'CONTEMPORARY MARITIME PIRACY AND SECURI-CAR THEFFS: CAN LESSONS FROM THE PAST HAVE PRACTICAL IMPLICATIONS ON REDUCING FUTURE INCIDENT?'

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Abstract

Through analysing lessons from the past regarding how several notable methods of crime in transit have transpired, flourished, diminished and ceased, this dissertation seeks to discover if it is theoretically useful to create a common typology of successful crime prevention procedures that can help prevent future attacks on valuables in transit.

The two main forms of transport becoming increasingly affected by the theft of cash and valuables in transit (CVIT) today are cash-in-transit vans and international cargo ships, both inconceivably important in modern society and equally as relied upon (BSIA, 2007; IMB, 2009). With the oceans home to ‘roughly 50,000 large ships’ carrying ‘80 percent of the world's traded cargo’ (Luft and Korin, 2004) and cash-in-transit vans carrying ‘£1.4 billion in cash daily’ (Home Office, 2007) around the UK, it is evident that the problem CVIT potentially creates is astoundingly costly.

This dissertation aims to provide a resourceful tool by providing a typology and framework of promising practice to be applied to specific areas of such an escalating global crime problem. A typology of promising techniques may advance knowledge and better focus efforts in reducing the incidence of future thefts of valuables in transit, particularly with regards to maritime piracy and securi-car thefts. History has consistently uncovered a preferred method of transport for thieves to target due to a form of displacement occurring once weak targets are universally hardened, and knowing this may help society gear up for the next CVIT problem before it arrives.

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Glossary

APC – Anti-Piracy Centre
BBC – British Broadcasting Corporation
BSIA – British Security Industry Association
CIT – Cash In Transit
CVIT – Cash and Valuables In Transit
GMB – Britain’s General Union
ICC – International Chamber of Commerce
IMB – International Maritime Bureau
IMO – International Maritime Organisation
MSCHOA - Maritime Security Centre (Horn of Africa)
RNM – Royal Naval Museum
UNCLOS – United Nations Convention On Law Of The Sea
Chapter 1 - Introduction

The aim of this dissertation is to analyse the evolution of the theft and robbery and related crime reduction techniques with regards to CVIT. The project seeks to construct a common typology of effective crime prevention techniques that might assist knowledge and better focus efforts in reducing the incidence of future thefts of valuables in transit, particularly with regards to maritime piracy and securi-car thefts. The term evolution refers to social evolution within the dynamics of offending, relating specifically to the gradual development and adaptation of the theft of CVIT to a more complex form, as seen as a pattern of movements over time.

Defined simply as the theft of both cash and valuables (which may include the kidnapping of human beings in the case of piracy) when in transportation between safeguarded or protected locations, this research proposes to clearly define the most effective methods of crime reduction that can be applied today to reduce the prevalence of the theft of CVIT. In terms of historical thefts of CVIT, banditry was often acclaimed to be a driving force behind the offence, leading Hobsbawm (2003: 7) to conclude that ‘banditry simultaneously challenges the economic, social and political order by challenging those who hold or lay claim to power, law and the control of resources.’

The theft of CVIT is a crime-type of importance on a global scale, which is gathering media and criminological attention (Home Office, 2007; BSIA, 2007; GMB, 2008; BBC, 2009) and through micro level analysis of specific forms of the theft of CVIT both historically and contemporarily (Kennedy, 1990 cited in Clarke, 1992), research will be focused upon five key forms of theft in transit occurring over several centuries, all of which have demonstrated differentiating forms of crime reduction, both immediately situational and at broader policing, social and legal levels (Newark, 1979; Vallar, 2009; Siegel, 2008; BSIA, 2007).

Whilst by no means a new phenomenon, the theft of CVIT is constantly evolving and growing, as the ICC International Maritime Bureau (2009) explains. Attacks on cargo ships are at the highest level for a decade and still increasing, as the level of ‘piratical incidents reported so far in 2009 has surpassed the total number reported in 2008’, with estimates of the cost of damage anywhere between $1 billion and $16 billion per year (De Rugy, 2009). Similarly, attacks on cash-in-transit vans saw an increase of 15% to 1033 from 2005 to 2006, with a recorded loss of over £20 million (Home Office, 2007). This has seen CVIT gain much publicity in recent years on a global scale. This increasing intensification in the scale of CVIT attacks and the subsequently increasing hauls by the perpetrators fully justifies further exploration into the field of crime reduction and prevention techniques.

A further area of under researched study that the project aims to assess is that of the repeat victimisation experienced by the organisations operating CVIT today. The analysis of which can lead to the identification of crime “hot spots” (Farrell and Sousa, 2001), paramount in both the global policing of piracy (ICC International Maritime Bureau, 2009) and the national strategies aimed against theft from cash-in-transit vehicles (Home Office, 2007). These identifiable crime hot spots are tied directly to the concept of displacement,
as the theft of CVIT may merely be relocated once preventative measures are put into effect (Clarke, 1992). It is the structured analysis of historical and current theft of CVIT combined with modern criminological theories aimed at bridging a gap between what works and what doesn’t in terms of crime reduction that is, in the opinion of the proposed research, clearly missing in contemporary criminology.

This general research aim has been broken down into several sub sections in order to allow for a fully justified analysis of CVIT to be sustained. Firstly, it is important to address the situational factors influencing the choices of offenders throughout the relevant historical duration in which the theft of CVIT has occurred. To achieve this, contemporary criminological theories will be applied to try and ascertain the decision making process behind the offenders choice of target selection.

It is also imperative to establish why history has consistently uncovered a preferred method of transport for thieves to target, focusing specifically on stagecoaches, ships, transit vans and trains. Have technological advances always preceded those of security? By comparing historical records of both transport advances and the subsequent criminal targeting, the research aims to establish a clear deduction as to why this has, and still does, occur.

