to

think that the others are destined to amass wealth for them" (Ibid. 60), this, thought Bonger, demoralises both the producer and the labourer. In the producer it creates greed and a disregard for those under his or her charge who are seen solely as profit making machines. In the labouring classes it creates feelings of insecurity and demoralisation because there is always a surplus of labour with which we can be threatened if we fail to live up to expectations.

Many of these ideas remain relevant despite their age and can serve to buttress more recent innovations including Elias' (1994) civilising process and its rumoured breakdown. The civilising process attempts to explain why we moved from a vicious, brutal and uncivilised cultural form to what we would now consider to be 'civilised' during the 18th century, one of the major symptoms of which being a shift in how we go about punishing criminals from the corporal and capital to the carceral. Elias (1994) saw the developments in punishment as a symptom of a wider change in society, of the development of evolved sensibilities and of empathy for our fellow human beings. The 'civilising process' is based on the work of Sigmund Freud and the psychodynamic model of the human psyche (as explained previously). Elias proposed that it was the development of the superego that leads to the beginning of the 'civilising process'.

During the Middle Ages we supposedly had a much wider emotional range and were capable of much more violent actions but also of greater passion. According to Elias, a truncation of this emotional range forms the basis of his 'civilising process' leading us to become less barbaric but also less passionate. The 'civilising process' is supposedly made up of three distinct developments: firstly, interpersonal violence became illegal with the state taking a monopoly on its application; second, the populous must come to rely upon each other (Norbert Elias & process sociology, 1995) and realise their interconnectedness, seen as essential for the development of empathy; third, the populous must learn manners, politeness and etiquette and stop expressing the more animal impulses of the 'Id' in public. However, this process was never seen as a permanent change, Fletcher (1997) writes that Elias frequently used terms like barbarisation when talking about the Holocaust, which he described as "a throwback to the Barbarism and savagery of earlier ages" (Fletcher, 1997: 180).

Neo-liberalism with its emphasis on self-fulfilment and the competitive individual could well be undermining one of the central concerns of the 'civilising process', that of the interconnectedness of people – pushing some into reformulating it as the 'Pseudo-Pacification Process' (Hall, 2000; Hall & Winlow, 2004; Hall et al, 2005). This might imply that we were never really 'civilised' in any permanent way, that we were happy enough to live peaceful lives while it was the easiest option. Some commentators have even noted a growing "affinity to the general barbarism that the Enlightenment and capitalism's unique civilising project had palpably failed to leave behind" (Hall & Winlow, 2004: 281). This raises questions around the purpose of the 'civilising process' as well as Elias' (1994) assertion that people were simply getting better in line with the liberal ideals of civility, freedom and democracy. It would seem that if this had been the aim all along, such civility would be unshakable by the forces of neo-liberalism and increased competition both globally and individually.

What might have been missing from Elias' account was a Foucaultian/Marxian appreciation of the reasons behind increasing civility. Foucault (1979) asserts that the

primary motivation was a need to protect the new property rights of the bourgeois class and to socialise the population into an effective working force for capitalism's new industries, this is why we saw the growth of the prison as a means of punishment. Although there is little doubt that the civilising process did reduce crime and specifically instances of serious interpersonal violence (Hall & Winlow, 2004: 282), this was purely temporary because it was motivated by the needs of the bourgeois classes to protect themselves and their property not because of a widely acknowledged need for greater civility and pacification.

In this interpretation capitalism might appear to have harnessed the fundamental insecurity of the human condition by providing jobs but also maintaining a labour surplus with which those who did not conform could be threatened. Since then, any political movement that threatened to create too much economic security for the individual has been seen as counterproductive by liberal ideologues (Hall, 1997). However, we must acknowledge the accomplishments of industrial capitalism in creating an inclusive economy, which, though based upon the same premise, seems to have done a better job of including and thus pacifying the lower classes than today's somewhat more exclusive model.

During the post-war social democratic era (roughly 1945 to late 1970s) traditional working class communities were fairly solid, stable entities where individuals gained identity through their work and through ideological identification with their compatriots. For sake of argument this relatively prosperous period came to an end in 1979 with the election of Margaret Thatcher, the leader of our first neoliberal government. This government simply were not willing to protect and subsidise industries like coal mining that were not 'profitable' in a world of increased global competition.

Though this might sound reasonable enough with modern sensibilities, its affects on those who relied on such industries for their livelihood seem to have been largely ignored. With the destruction of these traditional forms of working class life the 'proletarian hard-man', the pre-requisite workforce of heavy industry, was reduced "to a position of radical insignificance" (Hall, 2000: 36). He simply did not and could not fit into the burgeoning new service economy, leaving many inner city estates originally built to service particular industries struggling to find a source of income. Today many of these areas have become areas of permanent local recession (Taylor, 1999) with no jobs and permanently marginalised populations. "Seeing no attraction in the… routine forms of exploitation offered by neo-capitalist consumer/service work, many males continue to seek new functions and rewards…in the unregulated alternative economies" (Hall et al, 2005: 109).

