COMBATTING HATE?:
A SOCIO-LEGAL DISCUSSION ON
THE CRIMINALIZATION OF HATE IN CANADA

by
Senaka K. Suriya

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Department of Law
Carleton University
Ottawa, Ontario

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Decades of political dealings as well as judicial exchanges on law-making pertaining to hate in Canada have resulted in the creation of hate crime legislation. The contemporary debates on hate usually focus on the legalities of this hate crime legislation. This research, however, using a liberal consensus approach as well as a conflict approach, critically explores whether the criminalization of hate effectively combats hate in Canada.
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1. INTRODUCTION

Ernst Zündel, the Toronto Holocaust denier, was once again in newspapers in December 1997. He was appearing in front of the Canadian Human Rights Tribunal to defend the allegation of the Toronto Mayor's Committee on Community and Race Relations that his web site could expose Jews to hatred¹. Approximately two weeks before this affair, a gang of teenage boys and girls in Saanich, B.C., was at the centre of public attention for murdering fourteen year old Reena Virk, an "overweight" "dark-skinned" girl of "East Indian" origin. The gang members have since been charged with second-degree murder and aggravated assault². Less than three weeks before


this murder case hearing, Councillor Gordon Chong was elected to the new megacity council of Toronto during the November, 1997, Ontario municipal elections; he received nation-wide publicity for his remarks that the Roma people were "Gypsies" who exist by 'pickpocketing', 'pimping' wives and daughters and 'bumming' around at the expense of the social-welfare-net\(^3\). All of these individuated acts of hate made news, distancing the Canadian society at large from them.

Canadians would like to regard themselves as members of a kinder and gentler society, blaming bigotry and hostility in the society on a minority of narrow-minded individuals. However, according to a Decima Poll published in the *Maclean's* of December 27, 1993, seventy-two percent of Canadians think that racial minority groups ought to adopt Canadian cultural values and forget their own traditions\(^4\), implying that the cultural values of racial minorities are not Canadian. These attitudes cannot be completely isolated from exhibited behaviours as they are inextricably interwoven together\(^5\). Margaret Cannon

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characterizes this racism as "the invisible empire" of Canada, because it is a way of life, of thinking and of acting; it is found where Canadians work, live, play and raise their children. Importantly, peoples' attempts to 'outCanadian' each other happen not only on the basis of race, but also in relation to national or ethnic origin, language, colour, religion, sex, age, mental or physical disability, sexual orientation or various other factors. Although faceless, and by appearance fairly inconsequential, this nature of hatred consequentially affects the daily life of individuals.

The often stated solution to hatred is the criminalization of hate. Hate crime laws are often presented as a serious commitment on the part of the

Communities Can Respond. Toronto: Community Advisory Committee on Anti-Hate and Anti-Racism of the Municipality of Metropolitan Toronto at 12; Canadian Association of Chiefs of Police, 1996, Hate Crimes in Canada: In Your Back Yard, Ottawa at 5.


However, the Comité d'intervention contre la violence raciste states these aspects of hatred are generally interpreted as a relatively minor or benign form of 'racism', or as a basic human attitude that is fairly inconsequential. See Quebec, 1992, Violence and Racism in Quebec: Summary of the Report by the Comité d'intervention contre la violence raciste, Montreal [a committee consisting of members from the Maghrebin Research and Information Centre, the Quebec Human Rights Commission, the Quebec wing of the Canadian Jewish Congress and the Ligue des droits et libertés] at 13.
Canadian justice system to combat hate. As Luke McNamara points out.
Canada has even gained a reputation as a world leader for its hate crime laws\(^8\).
Is this reputation deserved? Is it misguided by a "halo effect" bestowed on
hate crime laws which exist only on paper? **This study, therefore,**
examines whether the criminalization of hate effectively combats hate
in Canada.

Hate crime offenses were added for the first time to the Canadian
*Criminal Code* in 1970 through *Bill C-3*. Subsequent provisions were added to
the *Criminal Code* in 1995 through *Bill C-41*. While *Bill C-3* created the
specific hate crime offenses of "advocating genocide", "public incitement of
hatred", and "wilful promotion of hatred*. *Bill C-41* did not create any new
hate crime offenses. *Bill C-41* rather dealt with aggravating or mitigating
circumstances relating to a crime or a criminal upon sentencing, if "bias,
prejudice or hate" were found in the commission of crime. Together, the
provisions introduced through these two bills represent the current Canadian
position on hate crime.

In this research, this current position on hate crime is discussed from
two theoretical perspectives: a liberal consensus perspective and a conflict
perspective. The second chapter introduces these two theoretical perspectives

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as a precursor to the subsequent chapters.

The liberal consensus perspective is predominantly used in hate crime research. Hate crime as specified in the Canadian Criminal Code presupposes liberal consensus assumptions of the criminal law. It assumes that hate crime law develops out of a broad-based normative consensus within society over the values that are reflected in the criminal law. Questioning the validity of hate crime laws becomes pointless as laws are viewed as a reflection of a preexisting normative consensus against ethno-racial and other forms of hate motivated violence in society.

Considering hate crime law as given limits our understanding of the criminalization of hate: we fail to explore the contested role of hate crime laws in the society. In fact, if we use only the liberal perspective to understand hate, we risk allowing law to shape our view of society and ignore the fact that hate constitutes more than breaking the criminal law. Since it is not useful for the purpose of this study to use a multitude of theories, the most promising theories were initially selected to address the inadequacies of the liberal consensus perspective. These alternate theories will be brought together under one umbrella term in this study and called the conflict perspective.

While some conflict theorists argue that the basis for conflict is class, there are other conflict theorists who argue that although class is a very
important factor, power is accumulated unevenly not only on the basis of class, but also on the basis of race, national or ethnic origin, language, colour, religion, sex, age, mental or physical disability, sexual orientation or other stratifying factors. Despite these varied theoretical positions, all theories in the conflict perspective commonly share the position that conflicts rather than consensus best account for the nature of social reality. Hate crime law develops out of competition at the level of norms as well as at the level of individual interests, power and resources. These different theoretical points of the conflict perspective provide a strong framework for a discussion of the criminalization of hate, challenging the underlying assumptions of the liberal perspective.

The third chapter introduces readers to the above mentioned hate crime laws in Canada, reviewing the judicial and legislative measures that have been developed to protect individuals and groups against the effects of hate. The critical analysis of hate crime laws is left for the fourth chapter.

In the fourth chapter, it is argued that the liberal and conflict perspectives bring to light different views on the nature and the extent of hate victimization in Canadian society, and the role and the extent of the pervasiveness of hate crime laws in Canadian society. As a result, both perspectives provide rather different answers to the question of the effectiveness of Canadian hate crime laws.
The final chapter suggests a tentative answer to the research question of this study: the criminalization of hate by itself is not effective in combating hatred in Canada.
2. THEORETICAL PERSPECTIVES

Official Canadian responses to hate crime are based on an ideology founded on liberal consensus. Hate crime is often discussed from this liberal consensus perspective. The overall result of this is that the strengths and limitations of the criminalization of hate cannot be adequately understood without exploring some of the parameters of this liberal consensus. There is also the need to look beyond a liberal consensus perspective for other possible explanations. Studying the criminalization of hate from other perspectives can help us to see more clearly the strengths and limitations of the criminalization of hate. The conflict perspective as articulated in this chapter fills this need to explore an alternate perspective. In other words, in this study, the issue of the criminalization of hate in Canada will be explored through:

1. the liberal consensus perspective, and
2. the conflict perspective.

These two perspectives hold different positions not just on the nature of hate crime itself, but also on law-making, law-breaking and law-enforcement aspects of hate crime. More importantly, drawing from unique
points in each approach, this research will uncover a variety of issues not otherwise exposed in critiquing the criminalization of hate in Canada.

2.1 Liberal Consensus Perspective

The liberal consensus perspective can be best described as traditional. It focuses on the formalistic rules and process-oriented aspects of law, proclaiming order. Official Canadian responses to crime have almost always fit within this legal perspective -- both historically and currently. Central to the formalistic rule and process orientation of Canadian criminal law is the principle called "the rule of law". This principle emphasizes the supremacy of regular law as opposed to the influence of arbitrary power, excluding the existence of arbitrariness.

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10 See Peter W. Hogg, 1985. *Constitutional Law of Canada*. Toronto: Carswell. However, some have suggested that crime has not always been viewed this way even in this century. See Jerold S. Auerbach, 1983. *Justice Without Law?*. New York: Oxford University Press.

prerogative, or even of wide discretionary authority on the part of the government; equality before law, excluding the idea of any exemption of officials or others from the duty of obedience to the law which governs other citizens.\(^\text{12}\)

There are two tenets of the rule of law principle: the supremacy of regular law and the equality of all before the law. These tenets help to portray Canadian criminal law as neutral and impartial.

In addition, the equality of all before the law is illustrated as a rational guarantee of protection to everyone in society, applying to victims as well as to accused persons. In other words, this rational guarantee must be understood as a delicate balance between the protection of the rights of accused persons against wrongful accusations and the protection of the public from harm while maximizing individual liberty. According to the Law Reform Commission of Canada:

\[
\text{[c]oping with crime is a two-sided problem for a just society. Crime uncoped with is unjust: to the victim, to potential victims and to all of us. Crime wrongly coped with is also unjust: criminal law -- the state against the individual -- is always on the cutting edge of the abuse of power. Between these two extremes justice must keep a balance}^{13}.
\]


Fundamental to these views of neutrality and rationality is an *a priori* pluralistic assumption that the society is made up of individuals who share a common set of values about the ways in which society should be organized. In a democratic structure no one is in a position to impose demands over others. As Neil Sargent points out,

the social relations between individuals and groups within society always take place against the backdrop of a broad societal consensus about the fundamental values that are of most importance within that society. In other words, even where there may exist significant conflicts of interests between different individuals or groups, nevertheless most individuals and groups within society will still share a common commitment to the fundamental social values around which society is ordered. This normative consensus is the glue which holds society together and operates to ameliorate the otherwise socially disruptive consequences of both interpersonal and inter-group conflicts.

Accordingly, the role of the state under this system acts as a legitimate neutral political forum that stands above disputing individuals where conflicts are arbitrated according to the rule of law.

Important to the rule of law concept is the notion of formal laws.

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emphasising social order. Formal laws develop out of a broad-based normative consensus within society over competing individual interests\textsuperscript{16}. Accordingly, formal law rules are formalized normative values. The enactment of criminal law as formal law rules is a symbolic affirmation of societal normative values. The breaking of criminal law rules denotes the breaking of societal normative values, and it is considered purposeless and irrational. Accordingly, society at large is not engaged in breaking criminal law rules. Criminal law-breaking is a criminally deviant behaviour.

A socially harmful behaviour in itself, according to James Inverarity. Pat Lauderdale and Barry Feld, would not automatically be considered as deviance. Despite societal attempts to designate many behaviours as deviant, only a few behaviours are eventually labelled as deviance\textsuperscript{17}. Even fewer are designated as criminal deviance. Accordingly, in this liberal consensus view hate crime behaviours are not the norm; hate crime behaviours are not actions of the society at large.

