THE BARE LIFE OF THE ‘PROBLEM DRUG USER’: AN ANALYSIS OF NEO-LIBERAL STATE RESPONSES TO ‘PROBLEM DRUG USERS’

By William Coyles

Abstract

This paper examines the intelligibility of the neo-liberal state’s war on the ‘problem drug user’ within Foucauldian analyses of liberal bio-political regimes of governance. In the modern era, with the epistemic shift to bio-power, the order of power has become imbued with a rationality which derives its principles from those of warfare. The ‘problem drug user’ has become the subject of quasi-military style interventions in the name of the life and health of the population. These interventions are exercised at the level of the ‘problem drug user’s’ life as their form of existence has been ‘disallowed to the point of death’ within an advanced-liberal Britain. The use of such authoritarian strategies is not antithetical to the liberal project of ‘government through freedom’ but is integral to it. Within neo-liberal ‘governmentality’, only certain populations who have reached the ‘maturity of their rational faculties’ are considered amenable to governance within late modern ‘circuits of inclusion’. The pathological ‘problem drug user’ has been led to their improvement by the neo-liberal state in the guise of a benevolent despot. The modern state utilises its sovereign power of deduction to render the ‘problem drug user’s’ bare life amenable to bio-political investment by the ‘experts of life’ in a ‘localisation without order’ outside of the political community termed by Agamben (1995) as camp. It is argued that the Cognitive Behavioural Therapy setting within the late modern prison is the materialisation of this state of exception. Within this permanent spatial arrangement the ‘experts of life’ assume the role of the sovereign, confronting the problem drug user (who assumes the status of homo sacer) in a fundamental bio-political relationship where through a series of practical exercises they are incited to enfold authority and ‘subjectify’ themselves. The telos embodied within this strategy of control is the freedom of the subject and their re-insertion into ‘circuits of inclusion’ where rational and prudent subjects of self interest are ‘governed through freedom’.

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Introduction

Within late modern Britain a salient ‘dialectic of freedom and control’ (Garland, 2001: 197-198) has become discernible within neo-liberal regimes of governance. This has been evidenced by consecutive Conservative and Labour governments’ implementation of an anti-statist strategy with regard to the economic realm and thus accentuating the market based freedoms of late modernity whilst a concomitant statist, authoritarian strategy has been applied to those populations incapable of exercising these freedoms in a ‘responsible’ and ‘prudent manner’. Indeed, these market based freedoms are increasingly dependent upon the continuous surveillance and control of those ostracised populations of ‘high risk’ expelled from late modern ‘circuits of inclusion’ (Rose, 2000) where ‘rational’ subjects are ‘governed through freedom’. Within neo-liberal crime control rationality the ‘problem drug user’ has emerged as an intractably ‘risky’ subject, resistant to governmental control within ‘circuits of freedom’ due to a range of ontological abnormalities. A variety of para-legal and quasi-military responses have been deemed necessary with regard to this population, “not so much in the name of law and order, but in the name of the community that they threaten” (ibid: 334). In a bio-political era in which the liberal democratic state has repatriated the supposedly ‘inalienable’ rights of life and liberty to the ‘sovereign subject’ of advanced liberalism, the ‘problem drug user’ appears to be excluded from such benefits of citizenship with an emasculating raft of punitive drugs legislation reducing this population to bare life. It appears that the conventions of the rule of law must be suspended indefinitely for the protection of society from a subject whose very nature appears to exclude them from neo-liberal circuits of freedom and civility.

Official discourse concerning ‘drug-related crime’ is instructive in elucidating the governmental rationality which suffuses neo-liberal state responses to ‘problem drug users’. Such discourse is often permeated with the imagery of war which augurs of the clear and present danger posed by the ‘enemy within’ to the ‘security’ and ‘freedoms’ of the ethical and prudent majority. This hyperbolic and apocalyptic narrative is evident in this HM Treasury Release (2001) which signalled an increase to the Home Office budget in its ‘fight’ against drugs;

…..hardly a family is unaffected by the evil of drugs....Drug related crime blights our communities. It destroys families and young lives and fuels a wide range of criminal activity, including burglary and robbery...We won’t tolerate the menace of drugs in our communities- it causes misery and costs lives...This new money will enable agencies to step up their fight against drugs and the crime it breeds. It will get dealers off our kids’ backs and into prison and help safeguard our communities.

Within such discourse the war against drugs often appears as a war or battle being waged against drug users. Nietzsche’s hypothesis promulgates the notion that the basis of the power relationship lies in a war like clash between forces” (Foucault, 2003: 16). These forces can include not only the non-discursive but also the discursive as claims to ‘truth’ become an imposition of force. As Foucault exclaims, “discourse is not simply that which translates struggles or systems of power, but is the thing for which and by which there is struggle, discourse is the power which is to be seized” (Foucault, 1984: 110). Rather than viewing the official discourse of ‘drug
related crime’ as a discourse of ‘truth’ in the absolute sense, it appears that it should be viewed as the discourse of a battle being waged between a dominant group or ‘nation’ who comprise the state and an ‘other’ nation or ‘enemy within’ whose intractable abnormality hinders the perpetual struggle towards the universalisation of the state. In an effort to comprehend neo-liberal state responses to ‘problem drug users’ the proceeding exposition will utilise a Foucauldian methodology to examine how the order of power has become suffused by a logic which derives its principles from those of warfare. It shall be shown that the problematisation of the ‘problem drug user’s’ pathological form of existence within neo-liberal strategies of control is not simply due to the biological and economic threat that they pose to the vitality and strength of the population but less saliently, it is due to their resilience and incompatibility to the neo-liberal project of ‘government through freedom’. This exposition shall delineate how in late modernity, with the entry of life into the order of power, the ‘problem drug user’s’ aberrant form of existence has come to be waged upon the political strategies of the neo-liberal state. The work of Italian philosopher Giorgio Agamben (1995) shall be drawn upon to illustrate how the ‘problem drug user’s’ aberrant form of life is coercively rendered amenable to the neo-liberal project of ‘government through freedom’ through a process of bio-political investment in a ‘localisation without order’ situated outside of the political community known as camp. It shall be posited that camp is materialised in the cognitive behavioural therapy setting in the contemporary prison system where the ‘experts of life’ assume the role of the sovereign and confront the bare life of the problem drug user in a fundamental bio-political relationship. The political technologies utilised by the ‘experts of life’ to ‘subjectify’ the ‘problem drug user’ and render him/her conducive to governmental power and ethical and prudent self government within ‘circuits of inclusion’ shall be examined with reference to Giles Deleuze (1988) and his notion of the enfolding of authority. To conclude, it shall be suggested that resistance to the perpetual war of normalisation and pacification, waged upon that ‘other nation’ in which the ‘problem drug user’ is said to be located, should take the form of a counter-discursive offensive. It shall be argued that this offensive should seek to introduce discontinuity into the institution of state sovereignty and allow those populations who refuse the ‘love of power’ by exercising a radical form of autonomy to remain free of the immanent form of subjection that is engendered by bio-political investment. This subjection is often facilitated by the sovereign power of deduction when dealing with intractable populations such as the problem drug user.
Defending an Advanced-Liberal Society from the ‘Problem Drug User’

The discourse of modern politics is imbued with a Hobbesian conceptualisation of the modern state which is premised upon an abrupt temporal rupture from the barbarism and anarchy which characterised the pre-political State of Nature (Neal, 2004). The impetus to enter civil society by means of a social contract which transferred the innately possessed rights of the subject to the political authority of a sovereign body was supposedly related to an ideological commitment which still underpins the political project of the modern state, the notion of a ‘modernity without war’ characterised by what Kant termed ‘perpetual peace’ (Reid, 2004). The constitution of political society and the institutions which comprise the modern state are thus conceived as apparatuses that have facilitated the ‘triumph of order’ and the ‘victory of reason’ through the suppression of pre-political barbarism and bellicose social relations characterised by endemic war (Neal, 2004). ‘Private warfare’ is therefore viewed as a spectre that is gradually extirpated within the social body as the modern state monopolises the instruments and institutions of war. Thus modern social relations are increasingly thought to be characterised by an absence of war which resides either prior to or on the frontiers of the modern state (Foucault, 2003). Despite this integral ideological commitment to peace, vociferously accented by all contemporary liberal regimes, the modern period has been characterised not simply by the proliferation and intensification of war beyond the boundaries of the ‘liberal zone of peace’ (Reid, 2004) but also within the ‘zone of liberal peace’ as social relations have become indelibly suffused with a rationality derived from the logic of war (ibid). For Foucault the raison d’État of the bio-political state is to ‘incite, reinforce and optimise life’ and “yet wars have never been so bloody as they have been since the nineteenth century, and all things being equal, never before did regimes visit such holocausts on their own populations” (Foucault, 1978: 137).