Thus we see multi-million pound economies developing around illegal items like drugs and firearms with a minority of people from such marginalised communities moving into these illegal economies as a way of achieving the lifestyle of conspicuous consumption that would otherwise be denied them. This, note Hall and Winlow (2003), is compounded by a 'hegemonic liberal cult of the self', which ensures that only values like individualism, entrepreneurship and personal lifestyle opportunity are expressed in popular discourse. Another study by Hall and Winlow (2005) shows this phenomenon in action in both socially marginalised young people and their more integrated fellows.

This second group, although we should emphasise that they are predominantly law abiding, appear to have lost many of the characteristics of working class solidarity and been forced to adapt "to advanced capitalism's distinctly competitive individualisation process" (Ibid. 32). One of the most pressing adaptations, note the authors, appears to be a dismantling of friendship networks as they are replaced by groups of acquaintances capable of facilitating. "successful immersion of the self in the competitive and often narcissistic symbolic interplay of nocturnal leisure" (Ibid. 36). In other words, some young people seem to be thinking of 'friendships' not as deep, meaningful interpersonal connections but in terms of what they can get out of them. This attitude also appears to extend to employment, which they seem to regard purely as a means to spending hard earned cash in the conspicuously hedonistic world of the nocturnal economy or on the many products of the consumer economy.

If we look for these same characteristics in the socially marginalised criminal population we find them flourishing. 'Friendships' "are little more than a shifting matrix of brief financial transactions and exploitative deals" (Ibid. 38). This section of the population also appear to share aspects of their peers' attitude to 'real ork', seeing it as a waste of time, a realm of poor pay and jumped-up bureaucrats. The legitimate economy is not seen as a viable path to the prosperity advertised by mainstream culture – one respondent in Hall and Winlow's (2005) study summarised this attitude with admirable brevity, "I think something like, maybe 50 grand, and then its [work] worth it. You get yourself a Mercedes, all the best clobber, then you can put up with it". There seems to be a common denial of the fact that this sort of expectation may be unrealistic and that the few that do make this sort of salary have probably either been extremely lucky, worked hard or had the resources behind them (namely money and the right friends) to make it a possibility. That said many seem to have noticed that there is little or no chance of gaining the lifestyle mainstream culture appears to promote by participating in the legitimate economy.

In addition to such inconsistencies of expectation we must also look to the growing gap between rich and poor to advance our appraisal of neoliberalism and its impact on criminal behaviour. Taking the United Kingdom as the example government statistics (National Statistics, 2005) show that although relatively steady and evenly distributed until the early 1980's the income of the top ten percent has risen much faster than that of the majority creating a growing 'wealth gap'. In 2003 the British poor were making approximately £170 per week, a figure that had only risen by £70 since 1971. In contrast those in the top 10 percent were making £660 per week in 2002-2003, which has risen dramatically by £350 since 1971. This appears to show a a marked discrepancy in the distribution of wealth within society, which the governments own figures show started to develop around the time neo-liberalism moved into the political mainstream (quoted in Harvey, 2005).

Many have acknowledged this aspect of the neo-liberal transition, David Harvey, for instance, notes "redistributive effects and increasing social inequality have in fact been such a persistent feature of neoliberalization as to be regarded as structural to the whole project" (ibid. 16). Even more controversially Dumènil and Lèvy (2004) conclude that neoliberalisation has, since conceived, been a project with the aim of restoring power to the upper classes after they lost much of it to social movements and redistributive government policies after the Second World War. For modern

Britain the result appears to be a problematically low minimum wage implicitly acknowledged by government tax credits that serve to top up the income of the low paid.

While such policies may work to stimulate economic growth by helping companies keep their costs down it may also have an adverse effect of the self-respect and social integration of those working at the bottom end of the income scale. We noted above that young, socially marginalised young people struggled to see that value of legitimate work and this appears to be reflected in some of the research on pay conditions. Toynbee (2003) asserts that adequate pay plays an important roll in status and self-worth. Company directors who can in some cases take home millions every year in salary in stock options will admit that they don't really need the money but their pay gives them a sense of status (Ibid). The low status and remuneration afforded occupations open to those with limited educational achievement may well contribute to the demoralising effects discussed previously.