Instead, hate conduct is seen as the actions of "underclass," "pathological" groups consisting of irresponsible deviants with the instigation of outside agitators and conspiratorial leaders. As a result, this liberal


consensus perspective stresses the importance of the enforcement of the societal norms which denounce the repugnancy of hate through the rehabilitation of inadequately-socialized, randomly-scattered deviant individuals. In the context of hate crime, these criminally deviant individual offenders are people who participate in an act which is included in the Criminal Code provisions dealing with hate motivated behaviours. The criminalization of hate from a liberal consensus perspective operates both to stigmatize and deter hate motivated behaviours on the part of criminally deviant offenders who commit hate crimes, and at the same time operates to symbolically reinforce the values reflected in the criminal law.

2.2 Conflict Perspective

The conflict perspective consists of a range of theories. Central to the conflict perspective is the position that group conflicts are an integral part of society. Criminal laws do not develop out of a broad-based normative consensus that is shared by most societal groups within society; but rather out of group conflicts based on competing individual and group interests.

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Accordingly, the conflict perspective argues that criminal law rules are not formalized broad-based normative values. The nature of values embodied in the criminal law rules, however, are perceived differently within the conflict perspective from one particular theory to another.

The theories which fall within the conflict perspective can be divided into two camps. They are either Marxist or non-Marxist. Marxist conflict theories argue that capitalist societies are structured around the class conflict between the capitalist class and the working class over the control of the means of production, leaving all other forms of conflicts peripheral to the class conflict. Non-Marxist conflict theories in contrast argue that Canadian capitalist society is made up of a number of fundamental conflicts between groups, not all of which are parallel to each other, but rather can be in conflict with one another.

Georg Simmel, Thorsten Sellin, Edwin Sutherland, George Vold, and Austin Turk made a major contribution to this non-Marxist approach.

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However, it was the contribution of George Vold in 1958 through his *Theoretical Criminology* that has been widely regarded as a landmark contribution to conflict theory in criminology\(^{20}\).

Central to the theory of Vold is his notion of group dynamics in society. He argued that:

> [t]he social-psychological orientation for conflict theory rests on social interaction theories of personality formation and the `social process' conception of collective behaviour. Implicit to this view is the assumption that man always is a group-involved being whose life is both a part, and a product of his group associations. Implicit also is the view of society as a congeries of groups held together in a shifting but dynamic equilibrium of opposing group interests and efforts.

This continuity of group interaction, the endless series of moves and counter-moves, of checks and cross-checks, is the essential element in the concept of social process. It is this continuous on-going of interchanging influence, in an immediate and dynamically maintained equilibrium, that gives special significance to the designation of `collective' behaviour, as opposed to the idea of simultaneously behaving individuals. ... The end result is a more or less continuous struggle to maintain, or to defend, the place of one's own group in the interaction of groups, always with due attention to the possibility of improving its relative status position. Conflict is viewed, therefore, as one of the principal and essential social processes upon which the continuing on-going of society depends\(^{21}\).


As Ronald Akers points out, the position that the whole process of law-making, law-breaking and law-enforcement is implicated in conflict among groups is essential in understanding this conflict theory of Vold\textsuperscript{22}. Hate crime as law-breaking is simply one aspect of this on-going process of group conflict. Furthermore, according to Vold.

\begin{quote}
the whole political process of law making, law breaking, and law enforcement becomes a direct reflection of deep-seated and fundamental conflicts between interest groups and their more general struggle for the control of the police power of the state. Those who produce legislative majorities win control over the police power and dominate the policies that decide who is likely to be involved in violation of the law\textsuperscript{23}.
\end{quote}

In other words, hate crime law can not be discussed in isolation from group conflict dynamics. Breaking hate crime law does not necessarily mean acts of individual deviance which challenge societal normative values. Breaking hate crime laws can also be seen as a rational and meaningful response to group conflicts. Under this perspective, accounting for hate conduct can be more meaningfully explained in two different ways. using


\textsuperscript{23} George Vold, 1958, *Theoretical Criminology*, Oxford: Oxford University Press at 208-209. However, it should be noted that legislative majority should not be interpreted as popular vote; interest groups have power to control the outcome of legislation processes. For a discussion of interest groups in Canada, see Richard J. Van Loon and Michael S. Whittington. 1987, *The Canadian Political System: Environment, Structure and Process*, Toronto: McGraw-Hill Ryerson Ltd at 402-434.
Dhiru Patel's elaborations: a social-forces approach and an institutional-structural approach.

According to Patel, the social-forces approach perceives collective violence as generally inevitable under certain historical or social conditions and only moderately useful in alleviating such conditions: it is caused not so much by deviants as by relatively impersonal social conditions like the presumably neutral problems of migration, family structure, urban overpopulation, or historical underprivilege of minorities, which lead to "breakdown," "relative deprivation," "alienation," and so on.

This approach suggests that hate is not a necessary feature of society but is generated inevitably under certain social conditions. Hate is not directed against any particular group per se, but it is rather a result of economic and political competition or conflict, and thus tends to increase when times are hard. In other words, hate is seen as a reaction of frustrated people under tough economic times or personal insecurities and is to be perceived as an unavoidable condition. Accordingly, the emphasis in this approach is on some

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modifications to law and policy through token 'tinkering', without making
drastic changes to the existing socio-political and economic system”.

In contrast to the social-forces approach, the institutional-structural
approach perceives

collective violence as basically structured, purposeful, rational,
and politically meaningful. Thus, this view stresses the
normality, legitimacy, and efficacy of violence as a rational
strategy in the struggle for power employed only after non-
violent strategies have failed or when societal structures are
incapable of accommodating basic demands. Hence, this
perspective views such violence as caused basically by those in
power who systematically exclude other groups.

Hate activities, under this reasoning, are the products of the basic
institutional-structural framework of society itself that has built into the
patterns of (unequal or stratified) social relationships and supporting
ideologies. Moreover, hate is embedded in the structures of society that
reflect the overall relations of power and is reproduced generation after

Institute for Research on Public Policy at 2.

Institute for Research on Public Policy at 2.

29 Refer to Dhiru Patel, 1994, *Speaking Notes on Context, Nature, Scope and Definition of
Hate Crime*, Ottawa: *Workshop on Police Response to Hate/Bias Crime*, April 22-23, 1994,
[by the Solicitor General of Canada Secretariat and Carleton University].
generation by virtue of the continuity of the social system itself. The state and its institutions, consequently, are not seen as neutral political fora that stand above disputing parties where conflicts are arbitrated as in the liberal understanding. Indeed, whether by design or practice, institutions structurally propagate hate or hate violence.

Unlike the 'token tinkering' with law and policy stated in the social-forces approach, the institutional-structural approach advocates increasing power and resources to the marginalized in society in solving hate. In general, all remedies advocated under this perspective include the removal of fundamental institutional-structural barriers faced by marginalized groups. Some authors even advocate the removal of capitalism altogether, presenting it as the main cause for the problem.

30 Barrett has made this comment with reference to racial ideology, although it is adopted here in the context of hate. See Stanley R. Barrett, 1987, _Is God a Racist: The Right Wing in Canada_, Toronto: University of Toronto Press at 7. Similarly, the society at large can be explained as a host as well as a producer of the ideology of hate.


32 Arguing from a Marxian perspective, these authors maintain that the problems of inequality stem from capitalism. The capitalist state in Marxism is regarded as the direct promoter of class rule preempting class conflict. The state is the basis of class-biased instruments of manipulation as well as an arena for class struggle, but functions primarily to support the long-term reproduction of capital by facilitating capitalists. The legal apparatus is an instrument of ruling-class domination. As a result, changes in law and policy are carried out in the vested interests of capitalism, rather than equality. Refer to Robert S. Ratner, _et al._, 1987, "The Problem of Relative
In contrast to the emphasis on the criminalization of deviant individual criminal offenders in the liberal consensus perspective, both the social-forces approach and the institutional-structural approach advocate that fundamental shift toward more equal social relationships is required to lessen conflicts. In other words, societal hate conduct cannot be individuated. Moreover, as Jack Levin and Jack McDevitt strongly assert, hate conduct cannot be merely reduced to the handiwork of deviant individuals, but rather it must be viewed as the daily activities of mainstream society. This places the responsibility for the predicament of hate on the mainstream society itself, rather than on a few deviant individuals.

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3. HATE CRIME LAW

3.1 Introduction

Events which led to the enactment of hate crime laws in Canada were very much a domestic political affair, although a significant force underlying the Canadian criminal law (in general) is based on centuries of English criminal law. Hate crime as currently defined in Canada was added to the Criminal Code in 1970 for the first time through Bill C-3, creating specific criminal offenses of "advocating genocide", "public incitement of hatred", and "wilful promotion of hatred". These criminal offenses remain unchanged in the current Criminal Code. Additional provisions were added to the Criminal Code in 1995 through Bill C-41. Unlike Bill C-3, Bill C-41 did not create any new crime offenses. Bill C-41 prescribed that longer sentences be


35 Bill C-41: An Act to amend the Criminal Code (sentencing) and other Acts in consequence thereof, as passed by the House of Commons on June 15, 1995, and given Royal Assent on July 13, 1995. By Order in Council P.C. 1996-1271 (August 7, 1996). other than subsection 718.3(5) and sections 747 to 747.8 of these provisions came into force as of September 3, 1996.
imposed by the courts if "bias, prejudice or hate" were elements of or motivating factors for a crime. These provisions remain unchanged in the current Criminal Code. In short, the hate crime offense provisions which were introduced through these two bills constitute the current Criminal Code position.

3.2 Origins

The English statutory offence of De Scandalis Magnatum in 1275 is considered as the legal origin of 'hate crime'. This statutory offence was introduced to criminalize the spread of false news or tales against "the King and any great men of the realm". Three centuries later, in 1606, in the case of De Libellis Famosis, the English Court of the Star Chamber created a new common law offence of libel. Given the high level of violence which people were accustomed to in English society at the time, the Star Chamber was concerned with two objectives: to protect public persons of higher social

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36 De Scandalis Magnatum, 1275, 3 Edw. 1. c. 34 (U.K).


38 De Libellis Famosis (1606), 77 E.R. 250 (Star Chamber).
classes from attacks, and to provide an alternative to duelling as an honourable way to defend one's reputation against unjust attacks. In light of the primary purpose of De Libellis Famosis -- to penalize actions against public persons and to eliminate circumstances which put their rule at risk -- it appears that the ruling elite (which included the bench of the Star Chamber) was implicated in developing this law to protect themselves. This appears to be one source of what became known as seditious libel.

Century later, according to The King v. Osborn in 1732, the criminal law had expanded to cover group defamation. Osborn had published accusations that certain Jews who had recently arrived from Portugal and were living near Broad Street in London had burned to death a Jewish woman and her child because the father of the child was a Christian. The accusation mobilized mobs to violently attack Jews in different parts of the city. The court found Osborn guilty, not of libel per se, but rather of publishing something tending to incite the public to breach the peace. The overriding


concern was to prevent actions which would breach the public peace, rather than providing protection to Jews.

