‘GENOCIDE PREVENTION IN THE MODERN SETTING: THEORY VERSUS PRACTICE’

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Abstract

‘...I know there is a God because in Rwanda I shook hands with the devil. I have seen him, I have smelled him and I have touched him. I know the devil exists, and therefore I know there is a God. Peux ce que veux. Allons-y’ (Dallaire, 2004: xviii).

Genocide is perhaps the most extreme and destructive crime against humanity, however, the international response to incidents of this nature has frequently lacked political will or commitment, either financially or through military interventions. A commonality in the lack of genocide intervention by individual states is the absence of gainful resources such as oil, gold and diamonds in the country of conflict, or through the description of such events as ‘civil wars’. A further problem encountered with the intervention of genocide is its legal classification, the limited meaning of which has consequently resulted in governments failing to respond whilst attempting to determine the correct ‘terminology’, with the recent conflicts in Darfur being a key example of this problem (Quayle, 2005). This thesis, therefore, attempts to determine whether genocide can be actively prevented through a discussion of the potential causal factors of genocide, and a critical evaluation of whether existing responses to genocide are both appropriate and effective.
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This dissertation is dedicated to all those who lost their lives to genocide and to those still living with the painful memories left behind. I sincerely hope that ‘Never Again’ will, one day, be more than an empty slogan.

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Chapter One: Introduction

According to Lemkin (1944), the term ‘mass killing’ was inadequate in describing the true atrocities of the Holocaust (cited in Yacoubian, 2000) thus as a result, he devised the term ‘genocide’ from the ‘Greek ‘genos’ meaning race or tribe, and the Latin ‘cide’, meaning killing. The term was, thereafter, adopted by The United Nations Convention on the Prevention of the Crime of Genocide (UNCG) in December 1948, making genocide a crime under international law (Alvarez & Bachman, 2008). Article II of the Convention defines genocide as any of the following acts committed with the intention ‘to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial, or religious group.:.

(a) Killing members of a group;
(b) Causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the group;
(c) Deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to bring about its physical destruction in whole or in part;
(d) Imposing measures intended to prevent births within the group;
(e) Forcibly transferring children of the group to another group’ (Jones, 2006: 12-13).

Not only is the act of genocide punishable, but also the conspiracy or the attempt to commit genocide, incitement to commit genocide, and complicity in the act of genocide (ibid). The UN’s decision to include the aforementioned four groups is based on the premise that such factors remain cognate to contemporary genocidal events (Quayle, 2005).

A key criticism of the Convention’s definition is the problem of proving intent as perpetrators may deny there was an intention to commit genocide, arguing instead that the killing was a consequence of trying to defend their community or acquire land (Alvarez and Bachman, 2008). However, intention can be inferred indirectly from specific policies, governmental documents, and speeches (ibid). As debate has continued surrounding an absolute and applicable definition of genocide, various commentators have sought to offer alternatives as an attempt to overcome this issue, one such example being that of Katz (1994, cited in Jones, 2006: 18) who states;

‘[Genocide is] the actualisation of the intent, however successfully carried out, to murder in its totality any national, ethnic, racial, religious, political, social, gender or economic group, as these groups are defined by the perpetrator, by whatever means.’

Although ‘the word is new, the concept is ancient’ (Kuper, 1981 cited in Jones, 2006: 3) and there are numerous examples throughout history of intentional mass killings of specific groups, for example, the total destruction of Carthage by Rome in 149 B.C. (Adler et al, 2004). According to Rummel (1994, cited Heidenrich, 2001: 8) 170,000,000 men, women, and children fell victim to genocide in the first 88 years of the twentieth century, thus ‘This is as though our species has been devastated by a modern Black Plague. And indeed it has, but a plague of absolute power and not germs’. Although most genocidal acts occur during periods of armed conflict, there is an important legal distinction between ‘war’ and genocide. Wars are supposed to involve only armed forces, and to preserve some civility, those involved in war must avoid harming non-combatants, which includes: ‘infants, children, women, the elderly, military physicians, medics and prisoners’ (Heidenrich, 2001: 1). By contrast, the victims of genocide include the defenceless, no matter how innocent or guilty they may be perceived to be, and is contrary to international law (ibid), however, Governments may fuse
together war and genocide by employing trained military and militia for both purposes, thus further blurring this distinction (Markusen and Mirkovic, 1999 cited in Adler et al, 2004).

What sets genocide apart from other forms of crime is the perpetrators have the legitimacy and authority of the government supporting their actions. This has led many academics to argue that the responsibility for the commission of genocide rests solely with the leadership of the state who perpetrate it, as both formal and informal agents of the state are those who plan and perpetrate the genocidal acts themselves (Alvarez, 2001). Genocide requires both planning and organisation, usually as a means to satisfy a goal of the governments, thus governments, or factions within a government, may generate resentment and prejudice toward a minority group in order to achieve this goal (Alvarez and Bachman, 2008), often through various propaganda campaigns.

It is vital that genocide is understood as a contemporary issue as well as one of historical significance, for example, England and Wales’ current political climate is, in many respects, comparable to that of Germany’s in the lead up to the election of the Nazi party, which can be seen in the rise in popularity of the British National Party (BNP). Whilst it is unlikely that this will lead to the occurrence of genocide in the UK, other cultural settings have witnessed such an escalation, for example the ongoing events in Darfur, and the recent conflict in Libya. Therefore, the aim of this dissertation is to determine whether genocide can be prevented, and this notion is explored through a range of debates:

Chapter 2 illustrates the methodological approach taken for this research project, whilst exploring the strengths and weaknesses of both primary and literary data collection.

Chapter 3 introduces the reader to the wider structural issues that surround the crime of genocide before discussing various theoretical approaches that attempt to explain the actions of perpetrators and bystanders.

Chapter 4 utilises genocide case studies from Rwanda and Bosnia, in order to demonstrate the various social, political, economic and criminogenic factors that precipitated these events. The chapter provides examples of some of the extreme incidents that took place, whilst also discussing the various interventions taken which facilitated the end of each of those genocides.

Chapter 5 critically discusses the current approaches taken by the UN in preventing and intervening in genocide, before discussing alternatives to these measures suggested by various academics, governmental agencies, and charities.

Finally, Chapter 6 considers future directions for the prevention of genocide; firstly to determine what will facilitate its success, and secondly, how likely this success will be.
Chapter Two: Methodology

Many writers have pointed out the importance of genocide research for contributing to the understanding of the problem and, as Alvarez (2001: 2) argues, ‘turning the empty rhetoric of “never again” into a promise and a reality’. There is a clear responsibility for academics, including criminologists, to conduct research in this subject area in order to generate ongoing action and shape both national and international policy (ibid).

The approach taken for this research project is a literary analysis, utilising existing data in the format of books, journals, websites, documentaries and museum exhibitions. Primary research is not appropriate for this particular research project for many reasons, the first of which being that genocide is an extremely sensitive topic, both for survivors and those studying it. Jones (2006) states that those who investigate genocide can be impacted both psychologically and emotionally and such an approach may also cause distress to survivors through recalling genocide-related events in their own lives. Yacoubian (2000: 14) summarises the limited use of traditional methods of criminological research when studying genocide, which include the issues that ‘field research presents physical dangers that make the standard problems of the method pale in comparison’ and the ‘use of unobtrusive measures is... hampered by... access to official records, and... language barriers’. He also states that the time needed to obtain reasonable familiarity with the history and culture of the study area is ‘unreasonable for most academics’ (ibid). In addition, the aim of the dissertation is to determine whether genocide can be prevented, however access to the relevant NGOs is problematic in this instance, therefore, literary analysis was deemed to be the appropriate research approach to adopt.