The third and final element of the neoliberal transition we have space to discuss appears to be a set of changes in the way we organise and perform 'social control' (social structures that hold us to the norms of our society). Over the course of the last 50 years many western nations have implemented changes in their internal construction of social control. Broadly speaking this has been expressed as a move away from traditional forms of control towards a "more ego-dominated self regulation allowed for the reflexive and flexible calculation that came to be expected" (Wouters, 1999: 416). As we relax the informal controls associated with the post war era and begin to rely more on personal judgement in combination with a rapid expansion of legal penalty perhaps more are likely to consider the possibility of committing deviants acts. Most criminological explanations of this development tend to focus on either changing control or upon the disintegration of morality and ineffective socialisation. What actually happened, however, was a relaxation of some controls and an intensification of others. In other words we have moved away from expecting individuals to be controlled by society and toward each individual controlling him or her self (ibid.) with an expansion of penalties if we fail.

If this development is coupled with the current of individualisation promoted by neoliberalisation, the deepening of social inequality as well as the development of a more expansive consumer culture it is just possible that some individuals may 'control' themselves into criminality in order to fulfil unrealistic expectations gathered from interactions between consumer culture and the 'hegemonic liberal cult of the self'. For the relatively well off, adopting the codified rules (laws) of our post industrial society may be advantageous enough to mitigate against a certain amount of criminality (if we ignore the white-collar variety) but for those who are disadvantaged by the current political economy, who live in areas where there are no jobs and no way of fulfilling their desires, what reason remains to be law abiding? In fact, many of the characteristics of the current political economy "such as reflexivity of the self and the weakening of collective identities" (Furlong & Cartmel, 1997: 82) that have been discussed above, may well have a deleterious effect upon social cohesion and control and perhaps even contribute to the crime rates of neoliberal nations.

The question that immediately comes to mind is that if we are all affected in the preceding ways by post-industrial capitalism then why do more of us not turn to

crime? A suitable place to start would have to be control theory. Control theory is according to Travis Hirschi a theory that states "delinquent acts result when an individual's bond to society is weak or broken" (Burke, 2001: 205). This 'social bond' consists of four elements, with the central idea being that we all have too much invested in society to commit crime and that we believe in the status quo. Here the present reading of control theory must depart from the traditional – if we wish to apply it to the subject of this dissertation it may be worth looking at control theory through the lens of radical criminology.

Radical theory concentrates on the interests of the upper classes and how these give rise to crime and punishment (Ibid. 152-153). As we noted above, our ability to form 'friendship' attachments with our compatriots appears to be decaying in some sections of our community. If this is truly the case, an absence of 'effective bonding' (between individuals and in their relationship with their state) may partially explain the relatively high crime rates that appear common to neoliberal countries. What actually stops more of us committing crime may be that instead of bonding to our society we come to embody the proliferation of 'rules' and laws within our societies (Hall, 2006), that these can take the place of informal control where external pressures are not too great.

Throughout this section we have discussed a number of social problems that appear to be intimately linked to the transition toward a more neoliberal mode of governance. Before moving on it may be worth pointing out that these are not just the preserve of an embittered and defeated political left but are also acknowledged by some of neoliberalism's leading theorists. Fukuyama (1998), for instance, recently admitted that frenzied competitive individualism and the expansion of consumption could have some rather 'disruptive' affects that may not be sustainable over the long term. While it seems to have become something of a political hegemon, at least in the Anglophone nations, neoliberalism may not be without considerable chinks in its armour as the following case studies further demonstrate.

Case Studies

The United States of America: Embodying Neoliberalism

The United States is perhaps the country that can best be used to illustrate some of the points made about neo-liberalism and its relationship with criminality in the preceding sections. In so doing we take a brief look at American history in an attempt to explain why they rejected homegrown iterations of a more socialistic outlook comparable with European Social Democracy. It also looks to American crime rates and tries to show how they might be linked to local versions of the phenomena discussed in the preceding section and to their version of neoliberal governance.

Despite the fact that the United States is probably the greatest representation of neo-liberal ideology, something vaguely resembling socialism did make an appearance on their side of the Atlantic, albeit briefly. After his election in 1933 President Roosevelt began a program of reform that preceded the successes of European Social Democracy by some fifteen years. New laws were passed to take control of the economy, to fix prices and wages and to limit competition, measures were also taken to lower the price of utilities (electricity specifically) and help the unemployed back

into work. Many of these measures were eventually struck down by the Supreme Court for being unconstitutional, but while the government was coming up with the vaguely socialistic policies of the 'New Deal' the US, for the first and only time in its history, had its own communist party that was becoming very popular through its efforts to organise the working classes (Zinn, 2001).

But this all changed rather abruptly, communism became a byword for evil during the Cold War with 'witch hunts' and a number of people being scapegoated for wider, more complex social problems. With the election of Ronald Reagan in 1980 old style liberalism made a big comeback as Neo-liberalism. Reagan was helped into power by the support of large corporations (something he has in common with the current president) and by the year 2000 they "had used that leverage to restore… [their] share of the national wealth and income to levels… not seen since the 1920's" (Harvey, 2005: 55). Today the USA exemplifies many of the problems discussed previously, often featuring near the top of the most ignominious world league tables including those for inequality and violent crime.