Meanwhile, further provisions were developed through *Fox's Libel Act* in 1792\(^\text{42}\) and *Lord Campbell's Act*\(^\text{13}\) in 1843. These acts dealt with libel. The Canadian parliament adopted the provisions of *Lord Campbell's Act* into *An Act respecting the Crime of Libel*\(^\text{44}\) in 1874, revising the law later to become *An Act respecting Libel*\(^\text{45}\) in 1886. This English tradition of criminal defamatory libel was continued in Canada until the first Canadian *Criminal Code*\(^\text{46}\) in 1892.

Defamatory libel as defined in the first Canadian *Criminal Code* has remained substantially unchanged\(^\text{47}\). However, in comparison to the parallel


\[^{44}\text{An Act respecting the Crime of Libel, S.C. 1874, c. 38.}

\[^{45}\text{An Act respecting Libel, R.S.C. 1886, c. 163.}

\[^{46}\text{The Criminal Code, 1892. S.C. 1892, c. 29.}

\[^{47}\text{Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46.}

Any subsequent reference to the *Criminal Code* will include all current amendments unless it is otherwise footnoted.

Section 298 reads: (1) A defamatory libel is matter published, without lawful justification or excuse, that is likely to injure the reputation of any person by exposing him to hatred, contempt of ridicule, or that is designed to insult the person of or concerning whom it is
period of English criminal law, the scope of Canadian criminal defamatory libel had been limited to libel directed against a person, without providing protection for groups having common characteristics such as race, religion, colour and ethnic origin.\textsuperscript{48}

\section*{3.3 Unsuccessful Use of Seditious Libel}

Having witnessed Nazi genocide and attempts to annihilate certain social and ethnic groups, one would assume that there was a strong consensus in favour of protecting such groups following the World-War II years in Canada. On the contrary, the response was not so positive.

In \textit{Boucher v. The King}\textsuperscript{49}, Aimé Boucher was charged with seditious libel published.

\begin{itemize}
\item (2) A defamatory libel may be expressed directly or by insinuation or irony
\begin{itemize}
\item (a) in words legibly marked upon any substance; or
\item (b) by any object signifying a defamatory libel otherwise than by words.
\end{itemize}
\end{itemize}

\textsuperscript{48} As the Quebec Superior Court stated in \textit{Ex parte Genest v. R.} (1933), 71 R.J.Q. 385-393, although physical persons as well as public bodies, corporations, societies and companies are covered under the definition of "person" in section 2 of the Canadian \textit{Criminal Code}, groups having common characteristics such as race, religion, colour and ethnic origin are not covered under the libel definition. In other words, Canadian criminal defamatory libel provides no protection for groups having common characteristics such as race, religion, colour and ethnic origin. See Stephen Cohen, 1971, "Hate Propaganda - The Amendments to the Criminal Code". 17 \textit{McGill Law Journal} at 765.

for distributing leaflets entitled "Quebec's Burning Hate for God and Christ and Freedom" in December, 1946. The leaflets contained inflammatory words concerning the Catholic Church and the government of Quebec. Boucher was convicted by a jury and sentenced to one month imprisonment\(^50\).

On appeal by Boucher, the Supreme Court of Canada did not dispute whether Catholics were victimized or whether the leaflets promoted feelings of ill-will and hostility between different classes of such subjects. The majority of Supreme Court judges held that in order to constitute a seditious intention or conspiracy there must be evidence of the intention to promote ill-will. Furthermore, the Court held that hostility must be for the purpose of producing disturbances against or resistance to the authority of the lawfully constituted government\(^51\). Accordingly, the Supreme Court of Canada overturned the lower court conviction of Boucher and rejected the common law definition of seditious intention as described by Sir James Fitzjames

\(^50\) Then, listed under section 133, 133A, and 134 of the Criminal Code. Currently, listed under sections 59, 60 and 61.

Stephen which stated that:

seditious intention is an intention to bring into hatred or contempt, or to excite disaffection against the person of, Her Majesty, her heirs or successors, or the government and constitution of the United Kingdom, as by law established, or either House of Parliament, or the administration of Justice, or to execute Her Majesty's subject to attempt otherwise than by lawful means, the alteration of any matter in Church or State by law established, or to incite any person to commit any crime in disturbance of the peace, or to raise discontent or disaffection amongst Her Majesty's subjects, or to promote feelings of ill-will and hostility between different classes of such subjects.  

The consequence of the restrictive interpretation of seditious libel was that the promotion of feelings of ill-will and hostility between different classes was not considered as seditious. In other words, the definition of English seditious libel at common law as described by Sir James Fitzjames Stephen was rejected in Canada.

Ardent advocates of free speech considered the decision of Boucher v. The King as a victory. Dismissing the absolute free speech notions, a delegation of the Canadian Jewish Congress (CJC) in March 1953 appeared

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52 This was first laid down by Sir Stephen in his Digest of the Criminal Law in 1877. It has been since quoted in many textbooks. See F. A. Brewin, 1951, "Case Comment [on] Boucher v. The King", 29 Canadian Bar Review at 194-195; Maxwell Cohen [Chairman], 1966, Report to the Minister of Justice of the Special Committee on hate Propaganda in Canada, Ottawa: Queen's Printer and Controller of Stationary at 38.

before a Joint Committee of the Canadian House of Commons and Senate on
the revision of the Criminal Code. The CJC delegation stressed the
importance of outlawing hate mongering presented under the pretence of free
speech. In addition, the CJC delegation requested that the formerly held
definition of sedition involving the incitement to violence against different
classes of Her Majesty's subjects be restored in the criminal law. The Joint
Committee, however, proposed no changes to the law.54

3.4 Modern Legislative Reforms

The issue of hate mongering surfaced again in 1963 with "a steady
dissemination of hate propaganda, mainly anti-Jewish, anti-Negro and neo-
Nazi in nature"55. The CJC decided to use these hate mongering activities to
mount a public campaign, stressing the need for anti-hate legislation. The
campaign of the CJC managed to attract considerable public attention and
sympathy. Two private member's bills against genocide and hate literature

Patterns of Prejudice at 5; Melvin Fenson, 1964-65, "Group Defamation: Is the Cure
Too Costly", 1(3) Manitoba Law School Journal at 269-270.

55 Maxwell Cohen [Chairman], 1966, Report to the Minister of Justice of the Special
Committee on Hate Propaganda in Canada, Ottawa: Queen's Printer and Controller of
Stationary at 12 and 260-271; Borovoy, A. Alan, 1985, "Freedom of Expression:
Some Recurring Impediments", in Rosalie S. Abella and Melvin L. Rothman (eds.).
1985, Justice Beyond Orwell, Montréal: Les Éditions Yvon Blais at 140.
were discussed in the House of Commons in February of 1964 and were a direct result of the CJC's public campaign. These bills were titled as Bill C-21 -- "An Act respecting Genocide" and Bill C-43 -- "An Act to amend the Post Office Act (Hate Literature). The bills were debated during a second reading without coming to a vote, and a motion was adopted to refer them to the Standing Committee on External Affairs. The Standing Committee stated that due to time constraints the subject matter could not be dealt with before the end of the Second Session of the Twenty-Sixth Parliament, and it recommended the reintroduction of the subject early in the next parliamentary session. This recommendation was not implemented.

However, the bills were reintroduced as Bill C-30 and Bill C-43 on April 8, 1965. In addition to these two bills, on the same day, another private member's bill entitled Bill C-16 -- "An Act to amend the Criminal Code (Disturbing the public peace)" was introduced. However, in May of 1965

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60 Bill C-16, Hansard, 1965 at 91. First reading on April 8, 1965.
Parliament was dissolved and an election was called. Consequently, the bills died on the order paper.

Meanwhile, in January 1965, the Minister of Justice, the Honourable Guy Favreau, had appointed a high profile Special Committee under the Chairmanship of Maxwell Cohen who was then the Dean of the McGill University Law Faculty to undertake a study on hate propaganda. Given the extra-parliamentary nature of the Special Committee, its work was not affected by the calling of the election. Its report, known as the Report of the Special Committee on Hate Propaganda in Canada or the "Cohen Committee Report", was presented to the new Minister of Justice, the Honourable Lucien Cardin, in November, 1965.

The Cohen Committee Report stated that:

Canadians who are members of any identifiable group in Canada are entitled to carry on their lives as Canadians without being victimized by the deliberate, vicious promotion of hatred against them. In a democratic society, freedom of speech does not mean the right to vilify. The number of organizations involved and the numbers of persons hurt is no test of the issue: the arithmetic of a free society will not be satisfied with over-simplified statistics demonstrating that few are casting stones and not many are receiving hurts. What matters is that incipient malevolence and violence, all of which are inherent in "hate"


62 Maxwell Cohen [Chairman]. 1966, Report to the Minister of Justice of the Special Committee on Hate Propaganda in Canada. Ottawa: Queen's Printer and Controller of Stationary.
activity, deserves national attention. However small the actors may be in number, the individuals and groups promoting hate in Canada constitute "a clear and present danger" to the functioning of a democratic society. For in times of social stress such "hate" could mushroom into a real and monstrous threat to our way of life.\(^{63}\)

The Cohen Committee recommended the creation of "hate" crime offenses in the Criminal Code. This was considered the beginning of an important change of direction respecting the need for legislative protection to guard against hate.

The Cohen Committee revisited the definition of English seditious libel at common law as described by Sir James Fitzjames Stephen which was rejected in Boucher v. The King, and argued that there were five kinds of seditious libel:

1. those against the person of the Monarch, the Government, or Constitution, or Parliament or the administration of justice;
2. those against the existing order of Church and State;
3. those in disturbance of the peace;
4. those which raise discontent or dissatisfaction among the citizenry;
5. those which provoke ill-will and hostility between various classes of citizens.\(^{64}\)

\(^{63}\) Maxwell Cohen, [Chairman], 1966, Report to the Minister of Justice of the Special Committee on Hate Propaganda in Canada, Ottawa: Queen's Printer and Controller of Stationary at 24.

\(^{64}\) Maxwell Cohen [Chairman], 1966, Report to the Minister of Justice of the Special Committee on Hate Propaganda in Canada, Ottawa: Queen's Printer and Controller of Stationary at 38.
Emphasizing the fifth kind, the Cohen Committee recommended the creation of specific hate offenses because Canadian criminal law at the time could not provide a sufficiently effective legal basis to prevent and combat hate propaganda against groups.\(^6\)

The Cohen Committee Report was presented to the new Minister of Justice in November 1965. However, it was not tabled in the House of Commons until April 10, 1966. Seven months later on November 10, 1966, Bill S-49, a bill based on the recommendations, was introduced in the Senate. This Bill was debated in the Senate, but it was neither passed in the Senate nor given any attention in the House of Commons.\(^6\)

Bill S-49 was reintroduced in the Senate as Bill S-5 in the autumn of 1967. Once again the Bill failed in the Senate. The Bill was reintroduced as Bill S-21 in 1969. At this time, a new government was in power with a sizable majority under the leadership of Pierre Trudeau, a member of the earlier mentioned Cohen Committee. The Senate passed Bill S-21 with

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\(^6\) Maxwell Cohen [Chairman], 1966, Report to the Minister of Justice of the Special Committee on Hate Propaganda in Canada, Ottawa: Queen's Printer and Controller of Stationary at 38 and 59-60; Also refer to Maxwell Cohen, 1971. "The Hate Propaganda Amendments: Reflections on a Controversy", 9 Alberta Law Review 103-117.

various changes in the spring of 1969\textsuperscript{67}. Finally, in the autumn of 1969, \textit{Bill S-21} was introduced in the House of Commons as \textit{Bill C-3}, and it received Royal Assent on June 11, 1970.