There are many advantages to using literary sources, such as free access to an increasing amount of documentary research with no permission needed (Noaks & Wincup, 2004) and the Internet, in particular, has helped to facilitate this. The data has more permanence which means it is available for others to check and as such, has a decreased likelihood of ethical problems (Denscombe, 2003). By comparing different sources of information, known as ‘data triangulation’, and using a number of theoretical positions through ‘theory triangulation’, the accuracy and validity of research improves (ibid), which would prove extremely difficult to attain through primary research in a project such as this. A technique most commonly associated with primary research is ‘snowball sampling’, where the researcher uses their initial sample group to establish contact with others, and so on (Bryman, 2008). This approach can be utilised in literary research where the bibliography from the source in use can also provide the opportunity to locate other such associated research. This was a crucial method in researching the Bosnian genocide as a case study, as much of the information initially located was based solely on legislature.

The most common sources of academic literature are books and journals, which offer the potential for in-depth practitioner knowledge on a given topic. Both must, however, be treated with caution in relation to the accuracy of their data, particularly if such publications are dated or are not peer-reviewed, whilst issues such as ‘Genocide’ are often not the focus for criminology-based publications, which can make access to such materials more problematic. According to Platt (1981 cited in Denscombe, 2003) and Scott (1990 cited in
Denscombe, 2003) document validity needs to be evaluated under authenticity, credibility and meaning. In relation to criminal statistics, including those of genocide, there entails a ‘dark figure of crime’ which effects the reliability of data. This refers to the volume of crime not registered in official statistics (Newburn, 2007) and as most genocides occur on a such a substantive scale, the number of the deceased is often difficult to measure, as highlighted by the variation in victim estimates for the Rwandan genocide such as over one million victims (Ilibagiza, 2006), compared with roughly 800,000 (Waller, 2007).

Further potential limitations of literary analysis must also be considered as according to Denscombe (2003), the use of triangulation can make the analysis of pre-existing data complex as it is necessary for the researcher to compare and integrate findings in a more demanding way, especially when there are contradictory findings. The credibility of sources must also be considered by the researcher, particularly in regards to the use of the Internet whilst accessibility to site content may also be limited, which could result in a biased sample (Bryman, 2008).

Despite the aforementioned potential issues regarding the chosen methodological approach, Morgan (2000 cited in Noaks & Wincup, 2004) has commented that there is more than sufficient data available for literary analysis by British criminologists. As such, literary analysis was considered to be the most appropriate approach for this research when taking into account the sensitivity of the topic, the accessibility of existing quality research and the time-scale and resources available for this particular research project.
Chapter Three: Explaining Genocide

‘…most perpetrators of genocide are neither insane nor pathologically cruel. They are people like us’ (Stanton, 2007 cited in Waller, 2007: vii).

Genocide has been termed by Waller (2007) as an extraordinary evil, an understandable term by many. As a subject, genocide has been heavily researched throughout the latter part of the twentieth century in an attempt to discover the nature of this ‘extraordinary evil’. For the most part, academics have found that perpetrators of genocide are not psychopaths nor pathologically cruel, but are in fact ordinary people (Stanton, 2007 cited in Waller, 2007). This chapter discusses theoretical explanations of perpetrator and bystander behaviour, as it is essential to understand the dynamics of these groups when attempting to prevent genocide.

Stanton’s (1998) eight stage model of genocide is used to establish a structural understanding of the genocidal process as it is a useful basis for analysis. Each stage identified by Stanton reinforces the others, with the first of the stages being ‘classification’. This refers to the human tendency to identify some people as ‘us’ and others as ‘them’, for example the Nazi’s Nuremberg Laws (ibid), however, this stage does not necessarily lead to genocide; only if cultural boundaries are created is it possible (Stanton, 2008). The second stage is termed ‘symbolisation’, where symbols are used to name and signify classifications, by referring to an ethnic origin or physical characteristics, for example. At later stages of the process, governments often require members of targeted groups to wear identifying clothing, such as yellow stars. The first two stages are fundamental operations in all cultures, but when combined with dehumanisation, they become steps of genocide (Stanton, 1998).

‘Dehumanisation’ is the third stage in the genocidal process, it is the denial of humanity, and can involve labelling target groups as animals such as ‘cockroaches’, a term used for Tutsi’s by extremist Hutus before and during the 1994 Rwandan genocide. Hate propaganda is used to spread dehumanising ideologies such as this, and contributes to individuals overcoming the normal revulsion felt against murder (Stanton, 1998; 2008). For Stanton (2008), stage four is ‘organisation’; plans are made for the genocidal killing, predominantly by the state, but sometimes through militias or terrorist groups. The fourth stage can quickly spiral into the fifth, which is ‘polarisation’, whereby groups are driven further apart by extremists who broadcast extreme propaganda (ibid). Combined with this, killings committed by one group often provoke revenge killings which can mark the beginning of mass murder (Stanton, 1998).

Genocide requires ‘preparation’, which is the sixth of Stanton’s eight stages. This stage includes identification, often through identity cards such as the requirement for Rwandans to carry ID cards identifying their ethnicity of Tutsi, Hutu or Twa, facilitating extremists’ easy identification of victims. Seizure of property and belongings, and transportation of victims also occurs at this time. The following stage is ‘extermination’; targeted groups are methodically and rapidly murdered, and are not considered as murder as the victims have been successfully dehumanised. The final stage is ‘denial’. Bodies are burnt or dumped into mass graves, victims are intimidated, records destroyed, investigations into the crimes blocked and genocidal actions are denied, claiming the deaths were a result of civil war (ibid).
As demonstrated, genocide is a process, with the turning point occurring at stages four and five; however, the stages prior to these are fundamental in laying the foundations for genocide to happen, known as ‘categorisation’. Within social psychology, there is a general consensus that people tend to form close ties with members of their in-group, attributing unique features to the individual members, while remaining suspicious of out-group members of whom they perceive to share similar characteristics (Nelson, 2006; Fiske, 2002 cited in Nelson, 2006). Society is reliant upon its members developing a sense of collective which promotes the importance of in-group identity, however, these same values can facilitate hostility toward, and competition with out-groups (Waller, 2007). Waller (2007) has commented that genocidal regimes have, in the past, emphasised collectivistic values that are central to personal identity. He gives the example of the collective identity in Rwanda prior to and during the 1994 genocide, for the Hutus held their ideology to be resurrected from colonial and indigenous Rwanda, whereas they held Tutsi to be an ‘alien’ and foreign race, and rejected any claim they had on Rwanda’s national identity (ibid).

The mental process of ‘projection’ occurs when individuals perceive others as responsible for their misfortunes, and these ‘others’, or out-groups, are scapegoated as feelings of fear and anger are projected toward them (Allport, 1954). For example, in the wake of defeat in World War I, Germany suffered extensive food shortages and inflation, which was largely blamed on the Jews (Goldhagen, 1996). According to Frey and Rez (2002, cited in Waller, 2007), scapegoats provide a social explanation for being responsible for specific negative events and justification for the discrimination and violence initiated against them. Groups determine whether a minority group is disliked through generalising the link between the immediate frustrator and the disliked group (Berkowitz and Green, 1962). This hostility will also serve to strengthen solidarity within the group (Alvarez, 2001), and in turn ‘create a predisposition for group violence’ (Staub, 2002: 14). Scapegoating can provide ‘great psychological usefulness’ (Staub, 1989, cited in Waller, 2007: 218) as the perpetrator need not feel guilty about his or her actions against the group.