All told, the United States records roughly 24 million crimes per year with a population of 295 million (Nationmaster, 2005). Although this sounds quite high it is actually quite similar to the UK crime rate and only seems high because of the population imbalance. What is striking however is their incidence of violent offences, particularly at the more serious end of the scale. In 2002, average non-fatal violence rates in the United States reached 310 per 100 000 population with comparable rates of 44 in the UK, 41 in Finland and 25 in Denmark (Hall, Forthcoming). Homicide rates are also correspondingly high with a level of 5.59 per 100 000 population in 2002, which compares unfavourably with an average European rate of 1.59 (ibid.). From this limited comparison of crime rates (while always acknowledging the fallibility of international comparison, we can begin to see why US incidence of violent criminality in particular might look high from a European perspective but it remains for us to adequately link this to current political formations.

As noted above neoliberal societies broadly tend to be characterised by the concentration of wealth in the hands of the top few percent of the population and increasingly polarised social inequality. With this in mind it may come as no surprise that the US is one of the most unequal developed nations. In 1999, the richest 0.1% of the US population held 6% of total national wealth (Harvey, 2005) and it "has more of its population living in poverty - 19.1% - than any other western industrialised country" (Hutton, 2002: 149). Since the 1980's America has become more and more unequal, salaries for those at the top of American society have grown massively, to the point where the country now has more than three million people with more than $1 million worth of assets. Over he same period the earnings of the average household have fallen creating a disparity compounded by decades of successive tax cuts, which makes redistribution of wealth to benefit the poor all but impossible even if there was the political will to do it (Ibid.). wealth to benefit the poor impossible even if there was the political will to do so (Ibid.). This is likely to be compounded further by current proposals for a flat rate of taxation, which would effectively mean that the poor pay more than the rich for national government. This is also further aggravated by the fact that it is almost impossible to live a fulfilling life on American minimum wage (30 Days: Minimum Wage, 2006).

Up to this point we have dealt solely with income inequality, but as is quite easy to imagine in a society where money is everything, income inequality leads to social inequality. The key vehicle of social mobility is education but the lack of redistributive taxation means that those on low incomes cannot afford to send their children to university, leaving them with no way out of the lower echelons of America's class system. Conversely, those with the money can afford a first class education thus tightening their grip on the upper echelons of American society (Hutton, 2002). The United States thus appears to be a staggeringly unequal society that can only debunk some of the central myths of the neoliberal experiment. The idea that the neo-liberalism will allow previously unprecedented levels of inter-class mobility, for instance may well be profoundly untrue, in reality "Britain and the US have the lowest intergenerational mobility across the European and Northern American nations" (Hall, Forthcoming)

As noted above the United States is possibly one of the most violent developed societies. The reasons for this have the root in the way the nation formed from a loose confederation of individual states. The only way such heterogenous colonies could be melded into one superpower was to form a consensus around the lowest common denominators, those of liberty and the free market (Hutton, 2002). Thus the United States has always had problems maintaining a consensus around deeper issues like government, punishment and taxation. What we have seen so far is that when values like liberty and individuality find their way to the forefront of national consciousness and combine with a culture of 'conspicuous consumption' it can result in criminality via diminution of the 'civilising process'. However, there is also the possibility that they have in some way bypassed the civilising process altogether.

As a nation it does not have the collective experiences of its European neighbours, in fact only 500 ago years it was a nation founded upon violence, exploitation and personal enrichment and has continued in much the same vein ever since. It has only moved from the exploitation of 'Indians' and the imported black population, through the violent armed suppression of strikes and pickets (Zinn, 2001: 235) to attempting to export its corrupting ideology across the surface of the globe (Harvey, 2005). The problem with taking this approach is that it implies the USA has never really been civilised, which could be problematic in terms of actually stimulating an informed, civilised debate on the future of neoliberalism and associated political economic formations. However, what we can see from this is the affect the ideology of limitless personal freedom has upon the civilising process. As discussed previously what this does is limit the ability of individuals to connect with each other and form the bonds that are so essential for the development and maintenance of civility.

Thus the United States appears to be the consummate neoliberal state and is probably the only state in the world founded upon liberal principles. What this tells us is that it is also likely to be an accurate expression of the consequences of this ideology, a category that seems to include a highly polarised social structure, relatively high crime rates and noteworthy incidence of violent criminality that seems to transcend the norm for 'developed societies'.