Finally and most pertinently, through the use of historical and modern day records, reports, studies and statistics, the research will examine what has previously been done to reduce or prevent the theft of CVIT across many different forms of transportation. Through the use of several criminological theories and practices, the research intends to find common traits and typologies that can be effectively and resourcefully implemented on future and current forms of transportation experiencing increasing rates of crime in transit.

It must however be noted that whilst this dissertation does contain reference to the most pertinent and recognisable forms of CVIT to address its purpose, it by no means intends to be a fully comprehensive and exhaustive record of all cases of CVIT throughout the relevant historical periods in which it sits.

In order for these objectives to be met, the dissertation is structured as follows:

Chapter Two presents an overview of the methodological approach adopted by the research, highlighting the utilization of and subsequent advantageous and disadvantageous aspects of implementing the sole use of secondary published literature sources.

Chapter Three provides the dissertation hypothesis that a common typology of crime preventative techniques would prove evident and further hypothesise that a timeline of criminal events could also be constructed, that history has consistently uncovered a preferred method of transport for thieves to target due to a form of displacement occurring once weak targets are hardened and new targets identified. Such hypothesis creation and subsequent testing is key, as Laycock (2010) states, increased hypothesis testing and scientific thinking is required within the sphere of Criminology in order to improve our understanding of crime and its causes.

Chapter Four examines the prevalence of historical forms of crime in transit, comprising primarily of the actions of highwaymen and pirates. This chapter serves to highlight the
pertinence of the theft of CVIT as a major criminal problem along with the motivational reasoning form offenders to commit CVIT theft and how it was subsequently overcome.

Chapter Five analyses train robberies; encompassing a vast timescale of events, ranging from the very first recorded train robbery to its near extinction a century later. This focus will provide detailed analysis of the techniques employed to prevent the robberies and also seek to distinguish as to why this method of transport was first selected by thieves.

Chapter Six will discuss the dissertation findings thus far and will begin to construct a common typology of effective crime preventative techniques and identification of common offender motivational traits.

Chapter Seven will focus on the displacement that occurred since the seemingly impenetrable target hardening implemented on trains resulted in cash in transit vans rapidly experiencing an increase in attacks. Examining both the reasons for, and methods used by perpetrators in order to extract cash and valuables from secure vans, the dissertation will then go on to analyse why the number of reported incidents are still rising.

Chapter Eight will seek to establish the current state of maritime piracy through establishing why offenders target cargo vessels. The dissertation will then go on to determine what is currently being done to prevent increasing attacks and pertinently, what more could be done to prevent the theft of CVIT.

As a result, a fully analytical and reflective conclusion will enable the dissertation to not only clearly deduce whether indeed, a common typology of crime prevention techniques could be identified, but also to make recommendations as to the most effective ways to police the theft of CVIT in the future.

Chapter 2 – Methodology

The theft of CVIT, despite being an increasingly problematic field for particular sectors of society, is by new means a new criminal practice ((Home Office, 2007; BSIA, 2007). It is due to this ‘problematic’ nature over a prolonged ‘historical’ duration in which the crime occurs that therefore necessitates a breakdown of numerous sub sections to be made in order to offer a full analysis in search of a common, shared typology of effective crime preventative techniques. This results in the most effective means of analysis relying on the use of core sources including historical reports, books and statistics, along with contemporary books, articles, media reports, statistics and criminological perspectives, all of which are secondary published literature sources. The use of primary data collection would make the collation of necessary data extremely difficult and would undermine the desired outcome, resulting in the dissertation falling short of achieving its key objectives.

The use of published research findings, other reports and criminological literature can yield many advantageous outcomes as Bachman and Schutt (2003: 259) state, “the research possibilities are almost limitless with the wealth of data already made available”, a notion particularly relevant to the research of historical events of criminality such as the theft of
CVIT, as it would be seemingly impossible to conduct any form of deep analytical research without some form of reliance upon historical records (Bachman and Schutt, 2003; Abbott, 1992).

A further clear advantage of using published sources as opposed to collecting primary data is the vast amount of information that can be processed and analysed quickly and cheaply in the given time frame set out for the proposed research (Maxfield and Babbie, 2008). Furthermore, published information contains a wealth of evidence that goes unexplored in initial analysis’ (Mullins, 2006: 41). When examined from different perspectives analysis of ‘the literature’ can provide evidence to support new hypothesis and collective evidence for the need for further enquiry.

There are however several disadvantages that must be highlighted with the sole use of secondary sources. Key to this is the issue of validity, as there is no assurance that information or statistics gathered by one researcher will seamlessly transpose to the aims of another (Maxfield and Babbie, 2008). In addition, supplementary information that may over the course of the research process become required may not be readily available, resulting in absent, unclassifiable or misclassified data (Mullins, 2006).

A further criticism of published information is that of data and information quality, particularly with regards to information obtained from the Internet. With little prior knowledge as to the credibility of an online source, this could become very problematic (Bryman, 2004). This is a clear concern for the proposed research due to it being a key area to locate historical and international records and statistics. In order to minimise and potentially exclude the probability of this happening, the research will take advantage primarily of widely recognised, credible sources. Through careful selection of credible sources, the research will also be supplemented with the most up to date and accurate records available.

It must also be noted that in order to achieve the outlaid objectives of the following dissertation, such a research proposal would necessitate the incorporation of numerous fields of study, as Liggett et al (2004: 139) state ‘There is nothing more wicked than crime. We would argue that our field could better conceptualize wicked problems if it integrates and utilizes knowledge from other fields.’ The outcome of this therefore results in an interdisciplinary approach being adopted in order to best understand the theft of CVIT. Due to countless articles related the theft of CVIT falling within the sphere of journalistic articles, historic records and historical biographies of banditry, every effort must be made to ensure that only the most relevant criminal elements will be utilized within the dissertation. As Hobbs (2000 cited in Killenspey, 2009: 21) states ‘we are dependent upon biographies, autobiographies and true crime books for an insight into the motives of professional criminals.’