However, in relation to Rwanda, Straus (2006) has rejected theories of deprivation and scapegoating. He found Rwanda’s perpetrators were poor, but were not on average any poorer than their neighbours, and points out that the violence did not begin in the poorest regions. Rather, Straus (2006: 232) comments that Rwandans feared punishment and so ‘calculated that compliance was less costly than opposition’. Furthermore, Straus (2006) argues that it is a setting of war and conflict that is necessary for ordinary men to kill, as it creates feelings of fear, anger, self-preservation and hostility which can create conditions for men to commit violence they might not in other circumstances. He states several other reasons for why war matters, firstly war settings legitimise killing; secondly war creates feelings of uncertainty and insecurity; and thirdly, war leads to the involvement of specialists in violence, namely gendarmes, militias and soldiers (Straus, 2006). Straus (2006) has emphasised the heavy influence of situational factors and the snowball effect of violence, as once a man becomes incorporated into the killing, he expects his peers to join him which results in large numbers participating.

For Straus, the state in Rwanda has resonance at a local level, so by controlling the state, the hardliners were able to enforce their decisions nationally and associate killing Tutsis with authority. Moreover, there is a long history of obligatory labour in Rwanda, and so this deep-rooted history contributed to large numbers of participation (Straus, 2006). Similarly to
Straus and influenced by Milgram, Waller (2007) discusses the ‘social construct of cruelty’ in which immediate situations help perpetrators initiate, sustain and even cope with the ‘extraordinary evil’ around them. There are various interpretations of this line of argument, such as Kelman and Hamilton’s (1989, cited in Waller, 2007) belief that compliance, identification and internalisation encourage individuals to obey authority. Kelman (1989, cited in Day and Vandiver, 2000: 44) proposed the best way to explain massacres and genocides is to look at ‘the conditions under which the usual inhibitions against violence become weakened’. He went on to identify three processes that contribute to loss of restraint: authorisation, routinisation and dehumanisation. Authorisation refers to an authority approving or ordering killing which, in turn enhances the willingness of people to participate in the killing. Routinisation normalises and legitimises even the most extreme actions, and by focusing on the technical aspects of their actions (Neubacher, 2006) it ‘allows people to participate in actions “without considering the implications of that action and without really making a decision”’ (Kelman, 1989 cited in Day and Vandiver, 2000: 45). Refusal to participate becomes increasingly difficult after frequent repetition of an action (ibid), and this dehumanising process eases any restraint felt by perpetrators. Kelman (1989 cited in Day and Vandiver, 2000: 45) comments that dehumanisation occurs when groups are defined entirely in terms of a category which has been excluded ‘from the human family…’. According to Kelman the three interrelated processes contribute to perpetrators losing the ‘capacity to act as a moral being’ (ibid).

Day and Vandiver (2000) have observed that two of Kelman’s processes can be recognised in Sykes and Matza’s (1957) ‘techniques of neutralisation’, the two that are of interest being ‘denial of the victim’ and ‘appeal to higher loyalties’. The former holds that victims deserve their fate, which becomes possible through dehumanisation, and the latter places responsibility on the larger group to which they are a member. Sykes and Matza (1957 cited in Alvarez, 2001) note that their ‘techniques of neutralisation’ are not rationalisations, but are techniques utilised prior to their actions, and most importantly, are what make individuals able to engage in behaviour that would otherwise be unacceptable. Sykes and Matza’s theory was first proposed to explain delinquent behaviour; nonetheless, it has been used to explain why ordinary people commit extraordinary acts, as Alvarez (2001) argues, perpetrators of genocide suppress internal constraints in specific contexts in order to participate. There are three additional techniques put forward by Sykes and Matza (1957 cited in Alvarez, 2001), these are ‘denial of responsibility’ where the perpetrator refuses to accept that their behaviour was their own fault and argue it was caused by forces beyond their control; ‘denial of injury’ occurs when perpetrators believe their behaviour to be acceptable when there is no sign of harm; and the fifth technique is ‘condemning the condemners’, which involves directing blame and focus away from their actions toward figures who represent the conformist world. Alvarez (2001) has applied all five techniques to genocide.

In relation to genocide, ‘denial of responsibility’ is where perpetrators claim they were following orders (ibid) which removes direct responsibility from the perpetrator. Cohen (2001) states that the lower perpetrators are in the hierarchy, the easier it is to deny responsibility, for example, during the Holocaust, Nazi leaders ensured that the perpetrators were explicitly ordered to carry out tasks in prescribed ways to avoid feelings of guilt or responsibility (Rubenstein and Roth, 1987 cited in Alvarez, 2001). Perpetrators ‘denial of injury’ involves the avoidance of terms such as ‘genocide’, ‘killing’ and ‘murder’ because of their negative connotations. The Serbian euphemism ‘ethnic cleansing’, and the Nazi term ‘Final Solution’ are examples of this (Alvarez, 2001).
Alvarez (2001) has stressed the importance of ‘denying the victim’ in mass atrocities, whereby perpetrators assert their victims deserved their victimisation and go so far as to claim their violence as self-defence arguing they are the true victims. Perpetrators have an acute consciousness of political history and past victimisation which is used to reverse victimhood (Cohen, 2001). To illustrate this neutralisation, Alvarez (2001) uses the example of the Serbs portraying the Bosnian Muslims as representing a viable threat to their Serbian neighbours; much of this was communicated through propaganda.

By ‘condemning the condemners’, perpetrators deflect blame by referring to instances of past inhumane policies and atrocities. Ratko Mladić (cited in Alvarez, 2001: 125) referred to America’s ‘chemical cleansing of the Indian tribes’ to deny America any moral authority over the Serbs attack against the Muslims (Alvarez, 2001). Finally, by ‘appealing to higher loyalties’, perpetrators portray their actions as patriotic and nationalistic, rather than personal. Thus, perpetrators contributing toward the goal of the ‘Final Solution’ could claim they were acting for the benefit of their country, thus the act becomes an obligation, rather than a criminal offence (ibid).

Alvarez (2001) has established two additional categories, ‘denial of humanity’ and ‘defining the situation’. The former refers to perpetrators neutralising internal prohibitions against killing. During the Holocaust the Nazis dehumanised their victims both verbally and physically, by shaving their hair, starving and beating them, and leaving them covered in their own waste, thereby successfully bringing their human state to beyond recognition and reinforcing their dehumanisation (ibid; Imperial War Museum, 2000). Alvarez’s (2001) latter category is dependent on an ongoing process. This categorisation is similar to Helman’s ‘routinisation’, as once engaged in genocidal activities, perpetrators utilise the aforementioned techniques in order to allow them to continue with their actions.

Although genocide requires active participation from many, it also requires the willingness from the rest of society to do nothing (Alvarez, 2001). What is difficult to understand is why some individuals choose not to participate, but hesitate to intervene. May (1992, cited in Vetlesen, 2000) believes people’s inaction makes them partially responsible for the harm they could have prevented, as lack of inaction is a choice. Similarly, Vetlesen (2000) has argued that the bystander who does not intervene helps legitimise the genocidal actions being perpetrated; however, bystander passivity is not the same as bystander indifference. The decision to not intervene may one based on fear (Cohen, 2001), or due to not knowing how to intervene through feelings of powerlessness (Geras, 1998 cited in Cohen, 2001).

Cohen (2001) has offered several situational influences on bystanders that may prevent or encourage them to help others. Individual responsibility may be diffused when there are a large number of people in the position to help; therefore, according to Cohen (2001), lone bystanders are more likely to intervene. However, individuals may be encouraged by others to help, or influenced by the anticipated reaction of those around them (ibid). Furthermore, a key factor to whether individuals intervene may be feelings of identification with the victim, as it places a cognitive demand on the bystander to imagine being in the same predicament (ibid). If bystanders remain passive, individuals may find it difficult to remain empathic toward victims and in opposition of perpetrators, therefore, to reduce feelings of guilt and distress passive bystanders may distance themselves from victims through just-world thinking (Staub, 1978 cited in Staub, 2002). Moreover, because armed conflict can obscure genocidal
killing, bystanders may become desensitised to the actions occurring around them, resulting in victims being cut off from assistance (Fein, 1984 cited in Adler et al, 2004). Staub (2002) argues that in order to counteract the early steps along the ‘continuum of destruction’, bystanders must commit to intervention early on, as once the commitment to destroy a group has developed and is in process, non-forceful reactions will be ineffective.