Japan: Confucianism to Encroaching Neoliberalism

Japan has always been seen as somewhat mysterious by westerners but in the case of criminality we may well be right. It is a nation of 120 million people that records only three million offences per year. In comparison this with the UK (which has a population of sixty million and roughly six million recorded offences per year) (Nationmaster, 2005), Japan effectively has 25% of the criminality we might expect them to have if they followed western European crime trends.

During the Tokugawa period (1600-1868) Japan closed itself off to the outside world maintaining stability by expelling westerners and removing the threat they posed to the legitimacy of the Emperor and the Shōgun (Henshall, 2004). This self-imposed ended abruptly by the arrival of a small American fleet of steam powered battleships in 1853 demanding that Japan open itself to trade. From 1854 onwards Japan raced to modernise before what they saw as an inevitable invasion by western powers. The age of the samurai was brought abruptly to an end, the shōgunate fell to be replaced by a new emperor and Japan started to move towards industrial capitalism with haste (ibid).

In the west all our experience tells us that such rapid industrialisation should lead to unrest and rising crime rates but it did not, in fact Japanese crime rates only began to rise in any noticeable way in the mid-1990's, although there were minor rises from 1983 onwards (Leonardsen, 2004: 39). A number of commentators have put forward the idea that Japan's increasing levels of criminality are due to decreasing levels of social control (Hill, 2003: 272) as they finally move toward a more western social outlook.

Prior to the 1990's Japan was a highly controlled society expressing a form of state managed capitalism coupled with a highly developed system of informal social control. Close links between state and business, and a system of 'administrative guidance' allowed the Japanese state to persuade business to move in certain directions, toward microelectronics for instance. State oversight of the national economy sat alongside a broad subscription to 'Japanised' Confucianism both functioning to keep Japanese society relatively stable and crime free over an extended period of time. Chinese Confucianism expressed the necessity of harmony, loyalty and duty, which would be mirrored by a benevolent government, however if government was not benevolent then it could legitimately be deposed. In Japan, this notion of benevolent rule and democratic censorship disappeared, this was a cause of much discussion during the Tokugawa era but was eventually removed as a concern by the Shintō assertion that every Japanese individual is ultimately related to the Imperial line thus loyalty to the ruling powers and ones own family interest becomes the same thing (Hendry, 1995:126).

The 20th century manifestation of this idea is the '*ie*' (family) system in which the world is divided into the *uchi* (inner circle) and *Yoso* (outer circle) (Van Wolferen, 1989; Komiya, 1999). It has survived to this day because of the way Japan was forced to open up to international trade at the End of the Tokugawa period. Because Japan had to adapt to its new situation and quickly gain the respect it needed to stave off invasion it quickly scrapped its old legal codes and transplanted a combination of French and German legal statutes to form the basis of a new system. The way this was done left old codes of conduct and moralities intact, mostly because of the fact that while the government was trying to present a western façade they were also

emphasising a set of ancient ethics known as *kokutai* which stressed loyalty to superiors.

This has resulted in some suspicion of law and legal systems on the part of the Japanese people who see it as a system of constraint rather than protection (Komiya, 1999) and also in what observers have called a dual legal culture in which one standard applies to those in one's social group and another applies to those outside. This manifests itself in the distinction between *uchi* and *yoso*. The world of the *uchi* comes laden with a set of *giri* (duties) that must be performed to the best of one's abilities. *Giri* governs personal action by eliciting favours from superiors, which can include anything from a drink after work to a helping hand up the career ladder and even marriage brokering. Most Japanese workers realise that if they want to benefit from being a member of an *uchi* they have to do their *giri*, if they do not it can lead to social ostracision, career stagnation and loneliness.

As we might imagine this system can have a powerful controlling affect on the individual (Komiya, 1999). However, if someone does offend their *uchi* the Japanese are often reluctant to resort to law because an individual can be brought back into the fold by informal sanctions of the type that Braithwaite (1989) called 're-integrative shaming'. Thus there is often little need to turn to the law for dispute resolution within the *uchi* relationship. This system is enforced through the socialisation of the young, naughty children, for instance, are punished by being sent outside away from the family unit, in a sense they are ostracised from their uchi. Thus the young learn early that it is better to fit in than to stand out (Komiya, 1999).

The *yoso* world consists of everyone outside the *uchi* where there is a complete lack of *giri* consciousness and capacity for informal sanction. Consequently, the Japanese are much more willing to resort to litigation in the *yoso* world to protect their individual interests. The reason this does not feature too highly in Japanese crime rates (or didn't until the early 1990's) is that most Japanese are members of an *uchi* and cannot risk losing its favour. In this simple observation we might see a problem for the future – if western values such as individualism and personal freedom were to find their way to Japan it is not inconceivable that more of the population might eventually come to identify with the *yoso* over and above their *uchi*.