### 3.4.1 Bill C-3: Specific Crimes

The Bill added specific hate propaganda offenses to the \textit{Criminal Code}\textsuperscript{68}. These "hate" offenses are listed currently under sections 318 to 320 of the \textit{Code}, creating three distinct categories, namely:

- a. "advocating genocide".

- b. "public incitement of hatred", and

- c. "wilful promotion of hatred".

Offenses under these categories must be directed against an "identifiable


\textsuperscript{68} \textit{Bill C-3} was given Royal Assent on June 11, 1970. The amendment is listed as \textit{An Act to amend the Criminal Code}, R.S.C. 1970 (1st Supp.), c. 11, amending R.S.C. 1970, c. C-34.

There were other unsuccessful bills introduced by private members such as \textit{Bill C-21} in 1964, \textit{Bill C-30} in 1965, \textit{Bill C-16} in 1965 and \textit{Bill C-117} in 1965. Refer to Stephen Cohen, 1971, "Hate Propaganda - The Amendments to the Criminal Code", \textit{17 McGill Law Journal} at 769.
group". Section 318(4) of the *Criminal Code* states that

"identifiable group" means any section of the public distinguished by colour, race, religion or ethnic origin.

Section 318 of the Canadian *Criminal Code* defines the offence of genocide:

(1) Every one who advocates or promotes genocide is guilty of an indictable offence and liable to imprisonment for a term not exceeding five years.

(2) In this section, "genocide" means any of the following acts committed with intent to destroy in whole or in part any identifiable group, namely,

(a) killing members of the group; or

(b) deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to bring about its physical destruction.

(3) No proceeding for an offence under this section shall be instituted without the consent of the Attorney General.

Subsection 319(1) of the *Criminal Code* defines the offence of public incitement of hatred:

(1) Every one who, by communicating statements in any public place, incites hatred against any identifiable group where such incitement is likely to lead to a breach of the peace is guilty of

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(a) an indictable offence and is liable to imprisonment for a term not exceeding two years; or
(b) an offence punishable on summary conviction.

Subsection 319(2) of the *Criminal Code* defines the offence of wilful promotion of hatred:

(2) Every one who, by communicating statements, other than in private conversation, wilfully promotes hatred against any identifiable group is guilty of
(a) an indictable offence and is liable to imprisonment for a term not exceeding two years; or
(b) an offence punishable on summary conviction.

Subsection 319(3) limits the application of wilful promotion of hatred:

319(3) No person shall be convicted of an offence under section (2)
(a) if he establishes that the statements communicated were true;
(b) if, in good faith, he expressed or attempted to establish by argument an opinion on a religious subject;
(c) if the statements were relevant to any subject of public interest, the discussion of which was for the public benefit, and if on reasonable grounds he believes them to be true; or
(d) if, in good faith, he intended to point out, for the purpose of removal, matters producing or tending to produce feelings of hatred toward an identifiable group in Canada.

The wilful promotion of hatred (in comparison to public incitement of hatred), however, requires the consent of the Attorney General to proceed to
trial. With reference to section 319(2). section 319(6) states:

No proceeding for an offence under subsection (2) shall be instituted without the consent of the Attorney General.

Unique to the criminalization of hate is the protection of identifiable groups note.

The rationale behind identifiable groups is that a single act directed at one individual victimizes more than just that individual note. A hate victim is selected for victimization on the basis of the perceived group of which the individual is a member note. This form of selection, according to Marvin Kurz, makes hate victimization non-random note. According to Cynthia Petersen, a

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70 See section 318(4) for “identifiable group”.

71 Maxwell Cohen, [Chairman], 1966. Report to the Minister of Justice of the Special Committee on Hate Propaganda in Canada. Ottawa: Queen’s Printer and Controller of Stationary at 24.

72 Perception is reality. Whether the identity of the victim matches the identity perceived by the assailant is irrelevant. For example, Alain Brosseau. Ottawa’s most well-known gay-bashing victim tragically losing his life was a heterosexual man. See Ottawa-Carleton Regional Police Bias Crime Unit and the Liaison Committee for the Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual and Transgender Communities. 1995, Brief submitted to the House of Commons Standing Committee on the Justice and Legal Affairs respecting Bill C-41, and Act to Amend the Criminal Code (sentencing) and other Acts in consequence thereof. Ottawa at 12; David Pepper and Carroll Holland. 1994. Moving Toward a Distant Horizon: The Public Summary of the Final Report of the Action Plan Project funded by the Ottawa Police Services Board, June 1993 - March 1994, Ottawa at 2.

73 Rachel Giese, 1995, “Hating the Hate Crimes Bill: Bill C-41 isn’t about fighting prejudice - it’s about revenge”, 29(4) This Magazine at 9.
single hate act victimizes an entire community of people, compounding on their pre-existing oppression. Extending beyond the arguments of Kurz and Peterson, Kevin Berrill argues that violence directed at groups is an "act of terrorism" in which the terrorist attack is intended to violate and isolate not only the victim but an entire group. As a result, a hate victim cannot be individuated to one individual; a hate crime victim is a deindividuated victim with a group identity. Accordingly, a hate victim can be best described as a deindividuated non-random victim. It can be argued that the creation of criminal laws against "advocating genocide", "public incitement of hatred", and "wilful promotion of hatred" was a recognition of the deindividuated non-random nature of hate victimization. For this reason alone, the notion of protection of groups was controversial. Opponents of the legislation portrayed the "identifiable group" as a special law provision protecting particular groups of the society.

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75 For Berrill's position, refer to Ottawa-Carleton Regional Police Bias Crime Unit and the Liaison Committee for the Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual and Transgender Communities, 1995. Brief submitted to the House of Commons Standing Committee on the Justice and Legal Affairs respecting Bill C-41, and Act to Amend the Criminal Code (sentencing) and other Acts in consequence thereof, Ottawa at 2.

76 The term deindividuated non-random victim is introduced here by the author of this research.
The Cohen Committee recommended that language and national origin be included within the definition of identifiable group. The drafters of the legislation felt that given the bilingual and bicultural nature of the country at that time, this inclusion could lead to difficulties. Accordingly, Bill C-3 excluded both language and national origin from identifiable group.

Private Member's bills such as Bill C-204 on December 18, 1968 to add "age", and Bill C-326 on June 27, 1990 and Bill C-247 on June 19, 1991 to add "sex" and "sexual orientation" to the identifiable group provision of section 318(4) were introduced. However, the bills failed after first reading in the House of Commons.

Meanwhile, since the enactment of the Canadian Charter of Rights and

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77 It should be noted that Recommendation 5(c) of the Cohen Committee states that:

"identifiable group" means any section of the public distinguished by religion, colour, race, language, ethnic or national origin.

See Maxwell Cohen [Chairman], 1966, Report to the Minister of Justice of the Special Committee on hate Propaganda in Canada, Ottawa: Queen's Printer and Controller of Stationary at 70.

78 Refer to Robert E. Hage, 1970, "The Hate Propaganda Amendment to the Criminal Code", 28 University of Toronto Faculty of Law Review at 66.

Freedoms as part of the Canadian Constitution effective in 1982\(^{80}\), the expansion of the definition of identifiable group has become a matter of discussion. Section 15(1) of the Charter states that:

Every individual is equal before and under the law and has the right to the equal protection and equal benefit of the law without discrimination and, in particular, without discrimination based on race, national or ethnic origin, colour, religion, sex, age or mental or physical disability\(^{81}\).

In addition, the Charter section 15(2) states that:

Subsection (1) does not preclude any law, program or activity that has as its object the amelioration of conditions of disadvantaged individuals or groups including those that are disadvantaged because of race, national or ethnic origin, colour, religion, sex, age or mental or physical disability.

The Special Committee on Pornography and Prostitution attempted to change the definition of identifiable group under section 318(4). This Special Committee recommended that the definition of identifiable group be

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\(^{81}\) The meaning of equality in this subsection is limited by the Charter section 1 to the "reasonable limits prescribed by law as can be demonstrably justified in a free and democratic society". In addition, in *Bhadauria v. Board of Governors of Seneca College*, the Supreme Court of Canada with reference to section 32(1) held that the Charter does not protect against the activities of the private sector. Nevertheless, the Charter has become a standard in discussing equality. See *Bhadauria v. Board of Governors of Seneca College*, [1981] 2 S.C.R. 181-195 (S. C. C.).
expanded to include the categories of sex, age, and mental or physical disability\textsuperscript{82}. In addition, the Law Reform Commission of Canada in 1986 regarded the open-ended provision of section 15(1) of the Charter to be the most suitable for an expanded definition of identifiable group, covering "sexual orientation" and other "ad hoc" groups\textsuperscript{83}. However, the Bill C-3 definition of identifiable group remains unchanged in the Criminal Code. Consequently, the scope of "advocating genocide", "public incitement of hatred", and "wilful promotion of hatred" as currently listed under sections 318, 319(1) and 319(2) of the Criminal Code remains unchanged since 1970.

In \textit{R. v. Keegstra} in 1990, the Supreme Court of Canada in upholding the constitutional validity of the hate crime provision under section 319(2) of the Criminal Code stated that


[a] person's sense of human dignity and belonging to the community at large is closely linked to the concern and respect accorded the groups to which he or she belongs. The derision, hostility and abuse encouraged by hate propaganda therefore have a severely negative impact on the individual's sense of self-worth and acceptance.

This case law position has affirmed the entry of identifiable groups as a part of Canadian criminal law, upholding the fact that a single act directed at one individual victimizes more than just that individual. However, what is uncertain is that whether this case law position has expanded the definition to cover a wider identifiable group.

3.4.2 Case Law as a Precursor to Bill C-41

The mid-1970s marked the beginning of another wave of racist group activity in Canada, and it saw the propagation of hatred against Jews and Blacks as well as East Indians, Catholics, French and Native peoples. Some of the flagrant forces in this period were the Edmund Burke Society, the Nationalist Party of Canada, the Western Guard Party and the Ku Klux Klan.