In an effort to examine why it is that a modern state which propagates an ideological commitment to ‘perpetual peace’ antithetically pursues an insidious ‘perpetual war’ against some forms of human existence such as that of the ‘problem drug user’ who is reduced to bare life and divested of all legal protection, it is necessary to examine how the order of power has come to be imbued with a rationality which derives its principles from war and to examine the nature of this war and the instrumental manner in which it is deployed. Michel Foucault, in his 1975-76 lecture series at the College de France entitled Society Must be Defended, performed an archaeology of sovereignty and mapped out the epistemic shift which occurs in the modern period to bio-power, a ‘regime of power’ which he espouses pursues peace through the dissemination of principles derived from war. Foucault espouses the claim that theories of power prior to the seventeenth century articulated a notion of a singular, royal power emanating from a sovereign centre, which was exercised in order to secure the sovereigns rule over his territory. This sovereign power was a power of deduction and suppression- “essentially a right of seizure: of things, time, bodies and ultimately life itself” (Foucault, 1978: 136). With the rise of states at the ‘threshold’ of the modern era and their appropriation of the mechanisms and means of war the theories of sovereignty expressed by Hobbes in Leviathan and Machiavelli in The Prince emerge (or in Machiavelli’s case re-emerge) to justify the monopolisation of power within the institution of the state. The Classical notion of history also served to legitimise and reinforce the power of the sovereign delineating a “memorialised continuity of power deriving in ancient kingdoms and heroic Great Kings, blinding
and dazzling…intensifying the luster of force (Foucault, 2003: 67). For Foucault the ‘philosophical-juridical’ discourse promulgated in the writings of Hobbes and Machiavelli which espoused the belief that political society was the ‘antithesis of war’ was a “ritual which reinforced sovereignty” (ibid: 69). However, just at the historical moment at which the state had managed to spatio-temporally banish war from within the boundaries of the modern state, a counter-historical narrative emerges which introduces discontinuity into the domain of Classical historical discourse by promulgating the notion that politics is merely war waged by alternative means. Foucault terms this discourse a ‘historico-political discourse’ and distinguishes it from the ‘philosophical-juridical discourse’ of Hobbes and Machiavelli before him “whose purpose was to legitimise sovereignty through the impartial retelling of past events” (Stone, 2004: 85). This historico-political discourse problematises sovereign power and is “a discourse which cuts off the kings head or at least does without a sovereign and denounces him” (Foucault, 2003: 59) and is spoken by a de-centred subject as the enunciative modality of the discourse is displaced. The speaker of this de-centred discourse does not wish to do away with the institution of state sovereignty; power is illegitimate only to the extent that it does not belong to them (ibid). Where as the subject who speaks the ‘philosophical-juridical’ discourse attempts to occupy a universal or totalising position and endeavours to unearth a kind of peace in their examination of history, the subject who speaks the historicopolitical discourse “is inevitably on one side or the other” (ibid: 52) and their effort is aimed at “rediscovering the blood that has dried in the codes…the battle cries that can be heard beneath the formula’s of right…the dissymmetry of forces that lies beneath the equilibrium of justice” (ibid: 55-56). Thus the historicopolitical discourse is a ‘perspectival discourse’ that problematises the neutrality of the ‘philosophical-juridical discourse’ (and by so doing the institution of state sovereignty which it legitimises) by espousing the idea that ‘truth’ is related to which side of the battle one is on (Stone, 2004: 85) and can be “deployed only from its combat position, from the perspective of the sought-for victory” (Foucault, 2003: 52). This partisan ‘historical political discourse’ is interested in revealing that what lies beneath the order and forms of justice which have been imposed by the state is the “forgotten past of real struggles, actual victories and defeats” (ibid: 56) which although hidden are codified by the state and actualised in juridical legislature. War becomes a ‘grid of intelligibility’ for social relations within this historicopolitical discourse and we have to defend ourselves against society is the catch cry of those “who have no glory…who now find themselves, perhaps for a time…in darkness and silence” (ibid: 70)

This counter history does not ‘cut off the kings head’ completely but instead introduces historical discontinuity into sovereign power as the “implicit identification of people with monarch, and nation with sovereign” (ibid: 69) is ruptured. In the epoch of sovereign power the terms ‘nation’ and ‘race’ were inextricably linked to the sovereign. The nation was a territory and collation of people which fell within the ambit of the power held by the sovereign. However, the meaning of the term nation is transformed by historicopolitical discourse as ‘multiple nations’ emerge within the territory ruled by the sovereign (Stone, 2004) and as historical claims become an imposition of force each seeks to narrate their own particular ‘truth’ of history and in so doing attempting to attack, seize and lay claim to the institution of state sovereignty (Neal, 2004). Thus a myriad of warring ‘nations’ or ‘races’ and subjectivities emerge within the sovereign geo-political area with their own particular
historical ‘truths’ and claim to power. War was previously conceptualised as something engaged in only by the sovereign. A nation- under the command of its sovereign went to war with another nation-under the command of another sovereign (Stone, 2004). However, following the historico-political discourse the possibility arose of there being wars between two or more independent nations within the same geopolitical territory and thus “history becomes the story of race struggle” (ibid: 88).

The contemporary notion of ‘state racism’, not simply in the narrow biological sense that the term has assumed, but in the Foucauldian sense of introducing a break into the domain of life between who will be forced to live and who will be allowed to die emerges when one dominant nation, the bourgeoisie, take control of the apparatus of the state and colonise and invert this partisan historico-political discourse. The bourgeoisie declares itself the universal subject of history and the subjectivity of the nation and the state become synonymous once more. The catch cry of the historico-political discourse, once colonised by the bourgeoisie, becomes not ‘we must be defended from society’ but ‘society must be defended’ from the sub-nation which despite ourselves we continue to recreate. As Foucault states;

“The discourse of race struggle will be recentred and will become the discourse of power itself. It will become the discourse of a centred, centralized, and centralizing power. It will become the discourse of a battle that has to be waged not between races, but by a race that is portrayed as the one true race, that holds power and is entitled to define the norm, and against those who deviate from that norm”. (Foucault, 2003: 61).

Sovereignty becomes inextricably linked with the collective subjectivity of the nation in the modern nation-state and thus emerges “a politics of collective subjective enmity wedded to a terrifying state machine” (Neal, 2004: 394) which problematises all abnormality constituted within the social body. The dominant nation, the bourgeoisie, seeks to become the only nation as there is “a striving towards the universality of the state” (ibid: 225). The ‘war of domination’ that raged within the geopolitical boundaries ruled by the sovereign is replaced by a more subtle violence of normalization and pacification which attempts to root out and regularise any form of radicality and singularity which erodes the strength and vitality of the social body (Baudrillard, 2002). Thus the colonisation and inversion of the historico-political discourse by the bourgeoisie catalyses the epistemic shift towards the normalizing and productive regime of bio-power as the individualizing regime of ‘pastoral power’ combines with its opposite, the ever more centralised state, by incorporating ‘strategies of the state’ with those of individual life (Simons, 1995). Therefore “modern art of government or state rationality…. develop(s) those elements constitutive of individual’s lives in such a way that their development also fosters the strength of the state” (Foucault, 1981: 322) and the state becomes a “formidable machine of individualization and totalisation” (Simons, 1995: 40). The raison d’etat of the bio-political state becomes to improve the vitality, strength and essentially the life of the population and by so doing improving the strength of the state vis-à-vis other states (Garland, 1997). The pastoral technology of police brings into existence a new entity to be known in minute detail and governed meticulously, that of the population. This modern, bio-political power over life is a bi-polar technology that developed in two interrelated forms, an anatamo-politics of the human body and a bio-politics of the population which rather than seeking to suppress or kill life like the sovereign power it had displaced sought to “invest life through and through”
(Foucault, 1978: 139). The first pole of bio-power which developed in the seventeenth century took the ‘body as machine’ as its object and focused upon “its disciplining, the optimisation of its forces, the parallel increase of its usefulness and its docility... (and)...its integration into systems of efficient and economic controls (ibid: 139) which found its institutional location in the carceral archipelago which began to spread across society, consisting in such institutions as the school, universities, barracks, workshops and the penitentiary (Foucault, 1977). The biopolitical pole of the regime of bio-power focused upon the ‘species body’ and inserted a series of regulatory controls to adjust the biological processes of the population such as “propagation, births and mortality, the level of health...and life expectancy” (Foucault, 1978:139) in an effort to enhance life at the level of the population.

The development of the power over life meant that “power would no longer be dealing simply with legal subjects over whom the ultimate dominion was death, but with living beings, and the mastery it would be able to exercise over them would have to be applied at the level of life itself” (ibid: 142-142). For Foucault modern states are ‘truly demonic’ as they are the ‘institutional loci of an irreconcilable tension’ between an ancient sovereign power of deduction defined by the power to ‘take life or let live’ and a modern and productive bio-political power defined by the power to ‘foster life or disallow it to the point of death’ (Ojakangas, 2005: 26). The sovereign ‘death function’ or the ‘refusal of life to the point of death’ can only be justified in modern, liberal societies which function in the ‘mode of bio-power’ and which have repatriated the ‘inalienable rights’ of life and liberty to the recently constituted ‘sovereign individual’ in an effort to ‘incite and foster’ a specific form of life, with reference to utilitarian bio-political ends. The power of deduction and suppression held by the sovereign is realigned to the life administering forces of bio-power and can only exceed its juridical limits in the bio-political state through a form of racism which introduces a break into the domain of life between what life must be fostered and what life must be disallowed to the point of death. This rationality is underpinned by the relationship of war “if you want to live the other must die...the very fact that you let more die will allow you to live more” (Foucault, 2003: 255). The ‘problem drug user’ situated within that ‘other nation’ at the nadir of the social strata known as the ‘underclass’ represents a sub-nation, despised for its abnormality by the ‘symbiotic subjectivity’ of the state and nation, which drains and saps the economic and biological strength of the population and therefore also the state. It is estimated that the cost of drug related crime over the past decade has reached one hundred billion pounds whilst in the same period ten billion pounds has been spent within the National Health Service treating ‘problem drug users’ (Addaction, 2008). This coupled with the biological threat posed to the ‘species life’ of the population through the potential spread of diseases such as HIV/AIDS, associated with drug users who use hypodermic needles, to the non-drug using population means that ‘problem drug users’ have become the subject of state intervention in the name of the life and health of the population. This intervention is informed by principles derived from war which have diffused the order of power since the colonisation of the ‘historico-political discourse’ by the bourgeoisie and is legitimised by society’s sovereign right to protect itself from threats foreign or domestic. The power exercised over the ‘problem drug user’ is exercised at the level of life or existence.
The ‘problem drug user’s’ form of existence has been ‘disallowed to the point of death’ within advanced-liberal British society, a situation encapsulated by the government’s introduction of the ‘Tough Choices’ initiative which elucidated the centrality of coercive and quasi-compulsory treatment to British drug policy and practice (Hunt et al, 2004). The ‘coercive leverage’ of the criminal justice system is utilised from ‘arrest-to-court-to-sentence’ to get illicit-drug using offenders into treatment (Seddon, 2007). The introduction of compulsory drug testing for arrestees, the imposition of Drug Treatment and Testing Orders with court reviews, abstinence orders and Community Rehabilitation Orders (CRO’s) with the condition of regular drug testing all illustrate the punitive and coercive shift in drug policy regarding the ‘problem drug user’ within the UK (ibid).