There is already some evidence that this is happening. Sugimoto (1997) writes that Japan is becoming more westernised with the younger generation in particular starting to adopt western values. The wartime and post-war generations experienced the hardship of the years after World War Two while rebuilding their society from the ground up. They remember the rapid change in values from imperialism to measured liberalism but "they inherited the style of the wartime generation and worked hard" (Ibid. 67). The children of the post war generation are thought to be slightly different. The 'prosperity generation' has grown up in a much more western environment than feeling the influence of consumerism and a broad emphasis on the individual. "[W]ith the emergence of the prosperity generation came the… 'neglect of the public and indulgence of the self'" (Ibid. 68). As if to add credence to this assertion, a study conducted by Japans institute if statistical mathematics illustrates that the percentage of Japanese wishing to lead 'an honourable life with consideration of civic spirit' has decreased while those wanting to live 'comfortable, enjoyable lives where they do what they want' has risen on the order of 30% in the last 50 years (ibid. 70).

Although it would be foolhardy to suggest that this transition may be the sole cause of Japan's rising crime rates it does show some parallels with the themes of decreasing social control and increasing instrumentalism as discussed previously in the context of the western hemisphere. Until recently the Japanese have experienced a measured success limiting the development of western values giving us a stark contrast to the development of competitive individualism.

Northern Europe: Social Democracy and Criminality

Despite neo-liberal assertions to the contrary the social democratic model of capitalism is neither dead nor doomed. This case study looks to European History to explain why they have stuck with something vaguely resembling socialism in an attempt to explain differences between US and European crime rates and, finally, the possible impact of encroaching neoliberalism.

European Social Democracy is based on a set of ideals often shunned by their neoliberal neighbours. Instead of individuals holding the means of production and deriving as much profit as possible from it, such vaguely socialistic societies tend to hold them in common (Schumpeter, 1976), aiming their social structures at equality rather than the maximisation of personal wealth. The first movements toward this sort of state were made in 1883 when Germany introduced health insurance policies followed, in 1889, plans for a state pension (Sassoon, 1996). Most of these early policies were based on insurance but the intension is clear, they were meant to move towards "a social service state, that is, a state that would acknowledge full responsibility in matters of sickness and unemployment" (Ibid. 138).

A number of reasons for such policies have been proposed over the years. The first, something of a conspiracy theory, holds that welfare was meant to hold off full-blown socialism, to buy off the working classes and discourage them from political action. Another explanation places the origins of the welfare state within economic necessity and the needs of industrial capitalism for a compliant workforce who would work in the factories. But in reality the motivation behind these developments seems to have had more to do with the wishes of the general population. In Britain, for instance, the Conservative party implemented social reforms because successive electoral defeats convinced them that it was the only way to remain electorally viable (ibid. 139). Whatever the reasoning, what matters is that these measures are still in place, even thought they appear to be diminishing. The reason for this is much simpler, it lies in the fact that continental Europeans have never really seen the attraction of Anglophone liberalism (Hutton, 2002).

At this point we should point out that European inequality is much less pronounced than in the USA but poverty still exists as it does everywhere – all welfare measures achieve is stopping those at the bottom becoming destitute, maintaining a certain amount of cohesion with the rest of society. In illustration, the GINI index scores countries on equality/inequality ranging from 0 to 100 with 0 representing a totally flat distribution of wealth. The United States scores a 40 on this index and compares unfavourably to many European countries including Sweden, Belgium, Norway, Finland (all 25) and Denmark (24) (Hurst, 2004: 160). However, it is not the redistribution of wealth that matters but real wages and it is here that many of these

European nations really show the value of the social democratic model. Countries like Finland and Sweden have high minimum wages (Hutton, 2002), which not only allows those at the bottom of the social hierarchy to have a decent quality of life but also provides a source of self-respect and personal investment in social structures. It is this that appears to be important in ensuring social stability and a relatively crime free society.

At this stage it is not really necessary to reiterate the point that European social democracies tend to experience less violence than the USA. Although probably not the only reason, it is easy to argue that this may be partly due to social democracy's tendency to preserve Elias' (1994) civilising process, one element of which is the interconnection of individuals, which allows for the development of empathy. What social democracy does is to maintain the connections between individuals by maintaining the unionisation of the workforce while a strong welfare state maintains even the poorest member's connections to social structures helping to guarantee a certain amount of personal investment in its continuation.

A potential problem for the future of these European nations arises from the rather virulent nature of neo-liberal ideology. John Gray's (1998) distinction between good and bad capitalism remains as relevant as ever and there is considerable evidence that European nations have had to adapt to compete in the new neo-liberal world economy. Since the 1970's social democratic parties across Europe have been moving in a neo-liberal direction, one of the primary indicators of this is welfare state retrenchment (Pennings, 1999). These countries start from a position of planning their economy, of nationalised industry and of a controlled economy but they are slowly moving toward scaling back welfare provision, free enterprise and the ascendancy of the individual (Ibid.). The problem is that the wholesale adoption of these values may contribute to a set of social problems that might take Europe down a road that is perhaps best left untraveled.