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84 The Supreme Court of Canada in R. v. Keegstra, [1990] 3 S.C.R. at 746 in reversing the decision rendered by the Alberta Court of Appeal (1988) which held that sections 319(2) and 319(3)(a) the Criminal Code violated both the right to freedom of expression as guaranteed in section 2(b) and the presumption of innocence as guaranteed in section 11(d) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms. See chapter four of this research for further information on R. v. Keegstra.
In comparison to the use of leaflets in the earlier wave of the 1960s, multiple mediums such as leaflets, books, telephones, audio/video cassettes and even computer hook-ups were used in spreading hate. As much as hate was disseminated to a wider audience through more sophisticated means, it gave rise to a wide-ranging debate seeking solutions to the spread of hate in Canadian society. However, neither the governing party nor the official opposition in the Canadian Parliament was enthusiastic in bringing legislative changes to the Bill C-3 provisions.

Interestingly, in *R. v. Ingram and Grimsdale* in 1977, the courts appears to have developed an alternate method as a response to hate. Shamshudin Kanji, the victim, a native of Tanzania, was new to Toronto. One day, when he was standing on the subway platform for the next train, Alexander Ingram and Thomas Grimsdale launched an unprovoked attack, pushing him onto the subway tracks. Kanji severely fractured both his legs and suffered severe damage to his knees. He was hospitalized for several months. Ingram and Grimsdale were convicted of assault causing bodily harm and sentenced to 16 and 21 months respectively. The Crown appealed the sentences, and the prison terms were increased to 30 and 24 months respectively.

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As mentioned earlier in the chapter, a wave of hate was seen in early 1960s.

Ontario Court of Appeal clearly stated that

[i]t is a fundamental principle of our society that every member must respect the dignity, privacy and person of the other. Crimes of violence increase when respect for the rights of others decreases, and, in that manner, assault such as occurred in this case attack the very fabric of the society. ... An assault which is racially motivated renders the offence more heinous. Such assaults, unfortunately, invite imitation and repetition by others and others incite retaliation. The danger is even greater in a multicultural, pluralistic urban society. The sentence imposed must be one which expresses the public abhorrence for such conduct and their refusal to countenance it.87

This decision directs that racial hatred is an aggravating factor to be considered in determining the appropriate sentence, recognizing the importance of respecting the multicultural and pluralistic make up of Canadian social fabric. Such a position on sentencing was further accepted in

*R. v. Lelas*88, *R. v. Simms*89 and *R. v. Curtis Peters*.90 Moreover, *R. v. Atkinson, Ing and Roberts*91, a gay bashing case, made it clear that aggravating considerations were not limited to racial assault incidents. The overall result

of these judgements is the further recognition that a hate crime victim is a
deindividuated non-random victim. Therefore, the significance of the specific
criminal offenses of "advocating genocide", "public incitement of hatred", and
"wilful promotion of hatred" has in one sense through sentencing been
extended to all criminal offenses by the case law.

3.4.3 Bill C-41: Sentence Enhancement

Some legal scholars, as well as many criminal justice practitioners, were
uneasy with this extension of deindividuated non-random victims into the
criminal law92. According to them, hate violence is just another crime -- no
more serious or worthy of special attention than any other crime. In this
reasoning, murder is murder, and assault is assault, regardless of whether the
offender was motivated by hatred against a class of people93. Nonetheless, the
idea of the deindividuated non-random victim was gaining further legitimacy.

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92 Nevertheless, the Canadian Association of Chiefs of Police (CACP) in its 1993
Annual General meeting adopted a resolution in favour fighting against hate
motivated violence. See Canadian Association of Chiefs of Police, 1996, Hate Crimes
in Canada: In Your Back Yard, Ottawa at 44.

93 Peter Finn, 1988, "Difficult to Define, Difficult to Prosecute". 3(2) Criminal Justice
at 20.
Publications such as *Is God a Racist: The Right Wing in Canada*[^1], *Web of Hate: Inside Canada's Far Right Network*[^2], *Report on Hate Group Activity in Ontario: Environmental Scan*[^3] and *Hate Groups in Canada: Impact and Challenges*[^4] indicated that individuals and groups subscribing to hate are not limited to a handful of individuals[^5]. In April 1994, some law enforcement


[^5]: Refer to the Appendix for a detailed list. For a set of reasons for the underestimation of hate crimes, see Julian V. Roberts. 1995, *Disproportionate Harm: Hate Crime in Canada, An Analysis of Recent Statistics*. Ottawa: Research, Statistics and Evaluation Directorate of the Department of Justice Canada.

Some attempts were also made to collect statistics concerning these individuals and groups engaged in hate motivated crimes through legislation. On June 8, 1993, a private member's bill namely *Bill C-445: An Act to provide for the collection of statistics respecting incidents investigated by police forces where those incidents manifest evidence of bias against certain identifiable groups*, was sponsored by Ms. Shirley Mahcu. M.P. According to the "Explanatory Note" of the bill, its purpose was:

- to have police forces across the country collect statistics that would indicate the number of incidents investigated by them that were wholly or partly motivated by bias against those sections or individual members of the public distinguished by colour, race, religion, sexual orientation or ethnic origin and that would identify the sections or persons who were the target of bias in each such incident.

As the House of Commons adjourned for the summer of 1993, the Bill died on
officials who attended the Workshop on Police Response to Hate/Bias Crime in Ottawa\(^9\) portrayed the situation as an epidemic\(^{10}\).

*Bill C-41: An Act to amend the Criminal Code (sentencing) and other Acts in consequence thereof* -- a bill designed to enshrine the principle into the Criminal Code that a longer sentence could be imposed by courts if hate motivation were an aggravating factor -- was introduced in June of 1994, and was passed by the Parliament in June of 1995\(^{10}\). The most relevant sections relating to hate crime in the bill were subsections 718.1 and 718.2.

718.1 A sentence must be proportionate to the gravity of the offence and the degree of responsibility of the offender.

718.2 A court that imposes a sentence shall also take into

September 8, 1993. Similar to many other private member bills, the bill was not given any further attention.

\(^9\) A selected group of participants were invited to this workshop which was sponsored by the Solicitor General of Canada Secretariat and organized by Carleton University.

\(^{10}\) Some authors argue that extreme metaphors such as "epidemic" justify new laws where plights do not in fact exist. See James B. Jacobs and Jessica S. Henry. 1996. "The Social Construction of a Hate Crime Epidemic", 86(2) *Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology* 366-391.

\(^{10}\) *Bill C-41: An Act to amend the Criminal Code (sentencing) and other Acts in consequence thereof*, First reading by the House of Commons on June 13, 1994, as passed by the House of Commons on June 15, 1995, and given Royal Assent on July 13, 1995. By Order in Council P.C. 1996-1271 (August 7, 1996), other than subsection 718.3(5) and sections 747 to 747.8 came into force as of September 3, 1996.

It should be noted that although *Bill C-41* is commonly known as the 'hate crime legislation', the bill implements a variety of other reforms to the Criminal Code respecting sentencing (mainly by amending Part XXIII).
consideration the following principles:
(a) a sentence should be increased or reduced to account for any relevant aggravating or mitigating circumstances relating to the offence or the offender, and without limiting the generality of the foregoing,
(i) evidence that the offence was motivated by bias, prejudice or hate based on race, national or ethnic origin, language, colour, religion, sex, age, mental or physical disability, sexual orientation or any other similar factor.\(^{102}\)

These sections did not create any new crimes, but simply codified the existing sentencing practices that had been developed in the above mentioned cases of *R. v. Ingram and Grimsdale*, *R. v. Lelas*, *R. v. Simms*, *R. v. Curtis Peters* and *R. v. Atkinson, Ing and Roberts*.\(^{103}\) Nevertheless, from the very outset of the

\(^{102}\) American statutes have included a combination of race, colour, religion, national origin, sex, gender, ancestry, ethnicity, disability, sexual orientation, age, political affiliation, creed, mental disability and blindness, although no single statute has included all the groups. For a collection of other definitions, see Equality for Gays and Lesbians Everywhere, 1994, *EGALE Submissions to House of Commons Standing Committee on Justice and Legal Affairs: regarding Bill C-41 - Hate Crimes*. Ottawa at Appendix 1.

The exact judicial interpretation of "any other similar factor" as specified under subsection 718.2(i) is yet to be seen. However, in light of the *R. v. Atkinson, Ing and Roberts* (1978), 43 C.C.C. 342-345 (mentioned earlier in this chapter) decision which states that aggravating considerations were not limited to racial assault incidents, it is most likely that the subsection will be interpreted as an inclusive clause.

introduction of the bill it was controversial, creating a division within the governing Liberal Party caucus. The bill soon became known as "hate crime legislation", although the bill did not exclusively focus on hate crime. While the bill covered race, national or ethnic origin, language, colour, religion, sex, age, mental or physical disability, sexual orientation or any other similar factor, some opponents of the bill focused on the inclusion of sexual orientation. They attempted to portray the bill as a gay rights bill. In fact, the inclusion of sexual orientation was equated to the promotion of "homosexuality". Elevating heterosexuality to the morally high ground, the opponents labelled non-heterosexuality as 'unCanadian', 'unnatural', 'wrong', 'immoral' and 'paedophilia'. All the Reform Party members and four


Liberal Party members openly voted against the Liberal government bill. The events which led to the enactment of Bill C-41, however, were not steered by governments. Instead, the communities most affected by hate crimes directed them. The most visible advocates of Bill C-41 were the B'Nai Brith of Canada, the Canadian Jewish Congress (CJC), the Toronto Mayor's Committee on Community and Race Relations, the Urban Alliance on Race Relations, Centre de Recherche-Action sur les Relations Raciales (CRARR), Equality for Gays and Lesbians Everywhere (EGALE), the Coalition for Lesbian and Gay Rights in Ontario (CLGRO), the 519 Church Street Community Centre and the Ottawa Police Liaison Committee for the Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual and Transgender Communities.


Attempts to equate paedophilia with sexual orientation are unjustified as paedophile behaviour is a criminal offence which has nothing to do with one's sexual orientation. See Equality for Gays and Lesbians Everywhere. 1994. EG-ALE Submissions to House of Commons Standing Committee on Justice and Legal Affairs: regarding Bill C-41 - Hate Crimes. Ottawa at 13.


Ottawa-Carleton Regional Police Bias Crime Unit and the Liaison Committee for the Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual and Transgender Communities, 1995, Brief submitted to the House of Commons Standing Committee on the Justice and Legal Affairs respecting Bill C-41, an Act to Amend the Criminal Code (sentencing) and other Acts in consequence thereof. Ottawa at 2.
3.5 Conclusion

This chapter has reviewed the legal measures that have been developed to protect individuals and groups against the effects of hate in Canada. Early English case law supported the creation of libel as a common law offence. While libel was used and expanded primarily to protect the ruling elite, it eventually did serve as a means of protecting other individuals and groups against hatred on occasion. However, the Canadian legal system was unwilling to expand protection against the hatred of groups. Even in the face of hate activities in the post-World-War II era, the Canadian Parliament and the judiciary seemed reluctant to provide legal protection. It was not until 1970 that the legislative process implemented the recommendations of the Cohen Committee of 1965 through Bill C-3. These criminal provisions for the first time in Canadian history recognized a range of deindividuated non-random victims under the definition of "identifiable group". Subsequently, the courts have been expanding protection to deindividuated victims -- not directly -- but through sentencing considerations and practices. Bill C-41, which was commonly known as 'hate crime legislation', simply codified such existing sentence enhancement practices. Overall, the journey to provide protection against hatred for individuals and groups in Canada has been a difficult one. The question, therefore, is how effective have the achievements of this journey been? It is to this point that we must now turn our attention and discuss the effectiveness of the hate crime laws.
4. EFFECTIVENESS OF THE LAW

4.1 Introduction

Since the Bill C-3 provisions became a part of the Canadian Criminal Code almost three decades ago, there have been only three cases with successful convictions out of a total of five prosecutions\(^{10}\). Section 318 on Advocating genocide has been used once. However, the attempt to convict William James Harcus, Theron Skryba and Joseph Edward Lockhart under section 318 for their Manitoba Knights of the Ku Klux Klan activities was unsuccessful\(^{11}\). Section 319(1) on public incitement of hatred has never been used. Section 319(2) on wilful promotion of hatred has been used four times.