It is instructive to examine why neo-liberalism, as an advanced form of governmentality, views the ‘problem drug user’ as an especially dangerous subject who can not be trusted to exercise the market freedoms of late modernity in a responsible manner and why there is such an emphasis placed by neo-liberal regimes of control upon channelling ‘problem drug users’ into treatment, coercively or otherwise. Early liberal government arose in opposition to the programme of police and its ‘encyclopaedic range of regulatory controls’ (Garland, 1997: 177) which sought to stringently manage and control the spheres of civil society which existed outside of the state. This art of liberal government known as laissez faire espoused the belief that the autonomous spheres of civil society such as the economy have their own pseudo-natural reality, characterised by their own immanent laws of exchange which are resistant to state manipulation. The economic subject of early liberal capitalism- the rational, self interested and ‘natural’ homo economis, was not thought to be amenable to close state regulation without adversely affecting the natural process of exchange which led to the accumulation of wealth (ibid). However, neo-liberalism differs from early liberalism in viewing the ‘artificial relation of competition’ rather than the ‘natural relation of exchange’ as the driving force behind the free market and the economic processes which inexorably lead to the ‘wealth of nations’. This shift from exchange to competition means that the anthropology of homo economis must be fostered and cultivated rather than assumed and thus this necessitates a constant intervention by the state on the conditions of the market; i.e “the interests, desires and aspirations” (Read, 2009: 29) of the population. Neo-liberalism imubes the order of power with a rationality which holds that the government and control of populations is reliant upon the ability of the state to cultivate and shape a certain form of subjectivity or ontology amenable to incentivised manipulation by governmental power. Neo-liberal rhetoric propagates the view that civil society is a sphere of limited government; however neo-liberal ‘governmentality’ seeks to incite an entrepreneurial, prudent and responsible form of freedom or conduct in its subjects through constructing the economic, social and cultural conditions which are conducive to the production and consumption of such a ‘responsibilized’ freedom. Therefore the governmental power of the neo-liberal state is “exercised only over free subjects and only in so far as they are free” (Foucault, 1982: 221). Governmental power seeks to align the subjectivity of the free, active subject with those that are approved by the state through the ‘unobtrusive technique’ of government- at a -distance. The rationalities and mentalities of the state are articulated through private powers in civil society who engage in the ‘conduct of conduct’ by providing ‘technologies of the self’ to be adopted by the individual rendering him/her self governable. Thus neo-liberal governmentality focuses upon
two poles of governance, the ‘government of others and the governance of oneself’ (Garland, 1997) however the intractable problem drug user is impervious to both.

The reactivation of the idealised subject of *homo-economis* in late modernity within neo-liberal forms of governance has meant that ‘economic reasoning’ has become a grid of intelligibility transferable across domains of conduct other than the market such as criminality. Within the ‘new criminologies of everyday life’ which have come to the fore in the discipline of criminology, the rational criminal has displaced the pathological criminal as the object of analysis. Administrative criminology promulgates the notion that the ‘offender’ is an eminently governable rational actor of self-interest who carefully calculates the costs and benefits of his/her actions and is “susceptible to modifications in the variables of the environment and…responds to this in a non random way” (Foucault, 2008: 269). The state, informed by these new rationalities of crime control, has engaged in a ‘responsibilisation’ strategy seeking to cultivate a specific form of subjectivity amongst potential victims of crime. *Homo prudens* (Adams, 1995; O’Malley, 1996) is that prudent subject who ‘target hardens’ his property and joins ‘neighbourhood watch schemes’ to increase the ‘guardianship’ of economically valuable assets. *Homo prudens* is propagated as a ‘technology of the self’ to be adopted by responsible individuals within crime control literature which stresses the importance of deterring the rational criminal through prudent, self interested behaviour. However, the ‘problem drug user’ poses a significant problem for conventional crime control strategies which conceptualise the offender as a rational subject capable of incentivised deterrence. Power only gets a hold of the individual “to the extent and only to the extent that he is *homo economis*…that is the surface contact between the individual and the power exercised over him” (Foucault, 2008: 252-253). Thus *homo economis* is “the interface of government and the individual” (ibid: 253). The ‘problem drug user’ is therefore unlikely to be ‘governmentalizable’ as he/she is physiologically/psychologically dependent upon an illicit drug and is therefore a subject who is a ‘slave to instinct’ rather than a rational subject of self interest. Their rationality is impaired by their physiological/psychological need and dependence upon an illicit drug and therefore they are governed by instinct (not reason) and thus they represent or resemble the pathological nature of the crime they are associated with, drug-related acquisitive crime. They are pathological due to their drug dependence and not susceptible to incentivised responsibility/prudentialism and are also not considered amenable to administrative crime control strategies or capable of the entrepreneurial adoption of state disseminated ‘technologies of the self’. Localised situational control techniques can not unobtrusively ‘reach’ into the ‘crimenogenic situation’ (which has an economic value of its own and thus is not suitable for intensive regulation) and ‘subjectivise’ a subject who is pathological rather than rational due to their drug dependence. This is why *exceptional*, coercive and punitive measures are deemed necessary to bring the problem user within the grip of governmental power by rendering them that idealised and normative subject of neo-liberalism- *homo economis* which must be achieved by first freeing them of their addiction to illicit drugs which breeds a multitude of pathologies resistant to government through freedom.

The technology of ‘pastoral power’ which is integral to the bio-political state and which enables state rationalities and mentalities to be irrigated to the peripheries of the ‘social’, creates a tension with the light and unobtrusive nature of neo-liberal
forms of governance which must allow the circulation and exchange of bodies and goods. This paradox perhaps explains the proclivity of liberal regimes of government to lapse into authoritarianism, particularly when dealing with ‘problematised’ sections of the population such as ‘problem drug users’. The neo-liberal state is a consumer of freedom, it is “a consumer of freedom inasmuch as it can only function insofar as a number of freedoms exist” (Foucault, 2008: 63). The neo-liberal state consumes freedom therefore it must produce and incite the specific form of entrepreneurial and prudent freedom through which its power is articulated, within its subjects. This process of producing a state approved form of freedom amongst its subjects “risks limiting and destroying it….this very act entails the establishment of limitations, controls, forms of coercion, and obligations relying on threats” (ibid: 64) against those unwilling or unable to become that normative conduit of state power - homo economis. For Foucault, Hebraic notions of the duties of the shepherd to his flock began to suffuse the order of power in the sixteenth century when the ‘individualizing power’ manifest in the Christian pastoral escaped its institutional confines and evolved into a ‘strange technology of power’ utilised by the state “which treated the vast majority of men like a flock and a few as shepherds” (Foucault, 1981: 303). In Hebraic literature “the shepherd wields power over a flock rather than over a land” (Foucault, 1981: 301) which is congruent with the epistemic shift which occurred at the threshold of modernity from sovereign power, which was exercised by the sovereign over his territory, to bio-power which is exercised by the state and takes as its object the population. The shepherd “gathers together, guides and leads his flock….he gathers dispersed individuals” (ibid: 301-302) just as the neo-liberal state gathers its flock in the guise of a population around a ‘normative ontology’ amenable to ‘guidance’ or governance, that of homo economis. “The shepherds role is to ensure the salvation of his flock” (ibid:301) as his salvation is inextricably linked to that of his flock just as the modern states ‘salvation’ in this world is indelibly linked to the strength, vitality and health of its population. The shepherds benevolence takes the form of “a kind of individualised kindness…for the shepherd see’s that all the sheep, each and every one of them, is fed and saved” (ibid: 302). The shepherd would leave the entire flock to go in search of just one stray sheep, as did Moses in Exodus, exposing the entire flock to danger. Thus the shepherd would risk himself and the flock for just one estranged sheep just as the neo-liberal state risks destroying the ethical, moral and ideological underpinnings of a regime of governance committed to ‘perpetual peace’ and freedom by utilising authoritarian measures such as coerced or quasi-compulsory treatment to bring the numerically insubstantial ‘problem drug user’ back to the ‘normative ontology’ of the population. The shepherd must not only know the state of his flock in aggregate terms, just as the modern state knows the median level of crime representative of its population through the use of actuarial technologies, but he must know the ‘public sins’ of each individual and of equal importance “he must know what goes on in the soul of each one” (ibid: 309-310) in order to identify dangers to the flock amongst its own number. Thus the state like the good shepherd watches over its flock, engaging in extensive surveillance of segments of the population identified as high risk through an actuarial knowledge of the population (crime statistics), such as that ‘sub-nation’ termed the ‘underclass’ were the problem drug user is said to be located. The state “renders an account not only of each sheep, but of all their actions” (ibid: 308) in the form of criminal records and estimates the “good or evil they are liable to do” (ibid: 308) through a psycho-medical knowledge of the ‘problem drug user’s’ pathological status. The bio-political state, in an effort to ‘subjectivise’ the ‘problem drug user’
and align him/her with the idealised normative subject of *homo-economis* (a governable subject) must first instrumentally utilise its ancient sovereign right to reduce its object of power to *bare life* (Agamben, 1995) before it can saturate and transform the conditions of action, the ‘problematised’ subjects ontology. Thus the specific form of governmental reason which characterises the neo-liberal state threatens to abrogate the ideological foundations of liberalism as a form of government committed to liberty and ‘perpetual peace’.