Many European countries have a long history of social intervention in the economy to prevent the kind of social inequality that exists in the United States preventing the kind of competitive individualisation of their population born of neoliberalisation. These European nations have acknowledged the fact that they need to adapt to compete in the liberalising world economy but far from wholesale adoption they have chosen only to pay lip service to this new ideology and adopt only the useful elements apparently maintaining some of their social cohesion in the process.

Conclusion

Hutton accurately sums up the neoliberal mindset "The American way was to live in a free market, to seize opportunity and to enjoy the fruits of one's work unoppressed by taxation or regulation" (2002: 115) that persists in the Anglophone nations. Capitalism's tendency to remove the old sources of identity and replace them with fleeting consumer gratification coupled with neo-liberalism's tacit endorsement of competitive individualisation have created a society in which many believe the life of the new aristocracy (a club consisting of film stars, sports stars, corporate 'fat cats' and lottery winners) is not beyond their reach if only they strive hard enough.

The problem is that this may create a society in which a small proportion of the population control themselves into criminality to achieve their consumptive potential. Individualisation of this type appears to break down the bonds between individuals that are so central to the civilising process brutalising western society. Case studies of northern European and countries such as Japan where neo-liberal values are beginning to encroach on older systems of government confirm that this ideology can be damaging to national stability, Japan in particular shows a startling correlation between the adoption of these values and crime rates beginning to rise.

It is as yet unclear whether these are transitional problems or something more permanent but the idea that these problems will disappear on their own at some point in the future seems rather optimistic if not a little naïve. Thus neo-liberalism may not directly cause criminality and violence in particular but its consequences certainly create the circumstances in which crime rates are more likely to rise.

References:

30 Days: Minimum Wage (2006) Channel 4, 3 April, 23:05 hrs

Bonger, W (2003 [1916]) 'Criminality and Economic Conditions' in Eugene McLaughlin, John Muncie & Gordon Hughes (Eds) *Criminological Perspectives* (2nd edn) London: SAGE publications pp58-64

Bourdieu, P (1998) *The Essence Of Neoliberalism* Available at: http://www.analitica.com/bitblio/bourdieu/neoliberalism.asp (Accessed: 18/02/2006)

Braithwaite, J (1989) *Crime, Shame and Reintegration* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press

Burke, R H (2001) *An Introduction to Criminological Theory* Cullumpton: Willan Publishing

Campbell, C (2000) 'The Puzzle of Modern Consumerism' in Lee, M J (Ed) *The Consumer Society Reader.* Oxford: Blackwell Publishers pp 48-72

Cardwell, M, Liz Clark & Claire Meldrum (1996) Psychology for A Level. London: HarperCollins

Dean, J (2005) *Enjoying Neoliberalism* Available at: http://www.long-sunday.net/long_sunday/files/enjoying_neo-liberalism.doc (Accessed: 18/02/2006)

Dumènil, G and Dominique Lèvy (2004) 'Neo-liberal Dynamics: Towards a New Phase?' in K. Van Der Pijl, L. Assassi & D. Wigan (Eds) *Global Regulation: Managing Crises after the Imperial Turn* London: Palgrave Macmillan

Elias, N (1994) *The Civilising Process* (Revised Edition) Oxford: Blackwell Publishing

Finch, A (2001) 'Homicide in Contemporary Japan' *British Journal of Criminology* 41 pp 219-235

Fletcher, J (1997) *Violence and Civilization: An Introduction to the Work of Norbert Elias* Cambridge: Polity Press

Foucault, M (1979) *Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison*. London: Penguin books

Fukuyama (1998) *The Great Disruption* London: Profile

Furlong, A & Fred Cartmel (1997) *Young People and Social Change: Individualization and Risk in Late Modernity* Buckingham: Open University Press

George, S (1999) *A Brief History of Neoliberalism* Available at: http://www.globalpolicy.org/globaliz/econ/histneol.htm (Accessed: 18/02/2006)

Gray, J (1998) *False Dawn: The Delusions of Global Capitalism*. London: Granta

Hall, S (1997) 'Visceral Cultures and Criminal Practices' *Theoretical Criminology* Volume 1 (4) pp453-478

Hall, S (2000) 'Paths to Anelpis 1: Dimorphic violence and the Psuedo-Pacification Process' *Parallax* Volume 6 (2) 36-53

Hall, S (2006) Conversation with Mark Horsley, 6th April

Hall, S (Forthcoming) 'A Tale of Two Capitalisms: A Preliminary Comparison of violence rates in European and Anglo-American Market Societies'

Hall, S & Simon Winlow (2003) 'Rehabilitating Leviathan: Reflections on the State, Economic Regulation and Violence Reduction' *Theoretical Criminology* Volume 7 (2) pp 139-162

Hall, S & Simon Winlow (2004) 'Barbarians at the Gate: Crime and violence in the Breakdown of the pseudo-pacification process' in J. Ferrell, K. Hayward, W.