As there has not been a serious enough event compatible with genocide or advocating genocide in recent Canadian history, no one seems to seriously

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expect the enforcement of section 318 on advocating genocide. This expectation seems to be realistic. However, it is unrealistic to argue that the incitement of hatred has not happened in public. It seems to be that the definition of section 319(1) on the public incitement of hatred as it stands is unusable in such events. In order to make section 319(1) workable, significant modifications to it would have to be introduced. Given this context, section 319(2) on the wilful promotion of hatred is seen as the most appropriate offence in combatting hate.

4.2 Review of the Case Law

_R. v. Buzzanga and Durocher_¹¹¹ in 1979 was the very first case prosecuted under section 319(2) on wilful promotion of hatred. Robert Buzzanga and Wilfred Durocher, two Franco-Ontarians, were accused of having wilfully promoted hatred against the French Canadians in Essex County, Ontario, by distributing anti-French-Canadian handbills in January 1977. The handbills were entitled "Wake up Canadians Your Future Is At Stake!", and the message contained statements such as "you are subsidizing separatism whether in Quebec or Essex County", "who will rid us of this subversive group if not

ourselves?". and "the British solved this problem once before with the Acadians, what are we waiting for ...?". The intention of the handbills was to provoke reaction among French Canadians to escalate support for a French School to be built in the region.

During the initial trial in Windsor, Buzzanga and Durocher were found guilty as charged. However, on appeal, the Ontario of Court of Appeal held that the intention of Buzzanga and Durocher to provoke a reaction among French Canadians did not correspond to the intention to promote hatred required by the word "wilfully". The court clarified that the meaning of "wilfully" was not restricted to the intention to promote hate, but it encompassed the means as well as the final objective where the accused persons foresaw that it was certain or substantially certain to result from an act one committed in order to achieve some other purpose. However, the meaning of "wilfully" excluded recklessness. The Ontario Court of Appeal found Buzzanga and Durocher not guilty.

R. v. Keegstra was the first case in which a conviction was obtained

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112 For the full content of the handout, see R. v. Buzzanga and Durocher (1979), 101 D.L.R. (3d) 488-509 (Ont. C. A.) at 494; R. v. Buzzanga and Durocher (1979), 49 C.C.C. (2d) 369-390 (Ont. C. A.) at 375.


under a Bill C-3 provision. James Keegstra was a teacher in Eckville High School, Alberta, from 1968 until his dismissal in 1982. His teachings attributed various evil qualities to Jews. He thus described Jews to his pupils as "treacherous", "subversive", "sadistic", "money-loving", "power hungry" and "child killers". He taught his class that Jewish people seek to destroy Christianity and are responsible for depressions, anarchy, chaos, wars and revolution. According to Mr. Keegstra, Jews "created the Holocaust to gain sympathy" and, in contrast to the open honest Christians, were said to be deceptive, secretive and inherently evil. Mr. Keegstra expected his students to reproduce his teachings in class and on exams. If they failed to do so, their marks suffered.

In January 1984, Keegstra was charged under section 319(2) of the Criminal Code with "wilful promotion of hatred". In November 1984, the Alberta Court of Queen's Bench rendered a judgement that the hate propaganda provisions of the Criminal Code were not in violation of the freedom of expression principle guaranteed in the Charter, and Keegstra's trial was set to

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117 R. v. Keegstra (1984), 19 C.C.C. (3d) 254-283 (Alta. Q. B.). It should be noted that section 319(2) was then listed as section 281.2.(2).
begin on April 9, 1985. In July of 1985, the Alberta Court of Queen's Bench found Keegstra guilty as charged and imposed a $5,000 fine (allowing 30 days to pay it).

On appeal, in June 1988, the Alberta Court of Appeal overturned the charges against Keegstra on the basis that the wilful promotion of hatred in section 319(2) of the Criminal Code did in fact violate the right to freedom of expression as guaranteed by the Charter. In December of 1990, overturning the Alberta Court of Appeal decision, the Supreme Court of Canada upheld section 319(2) of the Criminal Code as a reasonable limit on the freedom of expression as guaranteed by the Charter.

After dealing with procedural aspects referred to it by the Supreme Court of Canada, the Alberta Court of Appeal in March 1991 quashed the conviction of Keegstra but ordered a new trial. Keegstra's new trial began in March of 1992, and the jury at the Alberta Court of Queen's Bench trial

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found Keegstra guilty as charged under section 319(2) of the Criminal Code. Although the Criminal Code allows for a two year imprisonment, the court imposed a $3,000 fine, with 30 days to pay it, and upon failure to pay the fine, a term of 90 days imprisonment would be imposed. Keegstra's appeal case was heard again in the Alberta Court of Appeal.

In September 1994, the conviction of Keegstra was quashed on a procedural irregularity in relation to the jury. The Attorney General of Alberta appealed the decision to the Supreme Court of Canada. In February of 1996, overturning the decision of the Alberta Court of Appeal, the Supreme Court of Canada restored the Alberta Court of Queen's Bench conviction of Keegstra. Finally, in an appeal of sentence by Keegstra to overturn the sentence of the Alberta Court of Queen's Bench, in September 1996, the Alberta Court of Appeal sentenced Keegstra to one year suspended sentence. a

123 Ibid.


The second case where a conviction was obtained was \textit{R. v. Andrews\footnote{127 \textit{R. v. Andrews} (1990), 61 C.C.C. (3d) 490-505 (S. C. C.); \textit{R. v. Andrews} (1988). 43 C.C.C. (3d) 193-228 (Ont. C. A.).}}. Donald Andrews and Robert Smith belonged to the Nationalist Party of Canada, a "white nationalist political organization" which advanced white supremacy. Andrews was the party leader and Smith was the party secretary. Both members were responsible for publishing and distributing the bi-monthly \textit{Nationalist Reporter} which was the primary subject matter of the prosecution. It contained statements such as "race-mixed planet are only working against God's and nature's original will", "Toronto's violent crime rate is increasing -- almost directly in proportion to the increase in immigrants from the Caribbean. India. Pakistan and blacks from the U.S.", "almost all illegal aliens and refugees" coming to Canada are "clouds" who do not believe in democracy and harbour a hatred for white people, "stop the International Jewish Communist conspiracy". the "Holocaust Hoax" challenge can land you in jail. and "Zionist Economic Power [is] Growing". The acts specified in the offence occurred between December 1980 and March 1984. In January 1985.
Andrews and Smith were charged under section 319(2) of the Criminal Code with the offence of the wilful promotion of hatred.

Once again, in December 1985, both were found guilty\textsuperscript{128}. The trial judge sentenced Andrews to one year and Smith to seven months imprisonment. On appeal, in July of 1988, the Ontario Court of Appeal held that the Criminal Code provisions prohibiting wilful promotion of hatred did not violate the right to freedom of expression as specified in section 2(b) of the Charter. However, the Ontario Court of Appeal reduced the sentences respectively to three months and one month imprisonment\textsuperscript{129}.

Andrews and Smith appealed the decision of the Ontario Court of Appeal on the basis that section 319(2) violated their rights to freedom of expression as guaranteed by the Charter. In December of 1990, upholding the decision of the Ontario Court of Appeal, the Supreme Court of Canada held that "the rights and freedoms" set out in section 1 of the Charter are subject to "reasonable limits prescribed by law as can be democratically justified in a free and democratic society", and thereby the prohibition against wilful promotion


Section 319(2) was then listed as 281.2(2).

\textsuperscript{129} R. v. Andrews (1988), 43 C.C.C. (3d) 193-228 (Ont. C. A) at 220.
of hatred under section 319(2) was valid. The appeal was dismissed. The third case resulting in a conviction was \textit{R. v. Safadi}. In this case, Michel Sleiman Safadi (the accused) sent a total of 45 letters to religious groups, various police and government agencies and various people of Lebanese descent in the province of Prince Edward Island (P.E.I.). Safadi made the letters appear as if they originated from a Jewish source. The letters attacked Christianity in general, Jesus Christ, Mary and the Holy Spirit in particular, as well as government institutions using highly provocative and disgusting language. In July of 1993, the P.E.I. Supreme Court Trial Division held that Safadi promoted hatred against Jews and convicted him of wilfully promoting hatred. In September of 1994, the Appeal Division affirmed the conviction of the Trial Division.

There is no other case which resulted in a conviction under the wilful promotion of hatred provision. This brings the total number of convictions under all three hate crime provisions to three. In other words, by section


319(2) standards. Jim Keegstra, Donald Andrews, Robert Smith and Michel Sleiman Safadi are the only four individuals who have advanced hatred in Canada for nearly three decades. This record provides strong evidence of the ineffectiveness of section 319(2).134

4.3 Technical Reforms

The liberal consensus perspective premise is that hate crime law provisions are formalized normative values; hate crime law provisions are a symbolic affirmation of normative values, designating hate conduct as socially unacceptable behaviour. Despite the fact that there are some conflicts between different individuals or groups, most individuals and groups within Canadian society share a common commitment against hatred.

Inherent in this notion of normative consensus is the view that hate crime offenders are only a deviant minority; the society at large by virtue of being the majority cannot be deviant. Naturally, the deviant minority is

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unappreciative of the criminalization of hate through the enactment of laws. However, the society at large is supportive of the criminalization of hate. Therefore, in light of the strong evidence of ineffectiveness of section 319(2), the solution suggested is not to question the purpose of hate crime provisions, but rather to make them more enforceable in practice.

4.3.1 Requirement of Wilfully

The definition of "wilfully" as clarified in R. v. Buzzanga and Durocher\(^{135}\) has been seen as a hurdle in obtaining a conviction under section 319(2) on the wilful promotion of hatred. As a result, the Special Committee on Visible Minorities in Canadian Society in 1984 recommended the removal of "wilfully" as a requirement from section 319(2)\(^{136}\). However, the Special Committee on Racial and Religious Hatred of the Canadian Bar Association (CBA) opposed the abolition of the requirement of "wilfully" from the provision. A year later, dissenting from the position of the CBA Committee recommendation, the Special Committee on Pornography and Prostitution


recommended the removal of "wilfully"\textsuperscript{137}. Despite the recommendation in favour of change, the requirement of wilful intent remains unchanged.