Furthermore, it is this historical context that offers contemporary criminological solutions to reoccurring problems within the criminal sphere, as Tierney (2006: 2) states, ‘the main concerns and general shape of criminology as it has developed over the years cannot be understood without the context provided by history.’ Further to this, as Lea (2006) states, ‘history of course is of immense value itself and needs no justification in terms of any other discipline. The distinction between past and present is a relative one.’

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Therefore through careful selection of secondary published literature from a variety of disciplines, this dissertation can further knowledge and understanding surrounding the complex issue of the theft of CVIT on a global scale.

Chapter 3 – Hypothesis

The theft of cash and valuables in transit has historically always been a problem and has existed since the means by which the transportation of goods has existed (Wilczynski, 2008), and it has long been recognized that the more successful robbers, in terms of maximizing the financial rewards, are those that tackle the more risky targets (Einstader, 1969 and Roebuck, 1967 cited in Gill, 2001: 279). It is these postulations of risk reward ratios (Gill, 2001), along with proven statistical rates of CVIT theft increases and decreases over a longitudinal period of time that have therefore allowed the dissertation to make several key hypotheses that shall be tested during the investigative process. Such testing of hypotheses is key to improving our understanding of crime and its causes, as through an increasingly scientific approach being adopted and hypotheses being tested at every stage of investigation, existing knowledge of effective crime preventative procedures can be markedly improved (Laycock, 2010).

Firstly, a common typology of effectively implemented crime preventative techniques will prove evident both historically and contemporarily, something that the dissertation will exemplify during its recommendations for reducing the future incidence of the theft of CVIT.

Secondly, a timeline of seemingly transpositional criminal target selection will appear evident due to history consistently uncovering a preferred method of transportation for thieves to target. This will occur due to a form of displacement occurring once one form of transport is universally target hardened, resulting in a reduction in the repeat victimization and a change in the crime hot spots that have dependably blighted the act of transporting cash and valuables.

Finally, the dissertation asserts that an ‘experienceable crime’ hypothesis may prove evident throughout the relevant history of CVIT thefts discussed within. Through individuals exercising legitimately acquired knowledge and skills from previous jobs or life experiences in order to commit the theft of CVIT, it is hypothesised that lawful members of society turn their skills to fund a criminal career following the loss of social and financial support from the legitimate world.

The accurate testing of any hypothesis and its subsequent informative make-up is, as Popper (1959) states, essential. ‘Popper proposed an alternative scientific method based on falsification. However many confirming instances there are for a theory, it only takes one counter observation to falsify it’ (Philosophy Org cited in Sutton, 2010). It is by this reasoning that the dissertation will not seek to make any false claims of success or proven findings, as due to various time, financial and lack of suitable available resource constraints, this work is indented solely as an assertion of fact reinforced by relevant

Chapter 4 – Historical Crime In Transit

Historical Piracy

The theft of CVIT has been a plague to society for as long as goods have been transported between locations (Vallar, 2009). A key form of this historically was that of maritime piracy. Considered one of the oldest professions, piracy began soon after people first used water to carry trade goods from one place to another (Vallar, 2009). With the first recorded instances of its occurrence dated 1350BC, this primitive theft of CVIT took place on newly established trading routes rife with luxury goods that the pirates themselves could not otherwise gain access too (Vallar, 2009). This criminal practice continued relatively unchallenged and unchanged for centuries to come until the approaching end of the seventeenth century, when the act of piracy saw a drastic rise in its occurrence (Vallar, 2003). Key to this was the new found peace that had come to Europe, resulting in the privateers previously employed by warring nations throughout Europe, along with naval seamen finding themselves without jobs (Vallar, 2003). This problem was once again a predominant factor when in 1714, following the end of the war of the Spanish Succession, many Dutch and English privateers also turned to piracy rather than accepting a less affluent life as a sailor on a merchant ship (Wilson, 2006: 3). This saw the ‘golden age’ of piracy begin with ‘the greatest upswing in piracy ever’ (Vallar, 2003), lasting approximately 40 years, resulting in many of the now defunct privateers turning to piracy and many themselves becoming ‘legends in their own time’ (Vallar, 2003) rather than facing poverty, often only plundering ordinary supplies to survive, as Hobsbawm (2003: 9) states, banditry on the whole often ‘is about class, wealth and power in peasant societies’, as ‘it is often better to break the law than to starve to death’ (Hobsbawm, 2003: 10). Through individuals exercising legitimately acquired knowledge and skills from previous jobs or life experiences in order to commit the theft of CVIT, the dissertation can hypothesise a form of ‘experienceable crime’ may occur when previously employed, legitimate members of society turn their skills to fund a criminal career following the loss of social and financial support from the legitimate world.

Due to the maritime knowledge of the former privateers and seamen, piracy came very easily to the daring. Utilising fast, powerful boats, pirates vitally relied upon surprising the merchant ships (RNM, 2002). This prior knowledge held by the offenders is key to the successful accomplishment of the theft of CVIT, as such assisted knowledge based on former practices results in a thorough understanding of the weaknesses of targeted transportation and subsequently, how to overcome them.