Morrison & M. Presdee (Eds) *Cultural Criminology Unleashed* London: Cavendish pp 275-286

Hall, S & Simon Winlow (2005) 'Anti-Nirvana: Crime, Culture and Instrumentalism in the Age of Insecurity' *Crime, Media, Culture* Volume 1 (1) pp31-48

Hall, S, Simon Winlow & Craig Ancrum (2005) 'Radgies, Gangstas and Mugs: Imaginary Criminal Identities in the Twilight of the Pseudo-Pacification Process' *Social Justice* Volume 32 (1) pp100-112

Harvey, D (2005) *A Brief History of Neoliberalism* Oxford: Oxford University Press

Hayward, K J (2004) *City Limits: Crime, Consumer Culture and the Urban Experience* London: The Glasshouse Press

Hendry, J (1995) *Understanding Japanese Society* (2nd edn) London: Routledge

Henshall, K (2004) *A History of Japan: From Stone Age to Superpower* (2nd edn) New York: Palgrave Macmillan

Hill, P B E (2003) *The Japanese Mafia: Yakuza, Law and the State* Oxford: Oxford University Press

Hurst, C E (2004) *Social Inequality: Forms, Causes and Consequences* (5th edition) Massachusetts: Pearson Education

Hutton, W (2002) *The World We're In.* London: Time Warner Books

Komiya, N (1999) 'A cultural study of the low crime rate in Japan' *British Journal of Criminology.* Volume 39 (3) pp 369-390

Lea, J (1996) 'Poverty, Crime and Politics: Frederich Engels and the Crime Question' in Lea, J and Geoffrey Pilling (Eds) *The Condition of Britain: Essays on Frederich Engels* London: Pluto Books

Lee, D & Howard Newby (1983) *The Problem of Sociology* London: Routledge

Leonardsen, D (2004) *Japan as a Low Crime Nation* London: Palgrave Macmillan

Lury, C (1996) *Consumer Culture* Cambridge: Polity Press

Marx, K (2000) 'The Fetishism of the Commodity and its Secret' in Lee, M J (Ed) *The Consumer Society Reader.* Oxford: Blackwell Publishers pp 10-18

National Statistics (2005) "Income: gaps in income and wealth remain large," Available at: http://www.statistics.gov.uk/cci/nugget.asp?id=1005 (Accessed: 04/04/2006)

Nationmaster (2005) Available at: http://www.nationmaster.com (Accessed 25/11/2005)

Norbert Elias and Process Sociology (1995) Available at: http://www.usyd.edu.au/su/social/elias/ast/ast22_2.htm (Accessed: 15/12/2005)

Ohmae, K (1990) *The Borderless World: Power and Strategy in the Global Marketplace* London: Harper Collins Publishers

Pennings, P (1999) 'European social democracy between planning and market: a comparative explanation of trends and variations' *Journal of European Public Policy* Volume 6 (5) pp743-756

Sassoon, D (1996) *One Hundred Years of Socialism: The Western European Left in the Twentieth Century* London: I. B. Tauris

Scholte, J A (2000) *Globalization: A Critical Introduction* London: Palgrave Macmillan

Schumpeter (1976) *Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy* London: George Allen & Unwin

Sugimoto, Y (1997) *An Introduction to Japanese Society* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press

Taylor, A (1999) *Crime in Context: A Critical Criminology of Market Societies* Cambridge: Polity Press

Toynbee, P (2003) 'Mean Britain' *The Guardian* 17th January

Van Wolferen, K (1989) *The Enigma of Japanese Power* London: Macmillan

Veblen, T (2000) 'Conspicuous Consumption' in Lee, M J (Ed) *The Consumer Society Reader.* Oxford: Blackwell Publishers pp 31-47

Vidal, J (2006) 'Sweden Plans to be Worlds First Oil Free Economy' *The Guardian* 8th February

Wouters, C (1999) 'Changing Patterns of Social Controls and Self-Controls: On the Rise of Crime Since the 1950s and the Sociogenesis of a Third Nature' *British Journal of Criminology* Volume 39 (3) pp 416-432

Zinn, H (2001) *A People's History of the United States: 1942 – Present*. New York: HarperCollins.

Žižek, S (1999) *The Ticklish Subject: The Absent Centre of Political Ontology* London: Verso