4.3.2 	extbf{Attorney General's Consent}

The requirement of the Attorney General's consent has also been viewed by some commentators as a second obstacle to the enforcement of section 319(2). As Sanjeev Anand points out, despite the startling similarities between the statements in the \textit{National Reporter} which were the primary subject matter in \textit{R. v. Andrews} and the statement of Alexander McQuirter (one of the Ku Klux Klan leaders) on British Columbia television and radio, the consent of the Attorney General of British Columbia was not granted to proceed under section 319(2) against Alexander McQuirter\textsuperscript{138}. Similarly, both Ernst Zündel and Malcolm Ross advanced hatred against Jews as in the above mentioned \textit{R. v. Keegstra} case. However, as a result of the failure to obtain the consent of the Attorney General, neither Zündel nor Ross were ever prosecuted under section 319(2). Zündel was prosecuted and found guilty


under section 181 of the Criminal Code for "wilfully publishing a statement that he knew to be false". The actions of Ross in New Brunswick were found to have violated section 5(1) of the New Brunswick Human Rights Act. Accordingly, the argument has been advanced that the effectiveness of section 319(2) can be improved through removing the need for the Attorney General's consent as specified in section 319(6).

The Special Committee on Visible Minorities in Canadian Society in 1984 recommended the removal of the consent of the Attorney General to prosecute under section 319(2) on wilful promotion of hatred. However, the Special Committee on Racial and Religious Hatred of the Canadian Bar Association (CBA) recommended that the need to obtain the consent of the Attorney General not be removed on the basis that it serves to prevent

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frivolous prosecutions\textsuperscript{143}. A year later, dissenting from the position of the
CBA Committee recommendation, the Special Committee on Pornography
and Prostitution recommended the removal of the Attorney General's
consent\textsuperscript{144}. Nevertheless, the requirement of the consent of the Attorney
General under section 319(2) has remained unchanged.

\section*{4.4 Freedom of Speech}

A more central problem to the criminalization of hate from a liberal
consensus perspective is the tension which exists between the right to
freedom of speech and the rights of groups to be protected from speech which
promotes hatred. As the discussion of the case law showed, each case in
which a prosecution was brought under section 319(2) for wilful promotion
of hatred was challenged by the defence on the grounds that it violated the
accused's right to freedom of speech.

Thomas Berger argues that freedom of speech is the necessary

\textsuperscript{143} See Canadian Bar Association Special Committee on Racial and Religious

\textsuperscript{144} See Canada, 1985, \textit{Pornography and Prostitution in Canada: The Report of the Special
Committee on Pornography and Prostitution}, Ottawa: Supply and Services Canada, Vol. 1
at 317-323.
condition of all other freedoms. Yet, there is no truly free marketplace of ideas as individuals do not have equal access to forums of speech, and some forums of free speech are aimed at propagating hate. Commentators have pointed out that the freedom to propagate hate is not so much a freedom as it is a socially destructive ideology. As Alan Shefman points out, what is so important to a vibrant democracy is not this abhorrent and hateful speech. Hate speech restricts the free speech of its target. Nevertheless, it is this abhorrent and hateful speech which finds its way in many sophisticated


149 Ian McKenna, 1994, "Canada's Hate Propaganda Laws - A Critique", 9(1) British Journal of Canadian Studies at 27.
venues under the bandwagon of freedom of speech. Therefore, the real challenge under the liberal consensus perspective is to criminalize hate speech without limiting freedom of speech; the delineation of boundaries between hate speech and freedom of speech is the problem.

4.5 Alternate Explanation

In contrast to the liberal consensus perspective, the conflict perspective argues that hate crime law does not develop out of a broad-based normative consensus within society over competing individual interests, but rather develops out of the competition of groups at the level of norms as well as at the level of individual interests, power and resources. Accordingly, it is possible in a society where hate views are widely and strongly held on a more general level, to produce hate crime law condemning hate. In fact, as discussed in the previous chapter, there was no strong consensus either in the Canadian Parliament or in the society at large pushing for the implementation of the Cohen Committee recommendations as law.

The events which led to the enactment of hate crime laws were initiated and steered by the communities most affected by hatred.

Consequently, although Bill C-3 provisions became law, they cannot be equated to a broad-based normative consensus against hatred. Thus, the question arises as to whether it is realistic to expect the enforcement of section 319(2) as a broad-based normative consensus which they never were.\footnote{Jeffrey Ross argues that having failed to prevent Bill C-3 from being passed, a series of events took place in the interim to lessen the likelihood of using Bill C-3 provisions through enacting alternative sanctions against those who engage in the same type of activity for which the Bill C-3 provisions were designed. According to Ross, the enactment of section 13 of the Canadian Human Rights Act in 1977 is one such example. See Jeffrey Ross, 1994, "Hate Crime in Canada: Growing Pains with Canadian Legislation", in Mark S. Hamm (ed.), 1994, Hate Crime: International Perspectives on Causes and Control, Cincinnati, OH: Anderson Publishing at 155.}

As Vold pointed out, it is not just the law-making process that is implicated in conflict among groups: law-breaking as well as law-enforcement aspects are implicated in conflict among groups.\footnote{George Vold, 1958, Theoretical Criminology, Oxford: Oxford University Press at 208-209.} Accordingly, the reasons for only a handful of convictions under section 319(2) may be deeper than just technical inadequacies of the existing offence, and may be traced to the existence of deep-seated and fundamental conflicts among groups within Canadian society at the level of the law enforcement process itself. Consequently, what is realistic to expect is the non-enforcement of section
319(2) as normative consensus\textsuperscript{133}. Thus, given the existence of allegations against police racism and discrimination\textsuperscript{134}, it has been argued by some commentators that part of the blame lies on the law-enforcement personnel for not catching hatemongers. Other commentators have pointed to the role of the Attorneys General in deciding whether to prosecute\textsuperscript{135} and the apparent


\textsuperscript{135} Jeffrey Ross argues that while hate crimes take place everyday in Canada, charges are rarely laid. See Jeffrey Ross, 1994, "Hate Crime in Canada: Growing Pains with Canadian Legislation", in Mark S. Hamm (ed.), 1994, \textit{Hate Crime: International
lack of strong judicial support for the hate crime provisions\(^{156}\). as reasons for the lack of successful convictions under section 319(2). However, this still begs the question whether society at large is any more enthusiastic than the law-enforcement personnel, the Attorneys General or the judges in criminalizing hate.

Let us, for example, assume that the Attorney General's consent requirement is removed and the standing to bring prosecutions is given to affected groups and individuals. Surely, the number of prosecutions would increase\(^{157}\). However, there is no guarantee that the society at large will demand speedy trials, strong judicial condemnation of hate and financial support for affected groups and individuals to bring hatemongers to trial. In other words, the length of time, the divided and weak judicial support, and the financial costs involved in a prosecution as in the Keegstra case will continue. As a result, it is most likely that the increase in the number of prosecutions may become a short-lived phenomenon. In any event, there is

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nothing to suggest that even if there were an increase in the number of
prosecutions that there would be a significant increase in convictions.

It is possible that the Attorneys General have prosecuted hatemongers
under section 319(2) whenever a conviction is most promising. The factual
similarities of cases comparing the conducts of Donald Andrews and Robert
Smith with Alexander McQuirter or Ernst Zündel with Malcolm Ross may
not be the points which are most pertinent to a successful conviction, but the
most important factors might be the conflicting interests of competing parties
in the society at large in a given time and context. Furthermore, the
commonly demonstrated reluctance to institute criminal proceedings may, at
least partly, be attributable to the desire to prevent hatemongers from winning
support for their causes of hatred in the court of public opinion. ¹58

Even before Bill C-3 was introduced, Graham Hughes argued that.

[i]f the views expressed by the accused are aberrational and held
in general contempt in the society[,] it seems very unlikely that
to subject him to prosecution would excite very much sympathy
for him. Of course it may be said in such a society there may
not be much need anyway for legislation of this sort. If, on the
other hand, racist views are widely and strongly held in the
community[,] then no doubt such prosecutions would excite
sympathy for the accused, but this seems largely an academic
point since in such a community the passage of legislation would
seem very unlikely. The sensitive situation would be precisely
the one in which legislation of this kind is likely to occur,
namely in a society where racist views are strongly condemned

¹58 Luke McNamara, 1994, "Criminalizing Racial Hatred: Learning from the
by the official morality and the private morality of the majority of citizens but are nevertheless held by a sizable or significant minority. Here there is certainly some discernable possibility of prosecutions of this kind fortifying rather than diminishing the strength of racist sentiment\(^{159}\).

Three decades later, some authors continue to doubt whether prosecutions have merely provided a forum for hatemongers to spread hatred\(^{160}\). Although it is difficult to determine whether prosecution publicity has advanced the cause of hatemongers, it is certainly difficult not to ignore the publicity that they have received for themselves and their causes of hate\(^{161}\). Daniel Gamble argued that prosecution publicity makes hatemongers wealthier and well-known, attracting new recruits\(^{162}\). In a society such as Canada where hate is embedded in mass-culture through art, music, politics, humour and many other forms, prosecution publicity may even bring mass

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sympathy for hatemongers. As a result, hatemongers may even prefer prosecution in order to receive publicity.

Unless there is a very clear hate incident with mass disapproval, the arguments for the freedom of speech are relatively easier to sell in a court of public opinion than the arguments against hateful speech. Accordingly, those who suggest wording changes to Bill C-3 provisions to make them effective miss the point that it is not the wording which prevents convictions; it is the ongoing competition over the enforcement and legitimacy of Bill C-3 provisions which prevent convictions.

In contrast to Bill C-3 provisions, Bill C-41 provisions are relatively easy to enforce: under Bill C-41 provisions, it is difficult for an accused person to drum up support in the name of the freedom of speech as "bias, prejudice or hate" by itself is not criminalized by these sections. The provisions prescribe that longer sentences be imposed by the judges, if bias, prejudice or hate were elements of or motivating factors for a crime. In other words, until a crime is proven beyond a reasonable doubt, bias, prejudice or hate need not be used as elements in proving the offence. As mentioned in the previous chapter, even before Bill C-41 provisions become a part of the Criminal Code, this practice was put to use through the cases of R. v. Ingram and Grimsdale, R. v. Lelas, R. v. Simms, R. v. Curtis Peters and R. v. Atkinson, Ing
and Roberts\textsuperscript{163}. Since the proclamation of the Bill C-41 provisions as law, this case law position has gained more acceptance. \textit{R. v. Claude Joseph Robinson}\textsuperscript{164} and \textit{R. v. Burdi}\textsuperscript{165} are two recent examples of such sentencing.

Martha Shaffer, however, argues that Bill C-41 sentencing practice does not specifically address hate motivated violence. If hatred is a motive, it is considered only as a factor in sentencing, not as a hate crime by itself. She argues that this method of sentencing does not represent a strong denunciation of hate-motivated violence\textsuperscript{166}. According to her, the provision should either specify a penalty increase for each underlying offence or impose a penalty distinct from that of the underlying offence\textsuperscript{167}. In addition, she argues that the \textit{Criminal Code} should be amended to increase the maximum


\textsuperscript{164} R. \textit{v. Claude Joseph Robinson}, Appeal No. 9603-0483 Sentencing Judgment. Sentence Appeal Book filed on November 26, 1996 (Alta. C. Q. B.); Also see Western Report, 1996, "The wrong motive to have: a murderer draws 30 additional months in prison for his apparent racism". 11(35)/September 23 \textit{Western Report}.