The nature of perpetrators and bystanders is complex; however, by focusing on situational influences on the individual, this chapter has demonstrated that it is the situation that is essential to understanding why people participate in genocide and why others fail to intervene. Individuals react to the social world around them and perceive their actions as justified in the abnormal situation they find themselves in (Waller, 2007). Organisers of genocide ensure that ordinary boundaries are blurred throughout the genocidal process facilitating the breakdown of moral boundaries in the perpetrator and bystander.
Chapter Four: Genocide Case Studies

‘Bosnia trembled as if it had been hit by a powerful earthquake. But an earthquake comes and goes. This upheaval just kept on coming’ (Rezak Hukanovic, 1993, a survivor of Omarska and Manjača camps cited in Alvarez, 2001: 130).

‘No one escapes...not even new-born babies...the victims are pursued to their very last refuge and killed there’ (United Nations, 1994).

The Nazi’s annihilation of six million Jews made the Holocaust the ‘most shocking event of the twentieth century’ (Goldhagen, 1997: 4), however, it wasn’t just the sheer number of deaths at the hands of the Nazis that made the Holocaust so horrific. The scale of organisation involved in implementing the Holocaust is an aspect that still shocks people today, for example the Nazi’s use of Auschwitz where tens of thousands of Jews, Poles, Gypsies and Soviets were murdered in purpose-built gas chambers (Imperial War Museum, 2000). Unfortunately genocide is not a crime of the past, as according to Harff (2003) there have been nearly 50 instances of genocide since World War II. This chapter utilises the more recent genocides in Bosnia and Rwanda to show the events precipitating each genocide, and the actions taken to reach the aims of the perpetrators.

Bosnia-Herzegovina

After WWI Bosnia united with other Slav countries to form Yugoslavia, which was essentially ruled by Serbs from Belgrade (Peace Pledge Union, 2011). The Serbs were divided between the Chetniks, who supported a Serbian nationalist movement, and a political movement led by Josip Broz, known as Tito. There was widespread conflict between Tito’s forces and the Chetniks which led to thousands of Chetniks fleeing to neighbouring countries before and after Tito seized power in Belgrade, the Yugoslav capital (Jones, 2006).

Yugoslavia was a multi-ethnic state consisting of six republics or regions; Croatia, Montenegro, Macedonia, Slovenia, Bosnia-Herzegovina and Serbia, with Serbia incorporating two autonomous provinces, Kosovo and Vojvodina (Waller, 2007). As President of Yugoslavia, Tito crushed nationalism (BBC, 1995) and instituted a socialist state where Yugoslavs enjoyed freedom of movement and ethnic pluralism (Jones, 2006).

Following Tito’s death in 1980, the multinational federation unravelled. Serbian nationalism re-emerged stronger when Slobodan Milošević became Serbian president in 1987, encouraging Serb nationalism in all states belonging to Yugoslavia (Peace Pledge Union, 2011). Prior to becoming President, Milošević visited Kosovo to meet and undertake talks with the local Communist Party leadership to calm ethnic tensions with bordering Albania (BBC, 1995; Jones, 2006). He was met with rowdy and disrupting Serbs and made no effort to halt the crowd, but instead encouraged their protest. By 1989, Milošević controlled half of Yugoslavia and ended Kosovo’s autonomy, marking the beginning of his campaign for a ‘Greater Serbia’ (ibid; Cigar, 2000).

Influential figures in Serbia began to shape a stereotypical image of Muslims being inferior and a threat to Serbian nationalism by highlighting the massacres of Serbs by Muslim Ustaše during WWII. This was a discourse that spanned much of Serbia’s leading political figures and intellectuals, and subsequently entered the state-controlled media in an attempt to fulfil the Memorandum’s goals. The re-emergence of various Chetnik organisations were promoted.
by Milošević at this time, and the Belgrade authorities funded militias set up by these organisations (ibid). Meanwhile, Franjo Tudjman led a nationalist political movement in Croatia supervising campaigns of harassment against the Serbian population (Jones, 2006), and was later voted in as President when Croatia gained independence from Yugoslavia in 1991 (BBC, 1995), triggering an ethnic war between Serbs, Muslims and Croats (Waller, 2007). In 1992, Bosnia-Herzegovina was recognised as independent by the United States and European Union, however, the Bosnian-Serbs refused to accept the new government, which resulted in Milošević arming local Bosnian Serbs and beginning a wider war (ibid; BBC, 1995). According to the Bosnian Serb leader, Radovan Karadžić (cited in BBC, 1995), ‘Milošević didn’t care that the world recognised Bosnia’.

After a year’s conflict with Croatia, the Yugoslav Army, containing mostly Serbs, turned its attention to Bosnia (Peace Pledge Union, 2011). Neither the Muslim paramilitaries under the Bosnian president, Alija Izetbegović, nor the Bosnian police were strong enough to fight the Serbs (BBC, 1995). Bosnian Serbs had set up their own Republika Srpska in Eastern Bosnia by the end of 1993, and a Bosnian Serb army led by Ratko Mladić was in control of three quarters of the country (Peace Pledge Union, 2011). Concentration camps were set up in the region of Prijedor in North-Western Bosnia, these included Manjača, Keraterm, Trnopolje and Omarska (Helsinki Watch, 1993). The UN Commission of Experts (1994, cited in Srebrenica Genocide Blog, 2008) reported the main objective of the concentration camps, particularly Omarska, was to eliminate non-Serb leadership, and found non-Serbs in the Prijedor district were ordered to wear white armbands to identify themselves. Omarska’s mine was converted into a detention camp in early-1992 and contained up to two thousand prisoners. Helsinki Watch (1993: 108) stated the Omarska camp appeared to be the most brutal of the four camps in Prijedor, and quoted one of the prisoners saying:

‘We had three minutes to form a group of thirty, eat and get back to our room. Whoever didn’t make it would get beaten or killed… The stew we were given was boiling hot… so we all had “inside burns”. The inside of my mouth was peeling.’

The Omarska camp was discovered in July 1992 and forced to close due to international condemnation (Helsinki Watch, 1993).

The Bosnian town Srebrenica faced much of the wrath of the Serbs. By spring 1993, it contained 30,000 Bosnian Muslim refugees fleeing Serb assaults. Conditions in the town were poor, with overpopulation and resources dangerously low at all times. Although it was declared a ‘safe area’ by the UN’s Security Council on 16 April 1993, the Serb forces began a vicious attack on the town on 6 July 1995 despite the presence of UN troops. Over the following days, up to 8,000 unarmed Muslim men and boys were executed with military efficiency in local abandoned warehouses and factories, football fields and gymnasiuims. The bodies were then bulldozed into mass graves across the area (Peace Pledge Union, 2011; Waller, 2007).

With the aim of ‘ethnic cleansing’, the Serbs systematically murdered Muslim civilians, including professionals, intellectuals and political leaders in a clear attempt to eliminate the Bosnian Muslim culture and create a Greater Serbia (Waller, 2007; World Without Genocide, 2010a). All sides of the war were guilty of instances of ethnic cleansing; however, the intensity at which the Serbs attacked the Muslims made it a clear genocide against the
Muslim community. It has been estimated that 200,000 people lost their lives between 1992 and 1995 (ibid).