The war within the ‘liberal zone of peace’ waged against the ‘problem drug user’ abrogates those supposedly ‘inalienable rights’ the modern state has bestowed upon the liberal subject to mitigate the potential excesses of unrestrained sovereign bodies (Reid, 2004). The right to refuse treatment has been shown to be situated within the ambit of Article 8 of the European Convention of Human Rights (Havers and Neenan, 2002) and yet the ‘problem drug user’, expelled from the states ‘universe of obligation’, is legitimately subject to the hard coercive edge of sovereign power. The ‘problem drug user’ could be said to be situated in the ‘zone of indistinction’ delineated by Giorgio Agamben as the ‘state of exception’ in his 1995 publication *Homo Sacer: Sovereign Power and Bare Life*. For Agamben, the opposition between sovereign power (defined by Foucault as a means of deduction) and a productive biopolitical power is superfluous or as Agamben puts it “perfectly trivial” (Agamben, 1995: 87) as both regimes of power surreptitiously intersect in the modern state. Agamben posits the belief that the hidden function of sovereign power is to ‘produce’ *bare life* and thus it is responsible for the production of the most fundamental biopolitical relationship, that which exists between the emasculated subject shorn of all political rights and reduced to *bare life*—*homo sacer* and his mirror image the sovereign in the extra-juridical *state of exception*. For Agamben ‘unqualified’ *bare life*—*zoe*, that is mere existence, was originally excluded from political society by the Greeks in the foundation of the political community which cultivated a ‘qualified’ political life—*bios*. As he states, “Western politics has the peculiar privilege of being that whose exclusion of bare life founds the city of men” (ibid: 7). However Agamben, utilises Foucault’s distinction between the classical period and biopolitical modernity to illustrate how *bare life* becomes inscribed within the political order in modernity through an ‘inclusive exclusion’. Foucault states that the entry of life into the order of power at the ‘threshold of modernity’ calls mans existence as a living being into question as the “life of the species is wagered on its own political strategies” (Foucault, 1978: 143). The emergence of the human and social sciences in the modern period meant that “man was finally learning what it meant to be a living species in a living world…to have forces which could be modified…for the first time in history no doubt, biological existence was reflected in political existence, the fact of living was no longer an inaccessible substrate” (ibid: 142). The *bare life* of the ‘problem drug user’ (produced through their *very exclusion* from political society and which is accomplished by the abrogation of their citizenship) enters into a fundamental bio-political relationship with the sovereign who is also situated outside the juridical system in order to decide on both the ‘normal situation’ and the state of exception (Schmitt, 1985). Although the *bare life* of the problem drug user is taken outside of the juridical order or political society the rule or the norm (that is *bios* or the qualified political life— the individual endowed with rights) still “applies to the exception in no longer applying it, in withdrawing from it” (Agamben, 1995: 18). The ‘problem drug user’ who is cast into the *state of exception* and abandoned by normal human law becomes that figure of archaic Roman law—*Homo Sacer* who is included
in the ‘sovereign ban’ and exposed to an unconditional threat of death. “The ‘sovereign ban’ captures the bare life of the subject in the political order but outside of the political community” (Dean, 2004: 26) and thus the problem drug user is denied the status of a ‘sovereign subject’. According to Agamben, “what is captured in the sovereign ban is a human victim who may be killed but not sacrificed” (ibid:83) and in relation to modern law “Homo Sacer is the one who belongs neither to the sphere of positive law nor to that of natural law, he has neither the rights of the citizen nor natural rights” (Ojakangas, 2005: 10). Within contemporary British society the ‘problem drug user’ has assumed the status of Homo Sacer, existing in a relation of abandonment to the law and excluded from political society through the abrogation of his/her citizenship, the bare life to which the problem drug user is reduced is subject to the unfettered will of the sovereign/expert.
Neo-Liberal State Responses to Drug Users

“Those who would be free must first be bound” (Mead, 1997: 23).

The political philosophy of liberalism establishes a dichotomy between a circumscribed domain of government and a sphere of liberty and individual freedom which exists in a relationship of exteriority to the state known as civil society. This philosophy espouses the notion that civil society is comprised of its own immanent laws, processes and quasi-natural regulations which must be respected. However, converse to this view, the art of neo-liberal government does not merely presuppose that all its subjects are capable of an idealised ‘conduct of freedom’ but in contrast “can take all sorts of stances towards freedom…it can try to shape it…educе it among some and presuppose it among others…it can use freedom as a technical means for achieving its ends” (Dean, 2002: 37). As previously discussed, liberal political rationality imbues ‘freedom’ which a normative content and seeks to incite this idealised form of conduct, amenable to the articulation of governmental power, in its subjects. An ethical or moral element is an integral part of this normative content, something which is in fact a pre-requisite factor to the attainment of a state valorised notion of normative autonomy. Homo economis is not merely a rational and prudent subject of self interest but a moral agent guided by ethical self steering mechanisms. The strategic deployment of an ethopolitics (Rose, 1999) within an advanced-liberal British society, witnessed in the nineteen eighties and throughout the current decade by Conservative calls for a return to ‘Victorian values’ (Daily Mail, 2006), should be viewed as an attempt to reactivate moral discourses which are thought to regulate individual conduct. This strategy of regressive modernisation is not merely an attempt to secure social order by establishing a synthetic tissue of moral norms and values. Less saliently but equally important, it is the dissemination of a ‘technology of the self’ termed by Valverde (1996) as an ‘ethical despotism of the self’ to be adopted by those pathological populations such as the ‘problem drug user’ which facilitates their establishment of a relationship to ‘the self’ which emancipates them from their passions, desires and epicurean appetites, which breed a multitude of pathological morbidities resistant to government through freedom. The governmental rationality which suffuses this ‘technology of self-liberation’ is consistent with a belief promulgated by Kant which was axiomatic of the philosophical doctrines of the Enlightenment period and has to a considerable extent underpinned the entire project of modernity- in order for mankind to achieve reason they must first transcend their immature and savage nature (Sandel, 1982). The concomitant theory that “ontogeny recapitulates phylogeny….that individual development mirrors and re-enacts the evolution of the human race” (Russet cited in Valverde, 1996: 361) espoused the belief that the savage instincts, to which the problem drug user succumbs, are not absent in mature, rational individuals but are repressed by a strong moral will and virtuous ‘self-regarding habits’- namely, by an ‘ethical despotism of the self’. Thus neo-liberal ‘governmentality’, taking its cue from tenets which are integral to the ideological framework upon which modernity is premised, seeks to render the individual amenable to governmental power by facilitating and empowering him/her on their journey from nature to civilized, ethical reason. This strategy incorporates the deployment of illiberal technologies to achieve the liberal end of rendering the problem drug user ‘free’ and amenable to both governmental power and ethical and responsible self government through the adoption of state disseminated, self-mortifying ‘technologies of the self’. Thus the authoritarian and illiberal measures to
which the ‘problem drug user’ is subject have the ultimate end of colonising the ‘problem drug user’s’ relationship to the ‘self’. Neo-liberal rationality renders the interiority of the ‘problem drug user’ the battle ground upon which the war of normalisation must be fought and ultimately, governmental power must be resisted.

Neo-liberal ‘governmentality’ therefore assumes that not all populations are capable of the responsible, prudent and ethical conduct exercised by *homo economis*. Certain problematised populations such as the ‘problem drug user’ must be led to their own improvement. John Stuart Mills’s comments in his 1859 publication *On Liberty* elucidate the compatibility of authoritarianism with liberal regimes of governance. Coercive measures are considered legitimate when directed against certain populations perceived to be irrational and barbarous;

> It is, perhaps, hardly necessary to say that this doctrine is meant to apply only to human beings in the maturity of their faculties. We are not speaking of children, or of young persons below the age at which the law may fix as that of manhood or womanhood. Those who are still in a state to require being taken care of by others, must be protected against their actions as against external injury. For the same reasons, we may leave out of consideration those backward states of society in which the race itself may be considered as in its nonage….a ruler full of the spirit of improvement is warranted in the use of any expedients that will attain an end, perhaps otherwise unattainable. Despotism is a legitimate mode of government in dealing with barbarians, provided the end be their improvement. (Mill, [1859] 1974: 69).

This reveals the authoritarian Janus-face of the art of liberal government justified by a belief which sits uneasily with liberalisms universalizing claims, that liberal governance is only suitable for ‘improved populations’ and that some populations incapable of ‘spontaneous improvement’ must be led to their own self actualisation by a ‘good despot’ (ibid). Neo-liberal political rationality does not consider the problem drug user to have reached the ‘maturity of their faculties’. Enslaved by their physiological/psychological desire for an illicit drug they are unable to transcend their immature and savage nature and achieve reason. Therefore the neo-liberal state assumes the role of a ‘good despot’, the problem drug user constitutes a category of subject to whom paternalism is entirely legitimate, it is justified by the utilitarian end of enabling them to overcome their defective will, achieve reason and become amenable to governmental power. Therefore, somewhat paradoxically, the risk management technology of ‘coerced treatment’ is devised as a ‘strategy grounded upon freedom’, “those who would be free must first be bound” (Mead, 1997: 23).