Pirates used a multitude of modus operandi in order to overcome or, preferably, force surrender from merchant vessels and these included grappling hooks, pistols, daggers and homemade grenades (RNM, 2002). Piracy preventative measures at an immediately practical level included greased and glass covered decks in order to try and prevent the thieves from boarding the vessel (RNM, 2002).
Broader levels of crime prevention resulting in the demise of the ‘golden age’ of piracy came as globally, nations finally responded to the threat of piracy. Around 1730, America’s coastal colonies became more able to defend themselves (Wilson, 2006: 5) and newly introduced international piracy laws resulted in an increased military presence in piracy hot spots, such as those in the Caribbean and North American Coasts (Krystek, 1998). This understanding where and how piracy was growing was key to its demise, as Clarke (1980: 159) states, ‘conventional wisdom holds that crime prevention needs to be based on a thorough understanding of the causes of crime.’ Further to this, as Bouloukos and Farrell (1997: 219) state, it was this element of rationality practised by the pirates that gave the repeat victimisation experienced by victims ‘predictability, facilitating its prevention.’

One of the single most significant steps at reducing piracy was taken by parliament in 1721, striking at the root of the crime it forbid anybody knowingly trading with pirates at penalty of death, a crime prevention technique that has shown to be significantly effective for centuries (Prassel, 1996: 35). This idea is key to the notion of situational crime prevention, as through increasing the perceived risks and effort and reducing the rewards associated with the crime opportunity, the perceived costs outweigh the perceived gains and thus offender participation will subsequently decrease over time (Wortley, 1997: 65). Perhaps the greatest step toward reducing piracy, however, came in the form of increased risk of detection and thus capture of those practicing piracy, as Brantingham and Faust (1976 cited in Lab, 1992: 11) state, effective crime prevention ‘identifies conditions of the physical and social environment that provide opportunities for or precipitate criminal acts’. Such identification of areas most likely to be targeted, as occurred consistently from 1730 onwards with the increased presence of international navies in piracy hot spots (Krystek, 1998) resulted in an internationally collaborative crackdown on piracy, thus far increasing the likelihood of facing capture, something that has consistently shown to be an effective crime preventative tool (Tilley, 2009: 44). This transpired along side the afore mentioned increased penalties for those practising or liaising with piracy, resulting in an increased likelihood of capture and specific deterrence for those who were captured (Tilley, 2009: 29).

Such intensification in the use of military navies around known piracy hot spots, such as those in the Caribbean and North Americas resulted in a large pool of skilled seamen being recruited, many of whom were let go some years before. The practice of recruiting those tempted by or engaged in piracy was also key to reducing the prevalence of piracy as in terms of situational crime prevention, through tackling the root motivational causes of crime and increasing ‘social’ measures, such as increasing job opportunities, this has consistently shown to be an effective crime reduction tool (Clarke, 1980: 159) which led to organised piracy and privateering finally ending in the nineteenth century. Pertinently, the majority of maritime nations signed the declaration of Paris in 1856, outlawing privateering for good (RNM, 2002), a factor that Lab (1992: 116) cites as consistently providing a reduction in crime rates, as the universal condemning of a particular crime and thus increased universal tackling of it sees the ‘increased certainty of apprehension and punishment resulting in reduced offending.’ This international cooperation resulted in effective tackling of piracy, as Young (2007: 89) states ‘International co-operation was and still is an important element of Westphalian states in curbing piracy...historically when
international relations between colonial powers in the region were non-cooperative due to economic and political competition with each other, piracy had room to operate.’

**Highway Robberies**

Highwaymen thrived in England during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, actively committing the theft of CVIT predominantly between 1650 and 1800. Travel by road was already treacherous at the time and ‘nobody travelled alone without fear of being robbed’, resulting in the hiring of guards or escorts (SAD, 2009).

The origins of many highwaymen lies in the aftermath of the English civil wars, with many royalist officers ruined and becoming second class citizens, left with little or no resources by which to survive, these cavalrymen would pave the way for a new breed of thief, those who took to the road, setting the standard for centuries to come (Contemplator, 2002; SAD, 2009). Such causational factors further support the ‘experienceable crime’ hypothesis set by the dissertation, as once again, previously legitimate members of society turn their legitimately acquired skills and knowledge to fund a criminal career following the loss of social and financial support from the legitimate world.

With the advent of the public stagecoach in 1658, the highwaymen had found a new target. Proving an easier target than existing targeted mail coaches, which gradually developed greater target hardening capabilities with sworded capable guardians and faster rates of travel, new stagecoaches housed only wealthy travellers with very little protection (SAD, 2009), paving the way for crime displacement from one potential target to another (Lab, 1992: 67). This advent in new transportation with lack of suitable capable guardians was key to the prevalence of such theft of CVIT, as Newman (1997: 4) notes, ‘the situation is seen as the primary agent in crime causation’. As Eck (1993 cited in Newman et al, 1997: 223) notes, ‘displacement is most likely to occur in the direction of familiar places, times, targets and behaviours’, something that clearly occurred with regards to highway robberies. Further reinforcement of such criminal activity lay in the fact that the highwaymen had developed a greater level of attack than the stagecoaches could provide by way of protection, as they were already familiar with the use of pistols, something that the victims, armed merely with swords could not compete with (SAD, 2009), thus the technological advances of the time favoured the thieves rather than the victims.

Highway robberies maintained their prominence for well over a century until the second half of the eighteenth century, all but ceasing to occur from approximately 1815 onward (Spraggs, 2007). This demise of highway robberies is attributed to being caused by the establishment of the horse patrol around London in 1805, particularly in hot spots such as Hounslow Heath and the Great North Road. This was furthered when the Metropolitan Police was founded in 1829, and despite minor pockets of highwaymen still practising the theft of CVIT, the increase in paid police officers led to the eventual passing of the highwayman (Contemplator, 2002). Through increased detection of the highwaymen through police presence, some 250 highwaymen were tried and hanged between 1749 and
1771, many of whom were only associates of the thieves, a clear deterrent for anybody tempted to engage in the theft of CVIT at the time (Prassel, 2006: 50). This is key to the prevention of highway robberies, as individuals ‘can be deterred by environmental changes to reduce criminal opportunities’ (Newman et al., 1997: 7) and as Andenaes (1975 cited in Lab, 1992: 101) states, ‘the likelihood of deterrence increases as the risk of punishment increases’, a factor clearly evident within the realm of highway robberies.