NATO commenced air-strikes on 30 August 1995 on Bosnia’s capital city, Sarajevo, with the aim of reducing the threat held against the safe areas in Bosnia, and deter further attacks. The air strikes were discontinued on 20 September 1995; however, missiles were fired at Bosnian Serb radar sites in October 1995 (NATO, 2002). Later that same year, peace negotiations were held in Dayton, Ohio. The Dayton Peace Agreement, signed on 14 December 1995 in Paris, divided 51 per cent of Bosnia into a Croat-Muslim Federation and 49 per cent into Republika Srpska (World Without Genocide, 2010a).

Rwanda
Prior to colonisation, Rwanda was a monarchical political system. Tutsis controlled the monarchy and were of higher social status, whereas Hutus were farmers of lower social status (Straus, 2006). Germany colonised Rwanda in 1894 (Jones, 2006) and used the pre-existing categories, and subsequently changed the significance and meaning of them, believing they had found a ‘superior’ ‘race’ in the Tutsis. After the Germans defeat in WWI, they were made to give colonial Rwanda to Belgium (Straus, 2006).

Belgian anthropologists ‘scientifically’ measured differences between Hutus and Tutsis, documenting Tutsis as ‘tall, elegant, light-skinned and thin-nosed’, and by contrast the Hutus were described as ‘short stocky, dark-skinned, and wide-nosed.’ Compulsory identity cards were introduced in the 1930s by Belgian colonial officers, which led ‘race’ to become a symbol of oppression. However, after WWII, Belgian administrations were under pressure from the United Nations to make reforms in their colonial rule, such as increasing Hutu political representation. The Tutsi elite resisted reform which radicalised the emerging Hutu counter-elite and hardened Belgian commitments to change. The ‘Hutu Revolution’ was in full swing when Rwanda gained independence in 1962, with a mixture of events occurring. The Tutsi monarchy was overthrown and Grégoire Kayibanda was installed as Rwanda’s first President, the Rwandan government became dominated with Hutus purging Tutsis from their positions, and widespread violence against the Tutsis ensued. In the early 1960s and in 1973 there were a series of anti-Tutsi massacres under Kayibanda’s rule (ibid). Kayibanda’s presidency ended in 1973; nevertheless, his successor Juvénal Habyarimana, also a Hutu, retained his quota system allowing only a certain percentage of Tutsis to attend schools and universities (Melvern, 2007). Rwandans were still expected to carry identity cards showing their ethnicity of Hutu, Tutsi or Twa, and were subject to imprisonment or a fine if they illegally changed this classification (Prunier, 1995 cited in Melvern, 2007).

In 1985 Tutsi nationalist exiles in Uganda formed the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF) as a political group demanding the right to return to Rwanda. The rebels wanted an end to the discrimination against the Tutsi in Rwanda and subsequently invaded the country in October 1990 (World Without Genocide, 2010b). At the beginning of the civil war, Habyarimana did not consider the rebel attack to be a serious threat; however, he and his colleagues exaggerated the RPF threat and began to portray all Tutsi inside Rwanda as RPF collaborators in an attempt to gain back his lost popularity with dissident Hutu (Des Forges, 1999). The civil war lasted until 1993 when the Arusha Accords, a peace agreement, was signed by the rebels and the government which called for a ceasefire and an international peacekeeping force (UNAMIR) to assist the transition of government (Straus, 2006).
Meanwhile, hate propaganda was published about the Tutsi in the newspaper ‘Kangura’ financed by one of Habyarimana’s financial advisors, Félicien Kabuga. In 1990, the Kangura published the Hutu Ten Commandments which were instructions to discriminate against the Tutsi, with the first three referring to Tutsi women. Kabuga was also president of Radio Télévision Libre des Mille Collines (RTLM) which began broadcasting one month before the Arusha Accords were signed. It has been argued that the radio station’s purpose was to prepare Rwanda’s citizens for genocide (Melvern, 2007) by reminding listeners of the colonial days and subsequently demonising the Tutsi (Panorama, 1997). Furthermore, Kabuga helped finance the Interahamwe, a militia group, and used his import company to purchase 987 cartons of inexpensive machetes from China in 1993 (Melvern, 2007; Rusesabagina, 2007). The Interahamwe began as the Mouvement Révolutionnaire National pour la Développement’s (MRND) youth wing, and started their military training in early 1992 (Des Forges, 1999; Straus, 2006; Melvern, 2007). There was a second militia group named Impuzamugambi; however the Interahamwe were known to be the most effective throughout the genocide. During training, the Interahamwe were taught how to use explosives, handle weapons, and to kill efficiently by cutting the Achilles heel to prevent victims from escaping. Additionally, in the months prior to the genocide, Rwandans were able to buy Chinese-made grenades for three dollars and machetes for one dollar. By April 1994, it is estimated that there were approximately 30,000 militia members, all of whom had leaders at neighbourhood level (ibid; Rusesabagina, 2007).

On 6 April 1994 President Habyarimana’s plane was shot down. A group of his close associates began the planned extermination of the Tutsi population which started with the killing of political opponents, including moderate Hutus. Prior to 6 April, lists had been drawn up of victims; these lists were used by the militias to drive victims from their homes to public sites, such as schools and churches, where they could be massacred in large-scale operations (Melvern, 2007; Des Forges, 1999). Administrative officials ordered locals to establish roadblocks to catch any Tutsi trying to flee, which were mostly broadcasted over RTLM (ibid). In the three weeks following Habyarimana’s death, approximately 20,000 people were killed in Kigali, this violence soon spread from the city to the countryside (Waller, 2007).

By mid-May the RPF were rapidly advancing through Rwanda putting pressure on authorities to order the final stage of the genocide. The aim was to exterminate all the Tutsi that had managed to hide thus far and those who had been protected by their status in the community. Moreover, they also sought to exterminate any survivors who may have been able to testify about the genocide (Des Forges, 1999). By this point the country was literally overflowing with corpses, thousands of which were disposed of in Kagera River floating downstream toward Lake Victoria causing a huge humanitarian crisis (Panorama, 1998). Kigali officially fell to the RPF on 4 July 1994, and it has been estimated that between 800,000 and 1,000,000 people were killed over the 100 days of the genocide (World Without Genocide, 2010b; Waller, 2007). The Rwandan genocide was arguably the most efficient mass killing of the twentieth century, as Gourevitch (2000: 3) comments, ‘The dead of Rwanda accumulated at nearly three times the rate of Jewish during the Holocaust.’

This chapter has demonstrated the organisation and preparation involved when planning and committing genocide. The two case studies explored have shown how genocide is culturally specific in its execution; an example of this is the Rwandans use of the machete, a tool that has many uses for the ordinary citizen, nevertheless, both cases were no different in the
devastation caused by the actions committed. From these case studies, it is clear that those who are in fear of losing power, and decide genocide to be a viable means to maintain it, will go to any length necessary to hold on to what they believe is rightfully theirs.

Chapter Five: Counter-genocide Measures

‘Genocide is a prime target for prevention because it is a man-made, not a natural, disaster’ (Fein, 2000: 42).

The UN’s Genocide Convention (1948) presents various strategies for the intervention and prevention of genocide. This chapter examines some of the measures enforced by the UN and its member states, whilst the cases of the Rwandan and Bosnian genocides are utilised to demonstrate the potential benefits and limitations of UN policy in practice. The latter part of the chapter discusses alternative preventive measures put forward by various NGOs and academics from the field of genocide-research, whose work largely focuses upon the ‘micro’ level, unlike the UN’s traditional ‘macro’ level approach.