The techniques utilised by the neo-liberal state to lead drug users to their own improvement belie the totalising claims of theorists who have promulgated the notion that late modern Britain should be conceptualised as a ‘risk society’ in which a ‘new penology’ (Feeley et al, 1992) concerned with the identification, classification and management of ‘risky’ populations has displaced a ‘disciplinary society’ and its focus upon the correction of the individual offender. The rationality of control which underpins ‘risk society’ is “managerial not transformative…it seeks to regulate levels of deviance, not intervene or respond to individual deviants or social malformations” (ibid: 452). Within this ‘new penology’ risk is considered actuarial and something
which can be modified and regulated at an aggregate level. The rationality which suffuses risk management conceptualises the future as a domain to be known and governed through the “identification, assessment, elimination or reduction of the possibility of incurring misfortune or loss” (Rose, 2000: 333). Proponents of the ‘new penology’ believe that the focus upon the individual offender has been effaced as crime control rationality has shifted from normalisation (narrowing the margin between the distribution of offenders to the normative law abiding subject) to accommodation (responding to variations in the distribution of crime) within the ‘new criminologies of everyday life’ such as administrative criminology which focuses upon the behavioural, spatial and temporal aspects of crime (O’Malley, 1996). It is held that the more efficient governmental/actuarial power exercised within these crime control strategies has displaced the costly and ineffective disciplinary technologies of power, while any residual sovereign or coercive remedies are considered irrational anomalies whose survival is explicable only in terms of their utility in quelling resistance to “more efficient and instrumental methods of control (ibid: 197). However, contrary to the totalizing and homogenous view of social control posited by proponents of a ‘risk society’, the identification of dangerous sites and populations of high risk within the ‘social’ and their management through the deployment of governmental/actuarial technologies of power does not efface either the pathological individual or disciplinary technologies of power and sovereign based remedies. Those who are unwilling or unable to be ‘governed through freedom’ are the subject of an individualised and all together different strategy of control than those considered capable of making prudent and incentivised, self interested decisions. Those whose conduct is not amenable to modulation by governmental/actuarial power within ‘circuits of inclusion’ (Rose, 2000) are the subject of hybrid technologies of power within the ‘circuits of exclusion’ (ibid) where power works upon pathologies. Neo-liberal governmental power colonises disciplinary and sovereign technologies and puts them to governmental ends i.e. rendering the problem drug user a rational and responsible subject. Thus the ‘circuits of exclusion’ in which the Criminal Justice System operates do not merely seek to ‘manage’ the risk of crime through incapacitatory measures applied to pathological offenders (from the perspective of the new penology, prisons are nothing more than ‘holding pens’). Power is much more ambitious, although it may utilise incapacitatory techniques its normalizing proclivities remain. This fragmentary nature of the field of power, within which ‘government’ is pre- eminent, is supported by Foucault’s assertion that;

“….we should not see things as the replacement of a society of sovereignty by a society of discipline and then a society of discipline by a society, say, of government. In fact we have a triangle: sovereignty, discipline, and governmental management…. (although)….the tendency, the line of force….has constantly led to the pre-eminence over all types of power- sovereignty, discipline, and so on- of the type of power we call government.” (Foucault, 2007: 107-108).

A protective continuum of state response runs through the social body which responds to the ‘risk’ generated by illicit drug use by deploying a range of political technologies depending upon the ontological status of the drug user. At one pole the ‘recreational user’, considered a rational consumer is subject to governmental/actuarial technologies of power within ‘circuits of inclusion’ or freedom and are governed through a criminology of the self (Seddon, 2007) which
recruits the recreational drug user in the management of their own risk. The neo-liberal state has presided over a retraction of socialized actuarialism (socialized risk management) and cultivated a culture of private actuarialism or prudentialism (O’Malley, 1996). The responsible and prudent ‘recreational drug user’ is encouraged to develop a relationship between one-self and ‘tutelary powers’ (Cruikshank, 1996) such as health care professionals who promote a myriad of ‘regimes of the self’ which encourage ‘care of the body’. They are also encouraged to utilise governmental programs which provide actuarial and qualitative data on the ‘risks’ associated with drug use which allow the prudent ‘subject of risk’ to engage in privatised risk management as a standard, everyday ‘practice of the self’ (O’Malley, 1996). One such governmental campaign within the United Kingdom is the national drug awareness campaign, *Frank*. The primary aim of *Frank*, stated on its Home Office website, is to enable “young people to understand the risks and dangers of drugs and their use” (Home Office, 2009). The provision of the actuarial data which the ‘prudent subject of risk’ incorporates into his/her economic reasoning process, such as that concerning the actuarial ‘risk’ of suffering heart attacks or strokes due to cocaine use or contracting blood borne viruses through intravenous drugs use, is accomplished within this campaign via numerous mediums including advertising, PR, local campaigns, a website and an information helpline. This strategy seeks to align the recreational user’s patterns of consumption with those which are officially prescribed and encourages them to make the prudent, self interested decision to cease or at least not escalate use. The *Frank* campaign is keen to underline that its role is to ‘facilitate’ individuals and partnerships within civil society in the ‘war’ against drugs rather than to ‘provide’ a totalised, state protection. “The success of Frank depends upon you” is the sub-title emblazoned across *Frank’s* Home Office website page entitled ‘Commitments’. It is clear that individuals and private powers within civil society must ‘commit’ to the articulation of the governmental rationalities and mentalities which comprise the programme if it is to succeed. This strategy of government-at-a-distance, which underpins the campaign, in which non-state actors and organisations within civil society are recruited as conduits of governmental rationalities is evidenced by one of the stated aims of the *Frank* campaign which is to ‘enable’ ‘parents to have the confidence and knowledge to talk to their children about drugs” (ibid) and to ensure that “professionals who work with young people, especially vulnerable groups, are supported” (ibid). A *Meet Frank* booklet, available for download, is provided by the Home Office website which incites parents and drug workers to adopt *Frank* as a ‘technology of the self’, providing detailed information on the look, tone, and communication style which *Frank* is required to adopt when speaking to potential or actual drug users. In a section entitled *Who is Frank?* the booklet states “Frank is me, you, your colleagues, anyone involved in the drugs area. Frank wants to help you do what you do” (ibid). It appears that in order to govern drug users, the conduits of governmental power within civil society must first learn to govern one-self.

As we move toward the punitive pole of the continuum we are confronted by the drug user conceptualised as having attenuated ‘free will’ within neo-liberal strategies of control due to their use of ‘hard’, highly addictive drugs such as heroin and crack cocaine. The user conceptualised in this way by neo-liberal control practices has typically just entered the criminal justice system and will be considered ‘rational’ (until proven otherwise) and treated as such, even if the ‘choice’ they are given between heavily restricted options (between treatment and imprisonment such as with
DTTO’s) supplants the ‘free will’ accorded to those subjects who have reached the maturity of their rational faculties and can be trusted to make the ‘correct choices’. This drug user is in need of a ‘good despot’, full of the ‘spirit of improvement’, to enable them to become the category of subject suitable for unmitigated liberal ‘governance through freedom’ such as ‘the recreational user’. For now this user straddles the boundaries of freedom and coercion, governed within ‘circuits of inclusion’ only to the extent that they submit to a form of medico-penal control (typically exercised through regular drug testing, quasi-compulsory treatment and the threat of imprisonment for recalcitrance) being exercised over them. This user is generally subject to probationary measures of control or related technologies such as Drug Testing and Treatment Orders until the risk they pose can be further assessed. They are allowed to practice a responsibilized freedom within the community with only a light framework of supervision. Disciplinary technologies of power are utilised to enable this user to practice a prudent, responsible freedom by facilitating the suppression of their savage instincts and desires. They are incited to work upon their soul, establishing the self-control required to exercise a responsible freedom through the cultivation of virtuous ‘self-regarding habits of consumption’. A disciplinary regime of the body, imposed through regular testing and coercively backed by the prospect of imprisonment for breaching the conditions of their court order, cultivates an ethical despotism of the self, the aim of this disciplinary technology is to utilise habit (which becomes autonomous-mediating the link between the unconscious and compulsion-Valverde, 1996) to render the user free and capable of developing prudent autonomy through ‘practices of the self’. The spatial and temporal disciplining of this category of drug user is also accomplished through “electronic monitoring, tracking and the recruitment of other forms of social control such as the family, employers and bail hostel workers” (Garland, 1997: 192) which encourages the user to adopt a lifestyle conducive to the development of the strong ‘will’ and self-control necessary to become amenable to the liberal project of ‘government through freedom’. Thus working upon the soul is a prerequisite to modifying the drug users ontology, they must establish disciplined ‘habits of consumption’ and a disciplined lifestyle to free themselves from their enslavement to ‘un-prescribed desires’ and passions. These disciplinary techniques which help engender an ‘ethical despotism of the self’ within the drug user could be aptly depicted as technologies of ‘self-liberation’. This process of ‘self-liberation’ facilitates the development of a previously unrealised ability within the drug user to work upon the ‘self’. This category of drug user can work upon their ontology by practicing responsibilized autonomy in the community, facilitated on their journey to becoming that idealised subject of advanced liberalism, Homo Economicus by a ‘benevolent despot’ in the guise of the neo-liberal state.

Situated at the punitive pole of the continuum of state response is the ‘problem drug user’, categorised as an addicted consumer and thus considered pathological and un-amenable to governance within liberal ‘circuits of inclusion’. This category of drug users are recidivist offenders, typically committing ‘trigger offences’ associated with prolific hard drug use such as acquisitive, interpersonal and property crime. They have proven themselves to be unsuitable to ‘governance through freedom’ and are subject to sovereign technologies of control. Within the ‘circuits of exclusion’ where the ‘problem drug user’ is incapacitated until the ‘risk’ they pose can be rendered ‘governable’, the psychiatric expert assumes the role of a ‘petty sovereign’, inciting the production of the ‘problem drug users’ bare life by specifying the psycho-ethical
double of the offence within the ‘problem drug users’ Pre Sentence Report. This psycho-ethical double constitutes the materiality which juridical power must ‘bite on and get hold of’, the drug users ontology, their very way of being. As Foucault states, “expert opinion allows one to pass from action to conduct, from offence to a way of being, and to make this way of being appear as nothing other than the offence itself, but as a general form as it were in the individuals conduct” (Foucault, 1999: 15).