Further factors such as the increased usage of banknotes, more traceable than gold coins, made life for the robbers increasingly difficult, an immediately situational crime preventative technique (Spraggs, 2001: 234; Ekblom, 2005: 206) with a lasting effect on the rates of CVIT theft at the time.

The highwaymen had met his end, but the theft of CVIT had seen a displacement in its concentration. As Prassel (2006: 53) states, ‘crime remained, but it took new forms in reaction to new technology’, ‘fast trains appeared…stagecoaches and carriages no longer held great attraction, so highwaymen moved onto other things.’ Therefore, this displacement from the now primitive, but increasingly and more importantly, universally, hardened stagecoaches led to a reinsurgence of CVIT theft on the newly implemented and therefore, under protected, train network (Prassel, 2006). As Woodley (2010) states, although the painstaking development of the stagecoach took centuries, it all but died off immediately with the arrival of the train, as did the target selection of would be thieves of CVIT.

Chapter 5 – Train Robberies

Following the demise of the stagecoach, the first rail lines began to open around 1825, with a further wait of 8 years until passengers were able to be carried. Over a ten year period, parliament agreed to the building of 54 new rail lines, leading to 22,000 miles of track established by 1900 within the UK (HLS, 2010). A similar situation in the United States, by 1830 only 39.8 miles of track had been established, 10 years later 2,755 miles of track had been laid, and by 1880, 87,801 miles of track was in regular use (US Census Bureau, 1880: 308), thanks to the increasing production and therefore transportation of desired resources such as iron, silver and gold, potentially tempting targets for those with the capabilities of committing the theft of such valuables in transit (LOG, 1996a).

The rapid increase in the rail system invariably led to the introduction of a new wave of the theft of CVIT, as Michelson (1902) noted at the time, ‘the highwayman of the railroad has taken the place of the old time footpad’, with the first recorded incidence, the Great Gold robbery, occurring in England in 1855 (IIGI, 2008: 91; Prassel, 1996: 112). Involving the theft of £12,000 worth of gold bullion, the robbers showed great cunning and intelligence in their approach to overcoming the current day crime preventative measures in place. Overcoming double locked safes and guarded escorts, the thieves showed a greater knowledge of the current technological practices in place at the time, copying keys and familiarising themselves with the rail network routine procedures, thus indeed the thieves practiced a more advanced modus operandi than was currently installed in order to defend the target itself (Evans, 1859: 491).
Despite the mild frequency of train robberies taking place on a global scale following the introduction of the railway system, the height of the theft of CVIT from trains was centred around the mid-west states of the United States (Prassel, 1996: 112), which will therefore see the dissertation highlighting the subsequent crime reduction techniques employed in this area, which in turn perpetuated similar responses world wide (Prassel, 1996). The first recorded train robbery in the United States took place in 1866 with the notorious Reno Gang commencing what would soon to be a highly replicated criminal act. Utilising brute force and brandishing weaponry currently not carried onboard the rail network by hired escorts, this set the stage for a series of repeat attacks on the rail network, as within two weeks, two more trains were derailed and robbed of their valuable cargo (LOG, 1996b). ‘Between 1865 and 1930 train robberies were a significant problem for American railroads, express companies, law enforcement agencies, and rail passengers’ (Ruddell and Decker, 2009: 1).

**Why Engage In Train Robberies?**

As Weiser (2006) notes ‘During the years after the Civil War, much of the nation suffered a period of unemployment and lawlessness, spawning a number of notorious desperadoes and outlaw gangs.’ Just as history has uncovered in the cases of piracy and highway robberies, an era of depression and economic or political downturn will spur the desperate into committing criminal acts: Under protected and unguarded, the art of the train robbery was born out of the criminal outlaws desire to obtain maximum reward for the smallest perceived effort and potential danger (Newman et al, 1997). This once again, as in the cases of historical piracy and highway robberies, supports the dissertation ‘experienceable crime’ hypothesis, that learnt knowledge and skills from previously legitimate avenues, military training in the case of train robberies, may be once again turned to commit illicit acts of CVIT theft in order to survive. A new phenomenon in 1866, one of the major practitioners of such an act, Jesse James, first learned of ‘the latest science in outlawry’ from sourced reports by an ex-con doing time with John Reno, part of the infamous Reno gang responsible for introducing train robberies to the USA (Horan and Dullenty, 1997: 77). Such perceived ‘effort and threat’ was a direct correlative of the current preventative procedures put in place at the time, as Woodbury (1997) notes, ‘They would have robbed a bank, but at that time, there were more trains than banks.’ Towards the end of the nineteenth century, those engaged in the theft of CVIT from trains perceived them an easy target to rob due to the decentralisation of law enforcement at the time, enabling easy getaways over state or county lines and at a more immediate level, security arrangements on the trains themselves were minimal (Siegel, 2008: 347).

**Target Hardening**

Facing spiralling attacks from thieves, the railroads and express companies engaged numerous crime preventative means in order to stop the robbers, drastically increasing the target hardening capabilities of the trains. These included carefully selected officers standing by to travel to the site of hold-ups in order to take up chase of the robbers on fast horses, this technique was often coupled with the use of experienced trackers hot on the bandits trail (Prassel, 1996: 112). Despite the increased police response to the theft of CVIT from trains, it was in fact a multitude of differentiating factors that led to the eventual
demise of the train robbery; as travellers cheques increasingly replaced that of transported money and the rapid growth in telephone systems led to better communication between the agencies involved in reducing the theft of CVIT. A vast form of target hardening was also implemented on the trains themselves, with fast mail trains replacing the previouslypregnable and vulnerable express carriages (Prassel, 1996: 114). Key to the demise of train robberies was also the passing of the Federal Train Robbery Act by the American congress in 1902, making the entry of railway cars to commit murder or robbery a federal offence (Prassel, 1996: 114).