The drafting of the UN Convention was not guided by any general theory of genocide thus Heidenrich (2001) identifies that this makes the conception of preventative measures problematic, whilst the Convention is also reliant on the potential deterrent effects of the threat of punishment via international law (ibid). Despite such criticisms, the UN may instate a range of measures to be employed before, during, and post genocidal incidents, one such option being the use of diplomatic pressure, which largely involves ‘negotiation, coercion, and clarification of intentions and reactions’ (Alvarez, 2001: 136). Diplomats will try to persuade state leaders to change policies considered to be ‘discriminatory’ and may also emphasise the serious potential implications for that government if such policies remain in place. Possible sanctions, as defined by the UN Charter, include the ‘complete or partial interruption of economic relations and of rail, sea, air, postal, telegraphic, radio, and other means of communication, and the severance of diplomatic relations’ (Reismen and Antoniou, 1994 cited in Alvarez, 2001: 137). Alvarez (2001) suggests that because state leaders often attempt to conceal their intentions, international recognition and condemnation can have a positive impact on perpetrators of genocide, however, Warren Zimmerman (1996, cited in Heidenrich, 2001), the last of the old Yugoslav’s US ambassadors, has stressed the importance of force behind diplomatic pressure as without it, he suggests, those targeted may challenge the intent of the international community to intervene.

A second, and relatively inexpensive measure open to the UN is the jamming of electronic media (Fein, 2000) as this can be enforced via Article III of the Convention which criminalises ‘direct and public incitement to commit genocide’ (Fein, 2000: 55). Cigar (1995 cited in Alvarez, 2001) asserts that electronic media may be a significant facilitator of genocide, as evidenced in the Rwandan genocide via the broadcasting of hate propaganda towards the Tutsi population by RTLM. Coded dialogue, instructing listeners to ‘Do your work’... ‘Clean your neighbourhood of brush. Cut the tall trees’ (Rusesabagina, 2007: 105) was subsequently translated by Rusesabagina (2007) who asserts that ‘tall trees’ refers to the Tutsis, and ‘brush’ to any moderate Hutus and their family. Despite the substantive role hate propaganda played in Rwanda’s genocide, requests from UN Lieutenant General Roméo Dallaire and his team to de-license RTLM were rejected by the United States, however, on the grounds that jamming the radio would breach the constitutional commitment to free speech (Des Forges, 1998 cited in Fein, 2000). Cigar (1995, cited in Alvarez, 2001) has argued instead that in such instances, proponents of all cultural/political parties should be
given the forum to broadcast their arguments, whilst Dallaire (1995, cited in Heidenrich, 2001: 180) supports the creation of UN-based media which must ‘present the facts on a situation and not be reacting to false reports, propaganda, hype or deliberate disinformation’. There are, however, two potential difficulties with this approach, as the target population may be so indoctrinated that outside information will have only a marginal impact (Cigar, 1995 cited in Alvarez, 2001) whilst ‘outside’ information may itself be perceived as propaganda (Alvarez, 2001).

An alternative option available to the UN is the deployment of a peacekeeping force to the country of interest, a notion defined as ‘the deployment of a United Nations presence in the field, hitherto with the consent of all the parties concerned, normally involving United Nations military and/or police personnel and frequently civilians as well’ (Boutros-Ghali, 1992 cited in Heidenrich, 2001: 148: emphasis added). Agreement to peacekeeping from all parties usually involves persuasion, and perhaps most importantly, acceptance, thus once deployed, the mandate authorised by the UN becomes the peacekeeping force’s most important document as it contains all the details of the mission, including the specified number of troops required and their international legal authority. In the case of Rwanda, the signing of the Arusha Accords in August 1993 called for the UN Security Council to deploy a peacekeeping force within five weeks, however, the UN took two months to decide on the mandate (Heidenrich, 2001), finally appointing Lieutenant General Roméo Dallaire as Force Commander of the mission, named the ‘United Nations Assistance Mission for Rwanda (UNAMIR)’ (Dallaire, 2004: 92: emphasis added). The UN mission’s purpose, created by Security Council Resolution 872, was to sustain the region’s cease-fire, agreed through the Arusha Accords (Lopez, 2000), whilst also supporting the inauguration of a transitional Government (United Nations, 2001), however, these aims were not met. It took five months for the authorised troop strength to reach 2,548 (ibid), which had significant consequences for both Rwanda and UNAMIR as preparation for the genocide was already in operation. Despite receiving intelligence regarding preparations for mass killing of the Tutsi population, and subsequent pleas to the Security Council to act on this information, Dallaire was repeatedly told that it was not in his mandate to do so (Dallaire, 2004). On the 21st April 1994, by Resolution 912, the Security Council reduced UNAMIR’s strength by ninety per cent, from 2,458 to 270 (United Nations, 2001), a decision actively supported by the French Government, who later watched the US first block and then delay efforts to establish UNAMIR II (Dallaire and Manocha, 2007). One of the direct consequences of this withdrawal was the murder of 2,000 men, women, and children at the Dom Bosco camp, by Hutu militia who had been close by with machetes, and moved in to murder all those at the camp after the Belgian troops were withdrawn (Bradshaw, 2004).

The UN often designates ‘safe havens’ or ‘safe areas’, however, these are not places for ‘normal’ life but instead, are places where the persecuted can go to survive (Heidenrich, 2001) and alongside peacekeeping forces, safe areas must also be consented to by the surrounding forces. Resolution 819 was adopted by the Security Council on 16 April 1993 demanding Srebrenica, in Bosnia, and all surrounding areas be treated as a safe area and be free from attack by all parties (United Nations, 1996), whilst the following month saw the adoption of resolution 824 which declared five additional safe areas in Bosnia (ibid). In all six cities, the UN Security Council demanded withdrawal of all paramilitary units, and to allow its peacekeeping force, United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR), and international humanitarian agencies free access to all safe areas. The Council later authorised (via resolution 836) for UNPROFOR ‘to take necessary measures, including the use of force,
in reply to bombardments against the safe areas or to armed incursion into them or...deliberate obstruction to the freedom of...protected humanitarian convoys’ (United Nations, 1996). Despite this resolution, many of the humanitarian convoys’ supplies were raided en route to the safe areas, with little or no consequences, whilst the conditions of the safe areas were poor, with Srebrenica described as being overcrowded, grim and unsanitary (Heidenrich, 2001). The original plan for Srebrenica’s safe area included the presence of between 1,200 and 5,600 UN troops, however, the maximum number of soldiers reached only 510 at the beginning of March 1994, and Srebrenica was subsequently captured by Bosnian Serbs in July 1995. It has been estimated that 30,000 Muslims were expelled, or ‘ethnically cleansed’, from the safe area, and up to 8,000 Muslim men and boys were executed en masse (ibid), thus demonstrating the need for real commitment from member states to deploy the required number of troops to safe areas.

Peacekeeping, as illustrated above, can be unsuccessful when intervening in conflicts that are already underway, thus Peace enforcement was devised as a way to overcome the difficulties faced by peacekeepers (ibid). Peace enforcement operations often take months to assemble and orchestrate, and entail using military power to halt mass atrocities. The UNPROFOR operation in Bosnia was left with a deficit in troops when large numbers were sent to neighbouring Croatia and Macedonia, and this left the Bosnian safe areas vulnerable to attack. By expelling the occupants from Srebrenica and other safe areas, the Bosnian-Serbs lost their influence over UNPROFOR which enabled NATO to deploy Operation ‘Deliberate Force’, a two-week bombing campaign against them (ibid). This marked the beginning of actual peace enforcement in the Bosnian genocide and led to the signing of the Dayton peace accords (Pirnie and Simons, 1996 cited in Heidenrich, 2001). Perhaps more crucially, alongside the peace accords was the introduction of an Implementation Force (IFOR) (Heidenrich, 2001) which brought a halt to the conflict as over 50,000 heavily armed troops, two and a half times that of UNPROFOR, entered the region to enforce and maintain peace (ibid). The presence of UNPROFOR in Bosnia and the decisions made by the Security Council have, however, been criticised for hampering the ability to halt ‘ethnic cleansing’ in the region and inadvertently prolonging the War (ibid). For two years, France and Britain repeatedly blocked initiatives to use NATO in this way as they feared the UN troops would face reprisals if they did so. Heidenrich (2001) has pointed out that this fear was justified, as a number of UN troops were taken hostage when NATO’s airpower became more forceful.