Thus psychiatry allows sovereign power to colonise what lies beneath the threshold of the criminal act, something which is not a legal offence; an aberrant form of existence. The psychiatrist therefore has the ‘power of life and death’ within the Criminal Justice System (CJS), he/she becomes a doctor/judge (ibid) as they assume the role of the sovereign, deciding which form of existence is worth living- defining what constitutes the ‘good life’ or bios (Agamben, 1996) and which form of existence is a ‘life not worth living’. The problem drug-users form of pathological existence, deemed not worth living, must be reduced to bare life and the psycho-ethical double of the offence (the problem drug user’s lack of entrepreneurial spirit, self esteem or ethical self steering mechanisms) must be remedied. Thus expert psychiatric opinion facilitates the production of the problem drug user’s bare life by allowing sovereign power to punish something which is not the offence, but rather the psycho-ethical double of the offence, which germinates in the ‘problem drug user’s’ ontology. This psycho-ethical double, rather than being a legal offence, is an irregularity from psycho-ontological and moral norms which the psychiatrist portrays as the cause, origin and motivation of the offence. Thus the qualified life or bios (the individual endowed with ‘inalienable’ rights to life and liberty) - is contingent within an advanced liberal society not merely upon being human. Citizenship is contingent upon ‘conduct’ which finds its materiality, it’s psycho-ethical double, in the problem drug user’s ontology. The ‘problem drug user’, who’s very form of existence abrogates their citizenship, finds him/herself in a relation of abandonment to the law, “their very nature seems to place them beyond the limits of civility and its demands on subjectivity…the conventions of the rule of law must be waived for the protection of the community (Rose, 2000: 334). Cast into the ‘state of exception’ the ‘problem drug user’ assumes the role of Homo Sacer, the problem drug user is the one to whom all experts act as sovereign. The sacred life of the problem drug user, existing in a fundamental bio-political relationship to the expert/ ‘petty sovereign’ may be coercively transformed or disallowed to the point of death without committing a crime. The problem drug user, deemed ungovernable, is controlled within ‘circuits of exclusion’ which usually involve the use of imprisonment due to the threat their form of existence poses. They must be freed from their physiological addiction to illicit drugs through treatment and transcend their pre-social passions and desires by achieving a level of rational cognition. They must be facilitated in developing the entrepreneurial, prudent and ethical ‘self’ required to actualise them into a competitive society, governed through ‘freedom’.
The Bio-Political Investment of the ‘Problem Drug Users’ Bare Life in ‘Camp’

According to Foucault, modernity is characterised by the ‘demonic’ synthesis of ‘two distinct games’ of power relations; the city-citizen game of the Greek Polis founded upon the sovereigns negative power to ‘take life and let live’ and the Judaeo-Christian shepherd-flock game “based upon Christian love (agape) and the care of the living” from which the productive regime of ‘pastoral power’ emerges (Prosorov, 2007: 55). The ‘city citizen game’ originally excluded the zoe (bare life) of its subjects from the political community which cultivated a ‘qualified’, political life- bios (Agamben, 1995). However, as previously discussed, at the threshold of the modern/bio-political epoch, with the development of the human and social sciences, the bare life of man becomes inscribed in the order of power as the bios of the citizen and the zoe of man enter a zone of indistinction. As Prosorov exclaims, “bio-power takes as its object the entire domain of human existence, no longer making any distinction between the political and the physical, the public and the private, the collective and the individual” (Prosorov, 2007: 56). Where as with the ‘city-citizen game’ power was exercised by the sovereign over a territory “with its own life that the law restricts and regulates” (ibid: 54) the bio-political power of the benevolent shepherd is exercised over a population whose vitality and strength is dependent upon the existence and direct action of the shepherd. The constitutive function of the shepherd is underlined by Foucault who states “the shepherd only has to disappear for the flock to be scattered (Foucault, 1981: 302). Therefore, the deductive and suppressive power of the sovereign is displaced by a bio-political power wielded by the state which seeks to ‘invest life through and through’ (Foucault, 1978). The regime of bio-power, permeated by an ethos of love and ‘care of the living’, is one bent on “generating, inciting, reinforcing and optimising the forces under it” (ibid: 136) in a manner which fosters and incites a specific form of life. Thus in late modernity, the predominant relationship between power and the subject is characterised less by the transcendent and exterior power of the sovereign in relation to the citizen but increasingly by the immanent and saturating relationship of bio-political power to man as species. By displacing the ‘city-citizen game’, bio-political power transposes the ‘transcendent violence of the law’ in exchange for ‘the immanent power of the norm’ (Prosorov, 2007). Bio-power establishes an immanent relationship to its subjects as it moves ‘within’, penetrating and inscribing the subject’s body and suffocating their ontological being as its technologies of normalisation, deployed by the ‘experts of life’ (such as the psychiatrist), work upon the distribution of subjects scattered around a normative form of existence. The ‘experts of life’ in the liberal bio-political state ‘disallow to the point of death’ any form of existence which digresses from that idealised subject of advanced liberalism- homo-economis. Thus bio-power may be benevolent but it does not allow for un-prescribed forms of freedom or existence. It is a regime of power without an exterior, constituting its subjects at the very depths of their ‘being’ and therefore it renders resistance in the conventional Marxist ‘emancipative’ form, preoccupied with the transcendent institution of state sovereignty, redundant (ibid). Resistance to bio-power with reference to the sovereignty of the citizen (as within human rights discourse) is also ultimately flawed, as a citizen only gains such rights as a member of a particular political bios, ‘man’ has no such rights. Resistance to bio-power must take place on the bio-political terrain, it “must entail the refusal of care, an attitude of indifference, no longer to the threat of power but to its loving embrace” (ibid: 62). This strategy of resistance is exemplified by the ‘problem drug user’ who through exercising a radical form of
freedom refuses the restrictive form of life offered by governmental bio-political technologies. Their form of radical autonomy exerts the “power of life against the power over life” (ibid: 62) which renders the ‘problem drug user’ un-amenable to bio-political investment. As Deleuze espouses “Life becomes resistance to power when power takes life as its object…when power becomes bio-power, resistance becomes the power of life, a vital power which cannot be contained within the paths of a particular diagram (of power)” (Deleuze, 1988: 92). The ‘problem drug user’s’ indifference to governmental care ensures that, with regard to them, the love (agape) of power remains unrequited. The radical autonomy of the ‘problem drug user’ and the pathological form of their existence inhibits the bio-political investment of their body and soul. The intravenous drug user offends the processes of professionalism and normalisation which have been codified and monopolised by the ‘experts of life’ concerning who may legitimately penetrate the body. The ‘experts of life’ utilise such expertise in order to maximise, sustain and foster life were as the ‘problem drug user’ penetrates their own body in a manner which emaciates and depletes life. The pathological morbidities this life-negating practice induces, render the problem drug user un-amenable to the adoption of life affirming ‘technologies of the self’, the lack of which is perceived to be the cause of their present predicament, their savage and immature form of existence is a failure of the ‘self’. This problematised section of the population refuse (or are incapable of adopting) the specific form of life or existence offered by the ‘experts of life’ and by so doing they deprive power of its positive and productive content. The indifference or resilience of the ‘problem drug user’ to the bio-political imperatives of the state ensures that the power exercised over them is emaciated, hollowed out and reduced to its pure, negative form of sovereign power.

The ‘problem drug users’ existence constitutes a form of counter productivity which reduces power to a relationship of exteriority and transcendence rather than interiority and immanence with regard to their biological and ontological existence, for a short time “power is left with coercion and death as its only instrument” (ibid: 73).

The ever widening gap between the multifarious forms of aberrant existence which exist within the nation-state (such as the ‘problem drug user’) and the ‘norm’, as defined and embodied by the ‘dominant race’ or bourgeoisie “is the new fact of the politics of our time” (Agamben, 2000: 44) and what Agamben terms camp is the hidden regulator of this disparity. Agamben promulgates the notion that the concentration camp which first appeared in the late 19th century and which later became the space “in which the most absolute conditio inhumana ever to appear on earth was realised” (ibid: 37) in the Nazi Lager, is not an historical anomaly which the civilizing process of modernity has resigned to antiquity but is the “hidden matrix and nomos of the political space in which we live” (ibid: 37). For Agamben, camp is the materialisation of the state of exception, “where the suspension of the rule of law, acquires a permanent spatial arrangement that, as such, remains constantly outside the normal state of law” (ibid: 39). What is expelled from the juridical order (the zoe of man) into camp is not merely cast out into an external space but is captured outside (ibid). The bare life of man is captured in the political order but outside of the political community. Camp is where sovereign power and bio-power surreptitiously intersect in the modern state; the bare life of homo sacer is the hidden point of this intersection (Ojakangas, 2005). Sovereign power is instrumentally utilised to reduce intractable forms of existence which are resistant to bio-political investment to bare life so that they might be modified and inscribed in a permanent spatial arrangement where “power confronts nothing other than pure biological life without mediation.”
(Agamben, 2000: 41). According to Agamben, “camp is the new hidden regulator of the inscription of life in the order...it is the sign of the systems inability to function without transforming itself into a lethal machine” (ibid: 43). It is disturbing to note that at the beginning of the nineteen nineties, at the precise moment at which the British states neo-liberal rationality had began to problematise the ‘problem drug user’s’ intractable form of existence and a raft of punitive drugs legislation was being deployed to erode the citizenship of this population, a structure redolent of camp, a ‘localisation without order’, began to materialise for the bio-political investment of the ‘problem drug user’s’ bare life. Within criminal justice settings, particularly the prison, the spread of cognitive behavioural therapy (CBT) programmes since the early nineteen nineties has been “little short of remarkable” (Maguire, 2006: 69). By 2003 CBT programmes were operative in three quarters of all prisons in England and Wales (Clarke et al, 2004). Although CBT has traditionally been confined to the mental health domain it is a technology which has been subsumed into neo-liberal crime control strategy and utilised to support a ‘cognitive deficit model’ of offender behaviour by emphasising the interpersonal antecedents of criminal activity. It is a central tenet of this approach that individuals who do not have or apply ‘rational’ problem solving skills and who are incapable of suppressing internal emotional conflict through self-mortifying ‘technologies of the self’ are at greater risk of committing criminal offences. These CBT programmes are perceived to achieve ‘humane and liberating’ (Maguire, 2006: 70) ends by the ‘experts of life’ who administer them in the prison setting by facilitating the offender in the process of overcoming their cognitive immaturity and achieving a degree of rational cognition which will enable them to make prudent, self interested decisions. This approach aims to bring about behavioural modification through a ‘constructional approach’ which endeavours to transmute the offender’s relationship to the ‘self’ by altering their structure of cognition, a process which essentially ‘teaches’ them “how to think” (Robinson et al, 2001: 180). The ‘hypothesised mechanism of change’ entails the acquisition of new analytical problem solving skills. These skills are usually acquired implicitly through the socialisation process in a ‘normal social milieu’, however it is assumed that the ‘problem drug user’, typically encultured in a social milieu with weak socialising structures, has failed to acquire them. The ‘problem drug user’ is also equipped with the ‘technologies of the self’ necessary to deal with ‘interpersonal encounters’ such as emotional conflict and stress through a series of techniques which seek to install cognitive technologies akin to an ‘ethical despotism of the self’ (Valverde, 1996). The CBT therapeutic setting within the prison can be accurately depicted as a ‘localisation without order’ situated beyond the remit of the juridical order. What is cast into this space which can be defined as camp- the problem drug user’s bare life, is not merely excluded but is captured outside in the sovereign ban (Agamben, 1995). The rule or the norm-bios continues to apply to the problem drug user’s bare life by withdrawing from it, by dissociating itself, and in so doing reducing the ‘problem drug user’ to the status of homo sacer (citizen reduced to man and thus shorn of all political rights) whose sacred life is exposed to the unconditional threat of ‘coercion to the point of death’. The fundamental ‘human right’ granted to the citizens of a political bios, that of the ‘freedom of thought’ or psychological integrity, is withdrawn from the ‘problem drug user’. That which concerns him/her at the very depth of their being or ontology, is the subject of a range of bio-political techniques in a location where the psychiatrist/ ‘petty sovereign’ confronts the bare life of the problem drug user in a fundamental bio-political relationship. In camp, the possibility of atrocities being committed upon the ‘problem
drug user’ does not depend upon the rule of law but solely upon the professional expertise and technologies of power utilised by the ‘experts of life’ to subjectivise the problem drug user through the enfolding of authority (Dean, 1996). Power must establish an immanent relationship to the ‘problem drug user’, a relationship previously inhibited by their pathological form of existence engendered by illicit drug use (which rendered them a slave to their base instincts and desires) and also hindered by a cognitive incapacity (due to a lack of the relevant skills) to achieve the level of rational cognition necessary to become ‘governmentalisable’.