Opportunity Reduction

The target hardening features implemented onboard the trains included the placing of plain clothed, private detectives onboard along with stalls and ramps for horses to enable the immediate pursuit of bandits. Such federal involvement ‘extended the ability of law enforcement beyond the state or county border and this saw a decline from 29 robberies in 1900 to 7 in 1905, and by 1920 all but disappeared’ (Siegel, 2008: 347), due to having been captured, killed or no longer operating due to the frustrating new crime preventative measures in place (LOG, 1996b) which as, Tilley (2009: 44) showed, through increasing the risk of capture along with increasingly punitive punishments, a form of specific deterrence occurred. This transpired along side the increasingly collaborative crackdown on train robberies by federal agencies, which drastically increased the likelihood of capture, something that has consistently been shown to be an effective crime preventative procedure (Tilley, 2009: 44).

Contemporary Responses To Train Robbery

Contemporary train prevention techniques have built upon those established in the past, as today, an urban bypass by network design is in place in many locations, seen notably around Paris, trains bypass local poor suburbs where carriages holding tourists and wealthy business men travel, in an attempt to curb contemporary forms of train robberies (Graham and Marvin, 2001:367). Similar travel restrictions for public transport can be seen throughout the UK, as taxis and buses often avoid known trouble spots and routes, particularly at night in known crime hot spot urban areas (HSE, 2008). In addition to this, dedicated task forces are in place, such as the TOMCATS in the USA (RIN, 2003), and the BTP across the UK (BTP, 2008). Further to this, contemporary solutions to the theft of CVIT include security systems including fencing, lighting, sensors and CCTV on the more vulnerable aspects of the rail networks (Gough, 1977). This was furthered when, following September 11th, the rail industry as a whole increased ‘a security plan that matches intelligence community best practices’ (Smith, 2004). Such increased security measures included augmented use of web security, ‘limited access to railcar location data, employee identification checks, increased tracking and inspection of selected shipments, new encryption technology for sensitive data communication, better security for physical assets, and more employee training’ (Smith, 2004).
This dissertation has so far shown several notable key attributes to the contributing factors of the theft of CVIT in the past. Predominantly, it is evident that a period of social, economic or political turmoil has always been a precursor to the inauguration of new forms of the theft of CVIT (Vallar, 2003; Wilson, 2006: 3; Hobbs, 2003: 10; Contemplator, 2002; SAD, 2009; Weiser, 2006). A direct result of such a lack of power, wealth and resources, whether it be longitudinal or a sudden demise, sees those most desperate turning to crime in order to survive. This ‘turn’ to crime therefore sees the thieves exploit new, or severely under policed, unguarded and vulnerable targets, offering high reward for the perceived minimal amount of effort. Further to this, as in the case of piracy and highwaymen, an existing knowledge through previous practice of the current technological advances sees the thieves command a stark advantage over the target choice and subsequently the current crime preventative measures utilised to protect it (Wilson, 2006: 3; RNM, 2002; SAD, 2009). It is only when the eventual crime preventative measures implemented throughout the targeted transportation surpass those of the thieves and are at a constant enough level as to be consistently managed throughout the entirety of the journey, that eventually will see a reduction in the overall levels of the theft of CVIT (RNM, 2002; Contemplator, 2002; Prassel, 2006: 50; Siegel, 2008: 347; LOG, 1996b). Further to these immediately situational crime preventative measures, history has also dictated that wider, social level aspects prove to be just as effective at reducing the incidence of CVIT theft (Prassel, 1996: 114; Wilson, 2006: 5; Krystek, 1998). Thus, tough laws banishing the intent to commit, actually committing, or liaising with those who do commit CVIT thefts have consistently shown reasonably effective results in reducing the levels of prevalence, through a practice of reducing the frequency of outsider involvement, the thieves become increasingly isolated in their crimes (Prassel, 1996: 35) when combined with an increased risk of detection and capture (Tilley, 2009: 44). Through identification of physical and social environments that may provide criminal opportunities, an increased collaborative response by numerous agencies has resulted in a crackdown on those committing CVIT thefts throughout history, thus far increasing the likelihood of capture (Brantingham and Faust, 1976 cited in Lab, 1992: 11; Tilley, 2009: 44). Such increase in the perceived risk of capture has therefore been shown to be the biggest crime preventative mechanism for reducing the theft of CVIT throughout history.

The dissertation has also been able to construct an ‘experienceable crime’ hypothesis stating that history has continually shown that those who identify new forms of vulnerable transport to rob often utilize legitimately acquired knowledge and skills from previous lawful job or life experiences to commit illicit forms of CVIT theft in order to survive.

**Chapter 6 - Cash In Transit Vans**

Contemporarily, the rate of CVIT robberies from cash in transit (CIT) vans is increasing. As ‘in the first ten months of 2009 there were 911 of these offences in the UK, 15 per cent more than the 791 in the same period in 2008’ (Security Park, 2009). Such an increase saw the Home Office acknowledge that indeed, the last few years have seen a ‘steady but worrying’ increase in CVIT crime (Home Office, 2007a). This increase is particularly worrying for several reasons, notably as ‘76% of Cash & Valuables in Transit (CVIT)
attacks recorded in the EU occur in the UK’ (GMB, 2008). Due to the fact that approximately £1.4 billion in cash is moved daily around the UK in approximately 4,500 vehicles making some 100,000 deliveries and pick ups, the problem that CVIT theft potentially causes is enormous (Home Office, 2007a; BSIA, 2005). The problem CVIT theft creates is increased considering that the amount of actual cash in circulation (despite the burgeoning use of charge and credit cards) stands at some £35 billion, representing the highest amount to date, leading forecasters to predict an increase still over the next six years, increasing not only the frequency of deliveries, but also the financial loads that each courier must carry, leading to far higher levels of risk when transporting cash (BSIA, 2005).