As such, there are a number of issues to consider when using military intervention in genocidal conflicts including the deployment of a sufficient number of troops to perform successful peace enforcement (Alvarez, 2001); the affect such actions may have on the affected communities as prolonged violence may brutalise them further (ibid); the effect the action will have on neighbouring states where the conflict may overflow (ibid); and having a identifiable and physical target (Heidenrich, 2001). Military intervention in genocidal conflict is, therefore, often the secondary objective, meaning genocide can continue until international forces have achieved their primary objective (ibid). Perhaps the most significant issue to face when discussing military genocide intervention, however, is the political will to actually intervene. The international response to the 1994 Rwandan genocide was heavily dictated by the United States who, as one of the five members of the Security Council, arguably has the most influence of all member states. The US State Department continually resisted the use of the term ‘genocide’, instead insisting that ‘only “acts of genocide” were occurring’ (Bradshaw, 2004). This effectively demonstrated to the extremist Hutu’s in Rwanda that
international intervention was unlikely, an argument reinforced by the information given to James Woods, a deputy assistant secretary of state in the United States, by his superior: ‘if something happens in Rwanda-Burundi, we don’t care. Take it off the list... US national interest is not involved...we can’t put all these silly humanitarian issues on lists like important problems like the Middle East and North Korea and so on’ (Frontline, 2000 cited in Alvarez, 2001: 137).

The final UN intervention measure of note is ‘humanitarian operations’, particularly as genocides have been argued to cause more refugees than any other natural or man-made disaster (Fein, 1994, cited in Dallaire and Manocha, 2007), with refugees often flooding into neighbouring states causing major public health and food emergencies (ibid). The UN Security Council authorised ‘Opération Turquoise’, a French-led humanitarian operation in south-western Rwanda in June 1994, which was conducted until UNAMIR II was able to take over in late August of the same year (United Nations, 2001; Dallaire and Manocha, 2007; Heidenrich, 2001). The part of Rwanda where the operation was deployed was a safe area for fleeing refugees, and unlike UNAMIR, the mission had a Chapter Seven mandate which meant any force necessary to achieve peace was authorised. The safe area held approximately 3 million people, most of whom were Hutu, not Tutsi (ibid), however, the military-based response was ‘too little too late’, as the UN were faced with a substantive humanitarian problem for which they were unprepared (Prunier, 1995 cited in Heidenrich, 2001). This short-term peace-enforcement cost an estimated $100 million, whereas from April 1994 to December 1995, international assistance to Rwanda was over $2 billion, ‘a 20:1 ratio for the cost of assistance to that of prevention’ (Eriksson, 1996 cited in Fein, 2000: 43). This illustrates, therefore, that from an economic standpoint, intervention is a more cost-effective measure than a purely humanitarian response to genocide.

To address the aforementioned arguments in relation to the practicability of counter-genocide measures, the first factor to note is that there are warning signs of future genocides, described by Jones (2006) as: a history of conflict or actual genocide; financial crisis; hate propaganda; discriminatory legislation; and severe state repression. In the cases of Rwanda and Bosnia, at least four, if not all of these warning signs were identifiable prior to the genocides that occurred in both countries. According to Kuper (1985), genocide is best prevented in its early stages when these warning signs appear and he argues for impartial information to be gathered about potential genocides as part of an early warning system, which would form the foundation for required future action. This has been supported by commentators such as Heidenrich (2001), who has emphasised the necessity of reaching those who still have some degree of tolerance and optimism in order to be successful in stopping genocide before it escalates. To provide such intervention, an early warning system is required which in turn, according to Heidenrich, requires global monitoring by appropriate actors. As demonstrated above, states are often concerned at the costs incurred by genocide prevention, however, if an ongoing monitoring system was put in place and utilised by the international community, it would become a cost-effective preventive tool (ibid). Furthermore, successful genocide prevention can take a substantive period of time to organise as the UN who, currently, are the only agent worldwide equipped to respond to such situations, require anything over three months to agree and arrange a mandate and peacekeeping force. Therefore, an early warning system may be justified in this context (ibid).

The proposal of the implementation of an early warning system has, however, suffered criticism as having sufficient warning has scarcely been a problem in regards to genocide; it
is when the warnings are ignored that creates the problem (ibid). To overcome this, Stanton (2008) suggests that the warning system be independent of the UN to avoid aggravating any individual member states, whilst he proposes instead, the introduction of a Genocide Prevention Centre to hold a working relationship with the UN’s Special Advisor. The Centre would serve to validate reports received from NGOs and human right groups around the world (ibid) as organisations such as the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), Human Rights Watch, and the International Crisis Group currently have global representatives that can facilitate this process (Heidenrich, 2001). Stanton (2008) has stated that the information gathered by these organisations would be available for the Special Advisor and Secretary General of the UN to formulate recommendations for the Security Council. Once established, information gathering should continue by NGOs independent of the UN in order for the Centre to remain unbiased to the self-interest of member states (ibid). As with all the measures discussed in this chapter, however, an early warning system requires political will to render it effective (Stanton, 2005).

Fundamentally, one of the most important issues within genocide prevention is a full understanding of its root causes. Often genocide is assumed to be the result of ancient tribal or ethnic conflict, however, as demonstrated above by Jones (2006), there are many factors involved that increase the likelihood of future genocide. In order to successfully prevent genocide, false assumptions must be countered with accurate data, thus NGOs and specialist academics, those who are most knowledgeable on the subject, are the appropriate actors to work towards and help facilitate the prevention of genocide (Stanton, 2008). As such, early warning is a vital preventive measure, as Stanton (2005: 272) asserts, ‘World leaders must never again have the excuse that they “didn’t know”’.

Charny (1999 cited in Jones, 2006) and Stanton (2008) have both proposed for a standing response force to be deployed immediately in response to authenticated reporting of genocidal acts. Stanton (2008) proposes the creation of a UN force that is composed of volunteers from around the world, with the support of major military powers who train together for the purpose of peace-keeping, whilst training would include both military and non-military functions to effectively intervene in genocidal conflict (ibid). Similarly, Charny (1999 cited in Jones, 2006) suggests that an International Peace Army be created and divided into three units: military; medical and humanitarian; and for rebuilding communities, with the aim of the third unit to build safe and tolerant communities through reconciliation. The five permanent member states of the UN Security Council are yet to support either of these forces; however, Stanton (2008) asserts that the time will come for their creation.