The governmental practices implemented by the ‘pys-scientists’ in the CBT setting should be viewed as practices concerned with the enfolding of authority (ibid). Giles Deleuze, drawing upon Foucault, espouses the notion that the Ancient Greeks, in an attempt to establish a relation of self mastery, ‘bent the outside’, folding force through a series of practical techniques which caused the outside to fold back, establishing a doubling which hollowed out and constituted an inside. Deleuze promulgates the notion that the inside or interiority of the subject is constituted through the “peristaltic movements, folds and foldings” of the outside and posits the idea that these foldings “are not something other than the outside, but precisely the inside of the outside” (Deleuze, 1988: 96-97). Therefore, the ‘being’ or ontology of the subject is nothing other than the fold of the outside, invaginated and twisted to form an interior deeper than any interior, ‘an interior which thought cannot think of’, the unthought (ibid). As Deleuze exclaims, “thought can find nothing in itself except that outside from which it comes and which resides in it as the unthought” (ibid: 118). From this perspective power/knowledge floods the inside, hollows it out and creates a domain where force becomes self-referential, acting upon the ‘self’. As Deleuze states, “what comes about as a result (of the enfolding of authority) is a relation which force has with itself, a power to affect itself, an effect of self on self” (ibid: 101). Thus the enfolding of authority creates a relationship to oneself which is essentially one of internal regulation. Deleuze espouses the belief that this relation of self mastery developed by the Greeks did “not remain the withdrawn zone of the freeman…a zone independent of any institutional and social system” (ibid: 103) for in modernity it has been colonised and reintegrated into the systems of power from which it emerged. The relation to one self first cultivated by the ‘free men’ of Greek antiquity has been transmuted into a relationship of subjection that the subject has with both governmental power and their own self-identity or ontology to which he/she is inextricably tied.

The establishment of the ‘problem drug users’ interior domain through the ‘enfolding of authority’ is integral to the CBT programmes which have been introduced into the prison setting over the last two decades. They seek to deploy ‘technologies of the self’ to be adopted by the ‘problem drug user’ who through a series of practical exercises folds force, creating an internal double or ‘fold of being’ which is nothing other than the folding of an exterior relationship of authority. These ‘penal technologies of the self’ (Garland, 1997) seek to align the freedom, choices, conduct and form of life specific to the ‘problem drug user’ with governmental and political ends. Deleuze encapsulates the immanent form of subjection such ‘penal technologies of the self’ engender when he remarks “the intentionality of being is surpassed by the fold of being…the ontology is inseparable from the fold” (Deleuze, 1988: 110). These ‘penal technologies of the self’ represent a form of subjection without an exterior which saturates the subjects being, determining his/her cognitive/behavioural...
processes. The psycho-ethical double of the offence which finds it materiality in the ‘problem drug users’ abnormal ontology must be corrected through procedures which actively seek to ‘subjectivise’ and ‘responsibilise’ the offender, rendering them a prudent subject of self interest capable of exercising a state prescribed form of freedom. Upon entry to the prison system the ‘problem drug user’ undergoes an extensive assessment from a multidisciplinary team of CARAT (counselling, assessment, referral, advice and through care) personnel composed of “drug agency staff, prison officers, health care staff and psychologists” (Kothari at el, 2002: 418). The ‘problem drug user’ is subject to a Comprehensive Substance Misuse Assessment (CSMA) which establishes the level of risk they pose. The CSMA identifies static risk factors (antecedent causal variables which are not amenable to alteration) such as offending history and levels of past drug use and also seeks to uncover dynamic risk factors related to the offenders functioning which are amenable to modification such as mental health problems or cognitive skill deficits which form the basis for subsequent intervention (Maguire, 2006). Upon completion of this risk assessment the ‘problem drug user’ will be referred by CARAT services to various other agencies operating within the prison setting which seek to manage and reduce the level of risk they pose. This will almost certainly entail a referral to a medical agency which will implement a detoxification programme in an effort to free the ‘problem drug user’ from their addiction to illicit drugs. This will render those offenders identified as having cognitive skills deficits conducive to CBT programmes and their strategy of bio-political investment which seek to ‘rationalise’ the ‘problem drug user’, thus creating a subject capable of incentivised prudentialism within ‘circuits of inclusion’. A vivid example of a CBT programme which has been utilised extensively in the process of the ‘problem drug user’s’ bio-political investment is the Reasoning and Rehabilitation Programme (R&R) introduced into the UK prison system in 1992 (Poporino and Fabiano, 2000). The R&R programme is currently delivered in 26 prisons across England and Wales (Cann et al, 2003) and consists of seventy eight hours of contact time spread over thirty eight sessions involving groups of six to twelve offenders. This programme is devised for recidivist offenders judged to be at a high risk of reoffending due to their perceived lack of rational problem solving skills and also due to the inadequacy of their ethical self-comportment (Maguire, 2006) which is thought to lead to problems concerning self control. The first aspect of the governmental enfolding of authority within this programme is concerned with grasping hold of the “material part of…I…the offender)…which is to be surrounded and enfolded” (Deleuze, 1988: 103), what Foucault has termed the “substance of the punishable element” (Foucault, 1977: 17). The ‘substance of the punishable element’ or ‘psycho-ethical double’ of the offence has been identified by the psychiatric expert at the pre-sentence stage as the materiality which power must establish an immanent relationship with and normalise the ‘problem drug users’ ontology. In order to facilitate the problem drug user in grasping hold of and manipulating their own ontology through the adoption of ‘technologies of the self’ it must first be rendered ‘knowable’ through techniques of self assessment. The technique of ‘meta-cognition’ is utilised to “help participants become steadily more aware of their own thought processes…and comprehend the links between their own thoughts, feelings and behaviour…(in order to)…appreciate the extent to which this may be self consciously managed” (Maquire, 2006: 85). This approach involves the use of ‘Socratic questioning’ in an attempt to draw out, identify and render knowable the ‘self’ which resides within the ‘problem drug user’. This ontological ‘self’ constitutes a
materiality which must be known, worked upon and transformed by the offender through practices of the ‘self’.

The second aspect of the enfolding of authority concerns what Deleuze calls the “fold of the relation between forces according to a particular rule” (Deleuze: 1988: 104). This rule is related to the ‘mode of subjectification’ and this fold constitutes the “act of enfolding proper” (Dean, 1996: 224) in which the governable subject is obligated to actualise a ‘self’ other than that which has been drawn out and rendered ‘knowable’ through ‘meta-cognitive’ technologies, a ‘self’ which has been deemed normative. The R&R programme obligates the ‘problem drug user’ to become a prudent and responsible subject, exercising ‘reflexive’ rather than ‘instinctive’ forms of conduct (Maguire, 2006), they are obligated by the psychiatrist/ ‘petty’ sovereign to become that idealised subject of advanced liberalism- homo economis.