Such an increase in attack frequencies has been consistent for several consecutive years now, as the GMB (2008) show, ‘there were 836 attacks in 2005 up from the 763 in 2004, itself an increase on the 697 attacks in 2003.’ With a total of 2,295 attacks over the three year period, 447 crew members were injured, 58 of them seriously, and on 700 occasions a firearm was present at the time of the robbery. Often subject to attacks with blunt objects such as iron bars, machetes, knives and firearms, the incidence of CVIT theft can often result in not only a physical threat to the guards but also a mental one (GMB, 2008). As Stephen Roberts, the British Retail Consortium Director states, ‘this is retail crime at its most extreme. It often has devastating consequences for those involved and their families – long lasting trauma, permanent disability and occasionally even death’ (Security Park, 2009).

Providing a crucially important public service that the modern society relies deeply upon in order to maintain a consistent high street economy, the industry is in real danger of not being able to commit to such a dedicated task of redistributing cash at an appropriate rate due to the threat of attack (BSIA, 2005). As a sector spending some £120 million annually on armoured vehicles and a further £20 million on security training and tactical support, there are still several key issues which must be addressed in order to curb the spiralling threat posed to the CVIT industry in the UK (BSIA, 2005). As the Home Office (2007a) notes, ‘more needs to be done to reduce the vulnerability of delivery personnel, to reduce the benefits to the offender, to catch and convict more criminals, and to protect our communities.’ With clear crime hot spots identifiable within the Greater Manchester, West Midlands and Metropolitan Police jurisdictions, accounting for almost 50% of all CVIT attacks (See Appendix A), the immediate crime prevention tools must be predominantly targeted in such areas, as well as an industry on the whole (Home Office, 2007a), much the same as has always occurred historically in order to reduce and prevent CVIT thefts, as the dissertation has shown. Such a failure to implement consistent preventative procedures across the industry as a whole will merely lead to a displacement of such crimes to further unpoliced areas, as the Home Office (2007a) have already shown is occurring around Manchester, with the Greater Manchester Police reporting a 13.5% reduction in CVIT thefts between 2004 and 2005, despite CVIT robberies increasing substantially over the two years.

Why Target CIT Vans?

A study by Gill (2001: 281) found that through a study of 47 convicted CIT van robbers, the principal attraction lay in the freedom that arose from robbing a van in the open, thus
reducing the risks of being trapped and increasing the range of the offenders target selection to areas more secluded than others. This is key considering that a wealth of research suggests that target selection is often closely linked with its location (Gill, 2001: 281; Robertson and Potchak, 2002). CVIT thieves, as it has been shown thus far, are highly reasoning offenders, as Cornish and Clarke (1986 cited in Gill, 2001: 287) show, they often demonstrate an understanding of the main risks involved, and subsequently have ideas on how these risks can be managed, and moreover, ‘they are often prepared to use violence to ensure they achieve their objectives.’

**Target Hardening**

Therefore, in order to overcome the ‘risk management’ strategies employed by criminals, there are currently numerous crime preventative procedures in place to help reduce the prevalence of thefts from CIT vans. At an immediately situational level, the secure CIT vans used today utilize state of the art ‘ballistic and anti-ram protection’ and are ‘fully equipped with one person entry-exit system, controlled cash transfer unit, storage lockers, emergency escape routes…onboard computer control, biometric access control, weight sensing plus siren alarm and anti hi-jack systems’ (Penman, 2009). In addition to the vehicular transportation technology made available, cash case technology is also a prominent factor in the situational crime prevention technology currently adopted, this is particularly important as the BSIA (2005) show that in 2004, 66% of all CIT robberies occurred when the cash was in transit between the vehicle and destination. Such case technology includes the release of an indelible dye upon attempted access to contents. Further to this, access to the cases is regulated by state of the art electronic key technology (Gehrer Sharp, 2006).

**Opportunity Reduction**

In order to achieve the goal of an overall drop in CVIT thefts, the immediately situational preventative implementations are backed up by a wider plan of action by local authorities tasked with the policing of the secure transfer of cash. Such a plan of action is delivered primarily through the CVIT reduction delivery plan introduced in 2007, including pledges from all key stakeholders involved within the CVIT market; the British Bankers Association, the GMB trade union, the British Security Industry Association, the Security Industry Authority and the Association of Chief Police Officers (BSIA, 2010). Key to this was the involvement of the key organisations running and policing CVIT today identifying what ‘target hardening’ technological improvements are available and how these can be implemented, particularly in CVIT theft hot spot locations (Home Office, 2007b). Therefore through careful identification of the current CVIT robbery hot spots, a reduction in delivery pattern predictability coupled with increased policing and police community support officer presence during cash deliveries is aimed at reducing the incidence of CVIT thefts throughout the UK (Home Office, 2007b). Further to this, the joint CVIT reduction plan aims to, through focusing on reported crime levels, place a particular focus on the repeat victimisation experienced by those within the CVIT industry. It also noted the importance of ensuring the appropriate risk assessments and prevention measures are in place throughout the CVIT industry as a whole (Home Office, 2007a), something that the
dissertation found through its analysis of effective preventative procedures implemented throughout history. This increase in police presence around CVIT deliveries is being implemented throughout the UK currently, notably as can be seen by the Leicester Constabulary who run the ‘Follow That Van’ operation which sees police trailing CIT vans through theft hot spots in order to ensure safe deliveries are made (Klein, 2007). Further similar plans include Operation Matrix as utilised by the Merseyside Police, Operation Vanguard as used by the Metropolitan Police and Operation Liaison as seen by the Greater Manchester Police (BSIA, 2008a).