\textsuperscript{166} Martha Shaffer, 1995, "Criminal Responses to Hate-Motivated Violence: Is Bill C-41 Tough Enough?", 41(1) \textit{McGill Law Journal} at 202-203.

\textsuperscript{167} Martha Shaffer, 1995, "Criminal Responses to Hate-Motivated Violence: Is Bill C-41 Tough Enough?", 41(1) \textit{McGill Law Journal} at 207-208. See section 85 of the \textit{Criminal Code} for an analogous example.
sentence for all designated offences when the offences were motivated by hatred\textsuperscript{168}. However, it is unlikely that Shaffer's ideas could have been implemented in \textit{Bill C-41}. The passage of \textit{Bill C-41} was one of the most difficult amendments to law in recent history. As a result, despite imperfections, \textit{Bill C-41} is a major achievement; at its worst, in comparison to \textit{Bill C-3} provisions, \textit{Bill C-41} provisions are enforceable.

Mere relative enforceability of \textit{Bill C-41} provides authenticity to the notion of the deindividuated non-random victim which was initially introduced through \textit{Bill C-3}. Central to the idea of a deindividuated non-random victim is that a single act directed at one individual victimizes more than just that individual: a hate victim is selected for victimization on the basis of the perceived group of which the individual is a member, making hate victimization non-random. A single hate act victimizes an entire community of people, compounding their pre-existing oppression and reminding them to anticipate similar experiences in the future. However, the notion of a deindividuated non-random victim has remained at the periphery of Canadian criminal law as there were only three convictions under \textit{Bill C-3} provisions.

In time, when more convictions are obtained under \textit{Bill C-41}, the notion of deindividuated non-random victim will hopefully become a basic principle of_________________________________________


This approach is adopted in several U.S. states.
criminal law and be understood.

The meaning of hate motivated offence convictions, however, is subject to limitations. The focus of hate crime offence convictions is on hate crime offenders; the issues of victims are discussed in relation to hate crime offenders.\(^{169}\) As Colin Sumner points out, "once constituted, legal systems do not produce law, but exist as The Law. An ideology of legality develops which celebrates and elevates The Law to an exalted status."\(^{170}\) In hate crime law discussions, the issues of hate are seen in terms of obtaining convictions against individual offenders. What this viewpoint does not reveal is what it does: the hate crime offences which are based on the norm-deviance philosophy designate only a small number of people in the society as hate crime offenders.\(^{171}\) As a result, the society at large is not perceived as being engaged in violence; hate is not a product of the society at large. Ian McKenna argues it is this ideological view of the liberal consensus perspective that is the dominant view in Canada; this means that hate conduct in


Canadian society is invariably seen as a product of extremist groups. Luke McNamara argues that the issue of hate must be addressed in a broader social and historical context. According to Wayne Renke, attempts to put a face to perpetration minimizes both the depth and complexity of hate in Canada. He argues that the important elements in Canadian hate conduct are more faceless, more inarticulate, and more deadly. In other words, the criminalization of hate may in fact normalize many forms of hate in Canadian society. From this perspective, the criminalization of hate is not effective.

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5. CONCLUSION

The Criminal Code contains the relevant provisions pertaining to the criminalization of hate. The first set of provisions was added to the Criminal Code in 1970 through Bill C-3, creating the specific hate crime offences of "advocating genocide", "public incitement of hatred", and "wilful promotion of hatred". These hate crime offenses remain unchanged and are currently listed under section 318 to 320. The second set of provisions was added in 1995 through Bill C-41, prescribing that longer sentences be imposed by the courts if "bias, prejudice or hate" were elements of or motivating factors for a crime. The most pertinent of these sentencing provisions to the criminalization of hate are listed under subsections 718.1 and 718.2. In other words, the criminalization of hate is achieved through specific criminal offences and sentence enhancement.

Central to the idea of hate crime is that whereas a hate victim is selected for victimization on the basis of the perceived group of which the individual is a member, a single act directed at one individual of the group victimizes more than just that individual. This nature of selection makes hate victimization non-random. Inherent in this particular non-randomness is that
any given hate act violates not only the victim but an entire group of members. As a result, a hate victim cannot be individuated to one individual; a hate crime victim is a deindividuated victim with a group identity. Therefore, a hate victim can be best described as a deindividuated non-random victim.

Traditionally, the discussions on criminal law dealt with individual offenders and individual victims. When group dimensions were discussed, group members were reduced to a collection of individuals. Prior to the introduction of hate crime laws, an attack against an entire group of members with a collective identity was not legally recognized. Since the introduction of hate crime laws, the collective identities of victims have been recognized through the principle of the deindividuated non-random victim. When the criminalization of hate is discussed, it is this deindividuated non-random victim which is the one seeking protection.

The Criminal Code provisions on hate crime presuppose the liberal consensus assumptions of the criminal law, focusing on the formalistic rules and process oriented aspects of the Canadian legal system. Considering hate crime law only as formalistic rule and process, however, limits our understanding of the criminalization of hate. As a result, this study has exposed the underlying assumptions of the liberal consensus perspective in the criminalization of hate. Realising the inadequacy of the liberal
explanations, it has been necessary to supplement them using the conflict perspective. The explanations given in the conflict perspective as articulated in this research provide a different set of reasoning on hate which is significantly different from the liberal consensus perspective.

The liberal consensus perspective’s premise is that the social relations between individuals and groups within society take place against the backdrop of a broad societal consensus against hatred. Despite the existence of significant conflicts of interests between different individuals or groups, most individuals and groups within society share a common commitment against hatred. It is in this context that hate crime law provisions have been seen as formalized broad-based normative values, defining acceptable and unacceptable social behaviour.

The conflict perspective assumes that group conflicts are an integral part of society. Contrary to the idea that hate crime law develops out of broad-based normative consensus within society over competing individual interests, hate crime law develops out of the competition of groups at the level of norms as well as at the level of individual interests, power and resources. This skews norms as well as individual interests, power and resources in law-making.

The events which led to the development of hate crime law were steered by the communities most affected by hate. The communities most
affected were successful in using not only their own power and resources, but also using the power and resources of the Canadian society at large to create a consciousness against aberrant and deviant hate offenders. Although this consciousness was not comparable to a broad-based normative consensus within the society strongly condemning hate, it was sufficient enough to pass for the broad-based normative consensus in bringing about changes to the Canadian Criminal Code through Bill C-3.

Although Bill C-3 provisions became law after nearly three decades, there have been only three cases with successful convictions. As Vold pointed out, it is not just the law-making process that is implicated in conflict among groups: law-breaking as well as law-enforcement aspects are also implicated in conflict among groups. By this reasoning, the ineffective enforcement of hate crime law is a reflection of an attempt of different competing groups to maintain the upper hand and control the process of law-enforcement.

If we follow back the notion of competition to the level of norms as well as to the level of individual interests, the actions against the spread of hateful speech can be presented as a restriction against the freedom of speech. Where freedom of expression is a relatively easy sell in the court of public opinion, the enforcement of actions against the spread of hatred through the courts of justice becomes a difficult task. As a result, from the conflict perspective, the distinction between 'in court' and 'out of court' is not a
noteworthy reference. It is this support articulated through the court of public opinion which is turned against in order to neutralize section 319(2). Accordingly, no matter what wording changes are introduced to section 319(2), the idea of freedom of speech will take the upper hand in the court of public opinion.

Implicated in legalities, the focus of hate crime offence convictions is on hate crime offenders. At the same time, the criminalization of hate designates only a small number of people in the society as hate crime offenders. As a result, the criminalization of hate may give the false sense of security that the society at large is not engaged in hate conduct, confirming the dominant view that hatred in Canadian society is a product of extremist groups. The important elements in Canadian hate conduct are endemic in and are more faceless, more inarticulate, and more deadly. This should be a disturbing finding to all Canadians concerned with a just society. In other words, the criminalization of hate appears to in fact normalize and cover up many forms of hate in Canadian society.

Therefore, the criminalization of hate must be implemented neither as a stand alone strategy nor as a first resort. Implemented as a part of a comprehensive response in combatting hate, the criminalization of hate can be useful. The criminalization of hate by itself is not effective in combatting hatred in Canada.
Appendix

*Is God a Racist: The Right Wing in Canada*\(^\text{175}\), *Web of Hate: Inside Canada's Far Right Network*\(^\text{176}\), *Report on Hate Group Activity in Ontario: Environmental Scan*\(^\text{177}\) and *Hate Groups in Canada: Impact and Challenges*\(^\text{178}\) describe 'Who's Who' in the Canadian web of hate. A large portion of these descriptions deal with individuals and groups who are engaged in criminal or quasi-criminal activities. Stanley Barrett, however, in *Is God a Racist: The Right Wing in Canada* also describes the 'Who's Who' that fall outside criminal and quasi-criminal activities. He calls these societal elements the fringe right, while classifying individuals and groups who engage in criminal and quasi-criminal activities.

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\(^{178}\) Martin Thériault, 1993, *Hate Groups in Canada: Impact and Challenges* [Unpublished draft which was released for comments during the Workshop on Police Response to Hate/Bias Crime in Ottawa, April 22-23, 1994]. Ottawa: Solicitor General Canada Secretariat.
activities as the radical right\textsuperscript{179}.

The radical right refers to "those individuals who define themselves as racists, Fascists and anti-Semites, and [those] who are prepared to use violence to realize their objectives"\textsuperscript{180}. The fringe right refers to those "who oppose Third World immigration, foreign aid, homosexuals' rights, and the changing sexual norms of the society, but who at the same time do not condone physical violence and reject all accusations that they are Fascists, racists and anti-Semites"\textsuperscript{181}.

The radical right according to Barrett includes.

- Aryan Nations
- Black and Red Front
- British Party Canada
- British Israel
- British People's League (and Party)
- Canadian Action
- Canadian Anti-Soviet Action Committee (CASAC)
- Canadian National Party
- Canadian Nazi Party
- Canadian Youth Corps
- Christ Is the Answer Inc.
- Christian Defence Council
- Christian Fellowship Assembly
- Christian Mutual Defence Fund
- Church of Creativity
- Committee for Free Speech Canada

\textsuperscript{179} Stanley R. Barrett, 1987. \textit{Is God a Racist: The Right Wing in Canada}. Toronto: University of Toronto Press at 8-10. Kinsella does not make this distinction as he discusses only the radical right, the "most extreme elements of various neo-Nazi and white supremacist groups - that is those who advocate the use of violence or non-democratic means against the established order". Refer to Warren Kinsella, 1994. \textit{Web of Hate: Inside Canada's Far Right Network}. Toronto: HarperCollins Publishers at 5.


The fringe right according to Barrett includes.


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