Staub (2000; 2001; 2006) has written extensively on the importance of healing, forgiving, and reconciliation after victimisation, emphasising that if victimised groups are not sufficiently healed after conflict, it increases the risk of them becoming a perpetrator of violence, often through what they perceive as ‘retribution’ (Staub, 2001). Healing requires victimised individuals to engage with their previous traumatising experience under safe conditions as it helps reduce people’s repressed negative emotions and painful memories (Staub, 2000; Herman, 1992 cited in Staub, 2006; Pearlman and Saakvitne, 1995 cited in Staub, 2006; Staub, 2006). To reduce the likelihood of further mass violence in the future, therefore, it is necessary to heal the emotional wounds of the victims and perpetrators, as well as actively seeking punishment for perpetrators. The punishment of perpetrators communicates to victims that such acts are not regarded as acceptable or normal, and helps to recreate trust in the community (Staub 1998; 1999 cited in Staub, 2001), whilst successful
healing can make reconciliation possible (Staub, 2001). Galtung (2001 cited in Staub, 2006: 273) has defined reconciliation as ‘the process of healing the traumas of both victims and perpetrators after violence, providing a closure of the bad relations’, and is crucial in highlighting that the future is not defined by the past (Staub, 2000; 2006). In addition, forgiving is required for reconciliation to begin, however, the notion of forgiveness can be understandably difficult for those who have lived through atrocities such as genocide, and it may be difficult to forgive those who simply belong to the perpetrator group yet have not actively participated themselves (Staub, 2000). Healing, reconciliation and forgiveness each contribute to the basic needs of humanity, which Staub (2000: 377) has described as ‘security, positive identity, positive connection to other people, and a comprehension of reality that offers hope’. A project based on these principles has been held in Rwanda by Staub et al (1999 cited in Staub, 2000) who trained a number of local organisations for the project. The content included having people write and think about their experiences and then sharing them in a group setting, learning about the backgrounds of other genocides, and learning about the impact such trauma has on individuals (Staub, 2000). Staub (2000: 378) has reported that learning about the root causes of genocide had a ‘profound impact on participants’, for they began to perceive perpetrators’ acts as evil, rather than individuals themselves as inherently evil.

A further recommendation from Staub (2006) is for schools to promote reconciliation, an idea which has been proposed by various other commentators such as Kennedy (2008). Kennedy (2008) has discussed the need for further education by suggesting three components which are necessary in educational programmes’ content, the first of which is ‘teaching about genocide’ (2008: 2) which Kennedy asserts must be comparative. Personal accounts and facts from pre and post genocide are deemed appropriate content for educational programmes, whilst the patterns and unique factors that are identifiable within individual genocides can highlight future dangers to be aware of and respond to (ibid). The second component is ‘educating against genocide’, which focuses on raising awareness of the ways individuals are isolated prior to and during genocide through propaganda and ‘othering’, with the aim of teaching students how to identify and resist this manipulation (ibid). The third and final of Kennedy’s (2008: 3) components is ‘educating to prevent genocide’ ‘where we encounter the world of the bystander’. The intention here is to move away from passivity and toward positive action by making individuals aware of what they can do to help prevent genocide from happening (ibid).

As demonstrated in the second part of this chapter, the UN is not the sole organisation that can attempt to prevent genocide from occurring, thus what is clear is that a multi-faceted approach is necessary. The role that NGOs play is a crucial one, especially in relation to facilitating genocide education, and reconciling different cultural groups within a community. However, without the creation of an early warning system, the international community remain reliant on the UN for primary intervention in those situations where genocide appears to be likely, or where such actions have already occurred. Using the examples of the Bosnian and Rwandan genocides to demonstrate UN policy in practice, the importance of political will to intervene at the right time, with the correct equipment, and the necessary number of troops, is a significant issue in relation to genocidal incidents. When sanctions are implemented at the correct time, genocidal regimes can be halted in their preparation stage, however, the question may be raised as to what right the UN to intervene, and for what purposes? These are questions often left unanswered, as member states are largely concerned with protecting their own national interests rather than their international obligation to acknowledge and intervene in crimes against humanity (Dallaire and Manocha, 2007).
Mendez (2007: 226) has pointed out, the UN Counter-Genocide Convention focuses upon punishment more than prevention, based largely on the notion that such an approach has a deterrent effect, although the Convention does oblige states to implement all measures in ‘their power to prevent the commission of the crime of genocide…’ According to Heidenrich (2001: 20), the UN can no longer be relied upon to take preventive action against genocide, but ‘remains the most effective agent for this purpose’. Nonetheless, as Alvarez (2001: 141) has noted, ‘...even with the limitations inherent in each form of intervention, the risks of not doing anything are far greater.’
Chapter Six: Conclusion/Future Directions

‘Of all forms of wisdom, hindsight is by general consent the least merciful, the most unforgiving’ (Fletcher, 1999 cited in Favez, 1999: 1).

‘We choose to murder. We choose to be indifferent. Or we choose to rescue others. The choice is ours’ (Heidenrich, 2001: 262).

This thesis has demonstrated the complex nature of genocide, and the difficulty of implementing policy aimed to prevent and intervene in it. Genocide is the most devastating crime that anyone can participate in, however it is a crime that is under researched and understated. As an international crime, genocide is a universal threat, for according to Alvarez (2001: 10) ‘more and more, it seems, genocide is the preferred method for destroying perceived enemies.’ Too often governments avoid intervention in genocidal crimes, as unfortunately, throughout history there have been few military interventions launched with the primary aim being to stop genocide (Heidenrich, 2001).

Chapter three demonstrated it is the situation that facilitates genocidal participation; thus, in order to prevent genocide on a micro level it is necessary to prevent genocide at the macro level. However, whilst the situation is to blame, most importantly it is the escalation of the situation that needs to be tackled; therefore, intervention needs to be early on in Stanton’s eight stages to prevent this escalation. Structural understanding of genocide can help facilitate its prevention (Stanton, 1998; 2008), for that reason education on risk factors and early warning signs are a vital starting point for every society. Stanton (1998; 2008) has suggested that universalistic institutions promoting tolerance, diversity and understanding can make a significant impact on preventing and halting the genocidal process. However, education may not work in all cases; for example, prejudicial feelings may be so deep-rooted that individuals remain adamant in their beliefs. This may be the case for past perpetrators who find it difficult to admit their wrongdoing, for it will mean having to deal with the consequences and guilt from their past actions. Although laws and policies can ban racism and prejudice, they may not always have the intended influence on society, for example Hans Friedrich (cited in BBC, 2005), an ex-SS officer, admitted to still having hatred toward the Jews calling it his ‘unshakeable conviction.’ Nevertheless, new laws and policies will eventually become the norm for the majority. Furthermore, Harff (2003) has argued that societies who have had previous genocides are three times more likely to be at risk of another in the future, therefore, it is vital to deal with the aftermath of genocide, through education, reconciliation and healing (Staub, 2000).

To date genocide intervention occurs at the latter stages of Stanton’s eight stage model, despite the other stages taking place. It may in fact be up to the international community to influence governments to intervene at earlier stages, as international condemnation can force governments into action; when Omarska camp was forced to close in July 1992 is just one example (Helsinki Watch, 1993). Failure to act appropriately can have disastrous effects not just for the country of genocidal origin, but neighbouring countries also. For example, the Hutu refugees from the Rwandan genocide, including many of the perpetrators, are currently in conflict with the Congolese army due to a fight over control of mineral mines in the Democratic Republic of Congo. As a result, the Congo has become infamous for being the ‘world’s most dangerous place for women’ (BBC, 2011). Arguably, if the Rwandan genocide
had been dealt with appropriately by the UN and its member states, consequences such as this would not occur.

Fundamentally, it is the problem of political will that must be addressed for genocide to be successfully prevented at present and in the future. A viable solution, suggested by Stanton (2008), would be to force national leaders to learn that they must stop genocides or face the consequence of being voted out of office by creating a world-wide movement to end genocide. Essentially, it is governments who have the power to commit genocide, therefore, it is governments who have the power to prevent it. National interests must not only focus on military and financial need, but the need of humanity, as all that is necessary ‘For evil to triumph...is...for good men to do nothing’ (Burke, 1729-1797 cited in Imperial War Museum, 2010).
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