A third aspect within the R&R programme concerning the enfolding of authority is the governing work; this refers to the ‘skills’ which are provided by the psychiatrist and which the subject is encouraged to adopt as ‘technologies of the self’ through a series of practical exercises which enfold force. The ‘problem drug user’ is thus incited to ‘subjectify’ the ‘self’ through practices of the ‘self’. These ‘technologies of the self’ recruit the problem drug user in the task of their own government enlisting them “as an agent in their own rehabilitation...(while)... assum(ing) an alignment with the self-interest of the prisoner and the governing interests of the authorities” (Garland, 1997: 191). Within the R&R programme this self forming activity entails mortification rituals which seek to install an ‘ethical despotism of the self’. Through a series of ‘moral reasoning’ and ‘values enhancement’ exercises the ‘problem drug user’ is encouraged to adopt the cognitive skill of ‘perspective taking’ (Maguire, 2006), vicariously experiencing how their problem drug use negatively impacts upon the lives of their family, friends and the victims of their drug-related offences. This practice enfolds and installs an ‘ethical despotism of the self’ which equips the subject with the ‘self-control’ necessary to transcend their ‘instinctive’ passions and desires by making the ‘ethical choice’ to abstain from drug use. The ‘problem drug user’ is also taught a series of ‘interpersonal cognitive problem-solving skills’ (ibid: 84) to enhance their capacity for means-end, self interested decision making. In ‘critical reasoning’ exercises the offender is confronted with a hypothetical situation in which they are obligated to identify potential problems to which they must generate possible solutions through practicing ‘alternative thinking’ techniques. This approach stresses the individual’s ‘responsibility’ for any course of action that might be taken (ibid). These cognitive procedures become ‘automatic’ as the governable subject develops previously unrealised capacities to “generate ideas, adopt alternate perspectives...(and)...formulate the steps necessary to solve a problem” through the adoption of these skills as ‘technologies of the self’. These newly acquired cognitive skills become habitual through continual use, with habit mediating the link between the subjects ‘unthought’ and compulsion.

The telos of government embodied within these ‘prison technologies of the self’ is the freedom of the subject. Through the bio-political investment of the ‘problem drug users’ body and soul these ‘technologies’, deployed by the ‘experts of life’ within camp, hope to produce a form of ‘being’ emancipated from the base instincts and desires to which it was once enslaved. They seek to equip the subject with the capacities and skills which are required to exercise a rational, ethical and prudent
form of autonomy (that characteristic of *homo economis*) within the ‘circuits of inclusion’ were subjects are ‘governed through freedom’. As Foucault states when depicting liberal bio-political rationality, “liberalism formulates simply the following-I am going to produce what you need to be free, I am going to see to it that you are free to be free” (Foucault, 2008: 63). This rationality extends to and underpins the bio-political production of that which is most essential to the subject’s ability to practice a state prescribed form of freedom, a ‘self’ amenable to governmental incitement and ethical/rational self government.
Conclusion

It has become apparent throughout the preceding arguments that the draconian responses of the neo-liberal state to ‘problem drug users’ in late modern Britain are precipitated by the imperviousness of this intractable population to the bio-political imperatives and governmental crime control strategies of the state. It has been shown that the epistemic shift to bio-power, a ‘regime of power’ which pursues ‘care of the living’ through the dissemination of principles derived form war, transformed the ‘war of domination’ which raged between the multiple nations and ‘races’ within the geo-political territory of the sovereign into a war of ‘normalisation and pacification’ waged by the dominant ‘race’ against all abnormality constituted within the social body. As the dominant ‘nation’, the bourgeoisie, seize the apparatus of the state and colonise and invert the partisan historcio-political discourse of the dispossessed, a form of state ‘racism’ is born which introduces a break into the domain of life between who will be forced to live and who will be allowed to die. The sovereign power of deduction is realigned to the life administering regime of bio-power, as the raison d’État of the bio-political state becomes to increase the strength and vitality of the nation and by implication the state. The bourgeoisie, who have appropriated the institutions of war, seek to become the only ‘race’ as there begins a perpetual struggle towards the universalisation of the state. The ‘problem drug user’ situated with that sub-nation at the nadir of the social strata constitutes a sub-nation who drains the biological and economic vitality and strength of the population. They have therefore become the subject of a series of militaristic interventions in the name of the life and health of the population. With the entry of life into the order of power at the threshold of the modern bio-political era these interventions are exercised at the level of life or existence. The ‘problem drug user’s’ form of life has been ‘disallowed to the point of death’ within contemporary British society as the coercive leverage of the criminal justice system has been utilised to coerce them into treatment and governmental programmes which seek to modify their very ontology.

It has been shown that the ‘problem drug user’ not only constitutes a biological and economic threat to the population but that their very form of existence poses a threat to the neo-liberal project of ‘government-at-a-distance’. Neo-liberalism, as an advanced form of ‘governmentality’, conceptualises the problem drug user as an especially dangerous subject incapable of exercising the market freedoms of late modernity in a prudent and responsible manner. Neo-liberal ‘governmentality’ views the artificial relation of competition as the driving force behind the free market and as such this necessitates a constant intervention by the state on the conditions of the market i.e. the interests, desires and aspirations of the population. This imbues the order of power with a rationality which holds that the government of the population is reliant upon the ability of the state to cultivate and shape a certain form of subjectivity or ontology amenable to incentivised manipulation by governmental power. The governmental power exercised within the neo-liberal project of ‘government-at-a-distance’ is therefore “exercised only over free subjects and only in so far as they are free” (Foucault, 1982:221). Thus *homo economicus* is the idealised subject of advanced liberalism, capable of incentivised prudentialism and ethical and rational self government within ‘circuits of inclusion’ where subjects are ‘governed through freedom’. However, the ‘problem drug user’ is un-amenable to the neo-liberal project of ‘government through freedom’ due to their pathological form of existence as they are governed by ‘instinct’ rather than ‘reason’ due to their
enslavement to illicit drugs. They are thus un-‘governmentalisable’ and non-receptive to the strategies deployed by the ‘new criminologies of everyday life’ such as situational control. Governmental power cannot reach into the ‘crimenogenic situation’ and ‘subjectivise’ a subject who is pathological rather than rational due to drug addiction.

The neo-liberal project of ‘government through freedom’ is only suitable for improved populations that have reached the maturity of their rational faculties. Neo-liberal governmentality does not assume that all populations are capable of the responsible, prudent and ethical conduct of homo-economis. Some populations such as the ‘problem drug user’ must be led to their own improvement by a good despot full of the ‘spirit of improvement’. Thus the neo-liberal state assumes the role of a benevolent despot; in order to set the ‘problem drug user’ free they must first be bound. Considered un-amenable to governance within ‘circuits of inclusion’ and also incapable of ethical and prudent self-government the ‘problem drug user’ must be ‘incapacitated’ within ‘circuits of exclusion’, usually involving prison, until the risk they pose can be rendered governable. The psychiatric expert specifies the materiality which juridical power must ‘get a hold of’ and transform in the problem drug users pre-sentence report- the psycho-ethical double of the offence which finds its materiality in the drug user’s ontology. This facilitates the production of the ‘problem drug user’s’ bare life as it enables juridical power to punish something which is not an offence but rather an aberrant form of existence. In order to transform this aberrant form of existence, through bio-political investment (previously hindered by the radical autonomy of the problem drug user) the bio-political state must first instrumentally use its sovereign power of deduction to reduce the ‘problem drug user’ to bare life. The CBT setting within the prison system is the space where the state of exception assumes a permanent spatial arrangement and is where the bare life of the problem drug user is caught in the political order but outside of the political community. Within this space which can be accurately defined as camp, sovereign power and bio-power intersect. The ‘problem drug user’, now homo sacer, is the hidden point of this intersection. Camp is the space where the ‘problem drug user’s’ intractable form of life is bio-politically invested in a neo-liberal order which cannot function without instrumentally utilising its sovereign right to reduce the potentiality of all forms of life to the universalising subject of homo-economis. Within camp the ‘experts of life’ incite the ‘problem drug user’ to modify and manipulate their own ontology by disseminating cognitive skills to be adopted as ‘technologies of the self’ through bio-political practices which ‘enfold authority’. When the ‘problem drug user’ has been ‘subjectified’ and rendered capable of incentivised responsibility and ethical and prudent self government within neo-liberal ‘circuits of inclusion’ they will be deemed eligible for release.

The appearance of camp within an advanced-liberal Britain is a sign of the growing impotence of the British state’s bio-political project. The need of the state to revert to sovereign political technologies in order to render the ‘problem drug user’ bio-politically investable is a vivid example of how radical forms of existence can reduce the immanence of modern power in relation to the biological and ontological existence of the subject to a relationship of exteriority and transcendence. This relationship at least allows for freedom, bio-political saturation of body and soul allows only for subjection without an exterior. However, the plight of the ‘problem drug user’, who refuses the specific form of life offered by the ‘experts of life’ only to
be coercively forced to accept it within camp, suggests that the bio-political regime has squared its inadequacies by utilising its ancient sovereign right of deduction to achieve its bio-political goals. The application of the ‘sovereign death function’ to the ‘problem drug user’ whose form of existence is disallowed to the point of death in advanced liberal Britain, is legitimised by the bio-political end of improving the strength and vitality of the population and shoring up the security of neo-liberal ‘circuits of inclusion’. The ‘problem drug user’ is seen as a legitimate target for such coercive treatment by the ‘symbiotic subjectivity’ of the nation and state. It is essential that future research in this area generates counter-discourses which represent the view from below and give voice to the ‘poor words’ and subjugated narratives of that dispossessed and maligned ‘other nation’ where the ‘problem drug user’ is located. These counter discourses can weaken and introduce discontinuity into the institution of state sovereignty just as the historico-political discourses of the once dispossessed bourgeoisie did at the threshold of the modern bio-political-era. The de-legitimisation and emaciation of the institution of state sovereignty will allow for the radical forms of freedom characteristic of late modernity to thrive as the hidden regulator for the inscription of life in the order- camp, will be deprived of bare life to bio-politically invest. Thus those who wished to resist the loving embrace of power would be free to do so. However, it should be noted that the ‘kings head’ can never be cut off completely. If the institution of state sovereignty where to be weakened sufficiently enough as to allow for another ‘nation’ or ‘race’ to seize control of the apparatus of the state, it is to be hoped that a society is born in which the demonic synthesis of sovereign power and bio-power is permanently dissociated.
Bibliography