**Sentencing**

In addition to the policing strategies used to attempt to curb the prevalence of CVIT thefts, the criminal justice system has also responded with Crown Court judges actively raising awareness of the importance of CVIT crime, calling for sentences to reflect the seriousness of the crimes committed. Such a decision has been upheld by the criminal justice system as a whole, as through the increasing numbers of arrests made in recent years, lengthy, exemplary sentences have been issued as a deterrent for more to engage in CVIT related crime (BSIA, 2008a).

Following the implementation of the CVIT reduction charter, the BSIA (2008b) reported that the proactive partnership between the multiple agencies involved was beginning to produce results. With the first six months of 2008 showing a 29% decrease on the same months of the previous year and a 20% decrease since the partnership initiative was first introduced (BSIA, 2008b). However, such a reduction in the rate of CVIT thefts was short lived, as the latest figures show, (Security Park, 2009), CVIT saw a rapid increase in its rates of occurrence once again in 2009.

**What More Could Be Done To Reduce The Incidence Of CIT Theft?**

Predominantly, the key issue has been one of contradiction; as a direct failure to adhere to crime prevention advice as set out in the CVIT delivery plan has been evident. As the BSIA (2005) have shown in their Cardiff Study, with a restriction on the times CIT vans can enter high streets throughout the day, a clear lack of variety in delivery times and routes becomes evident, increasing the predictability for thieves to target CIT vehicles. Furthermore, if CIT vehicles must park some distance away from their delivery destination, there is a greater threat posed to the guards, as can be seen in 2004 where 66% of all CIT robberies occurred when the cash was in transit between the vehicle and destination (BSIA, 2005). This is a major factor as the high financial investment and police resource investment may be put at risk by ‘extended exposure of cash and people to (often much) longer deliveries on foot, caused solely by parking restrictions’ (BSIA, 2005).

Therefore, in order to truly reduce the incidence of CVIT thefts, it must be speculated that the criminals desire to illicitly gain the CVIT will remain constant, therefore a clear emphasis must be put on the reducing the chances for them to do so (BSIA, 2008b). Where such preventative measures cannot be effectively implemented however, increased chances
of identification through increasing the level of police surveillance in such ‘hot spot’ areas along with the CJS taking a tougher stance on the sentencing of those convicted would act as a strong deterrent for those willing to engage in CVIT thefts along with a greater perceived risk of capture by the criminals (Tilley, 2009: 44).

Clear improvements therefore must be made to remove the parking limit restrictions pushing CIT vans away from the destination, greater use of CCTV and police surveillance in recognise hot spots, safe areas for the transfer and collection of cash and finally dedicated police resources aimed at tackling the criminals behind the majority of CVIT attacks within the UK (GMB, 2006).

**Chapter 7 - Contemporary Maritime Piracy**

Contemporary maritime piracy has resulted in a vast resurgence in the rate of attacks on ships, namely international cargo vessels throughout the world at present, and although targeted primarily in several geographical hot spots, this figure is an increasingly alarming one (Luft and Korin, 2004). Maritime piracy is defined by The International Maritime Bureau (IMB) as ‘the act of boarding any vessel with an intent to commit theft or any other crime, and with an intent or capacity to use force in furtherance of that act’ (London P&I Club, 2009: 1), and more notably through the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (United Nations, 1982) which sees maritime piracy defined as ‘any illegal acts of violence or detention, or any act of depredation, committed for private ends by the crew or the passengers of a private ship or a private aircraft, and directed on the high seas, against another ship or aircraft, or against persons or property onboard such ship or aircraft’ or ‘against a ship, aircraft, persons or property in a place outside the jurisdiction of any state.’

The escalating global problem of piracy has tripled in the last decade and shows no signs of stopping, a hugely problematic factor considering that the oceans are currently home to ‘roughly 50,000 large ships carrying 80 percent of the worlds traded cargo’ (Luft and Korin, 2004). This is furthered by the IMB (2009) who state that attacks on cargo ships are at the highest level for a decade and still increasing as the level of ‘piratical incidents reported so far in 2009 has surpassed the total number reported in 2008’, with estimates of the cost of damage anywhere between $1 billion and $16 billion per year (De Rugy, 2009). Further to this, as Chiarugi and Archibugi (2009) have shown, there is a large imbalance between the amount of money Somali pirates have actually gained through piracy (estimated at approximately 60 million dollars in 2008) and the estimated billions of dollars worth of damage that they have actually caused. In addition to the financial losses caused by maritime piracy, the risk to those onboard vessels is increasingly perilous, as in the first 9 months of 2009 114 vessels were boarded, 34 hijacked, 88 fired upon, 661 hostages taken, 12 crew members kidnapped, 6 killed and 8 still missing’ (IMB, 2009). This corresponded with a 200% increase in the number of firearms used, as the IMB (2008) state, the reward ratio for pirates, particularly Somalian pirates is so high that only increased naval and military intervention will reduce this.
With the identification of several notable piracy hot spots on a global scale, predominantly lying on the coasts of the South East Asian and Indian Sub Continent and the coasts of Africa and the Gulf of Aden, most notably off the coast of Somalia (CCS, 2009a), (See Appendix B), Chiarugi and Archibugi (2009) site this as a result of three key factors: ‘The failure of the Somali state, the difficulty of coming up with an effective response, and the structural weakness of merchant vessels.’

**Why Target Cargo Vessels?**

Predominantly, the problem of piracy stems from the illicit money gained recognised as being the most financially viable means of survival for many, something Johnson and Pladdet (2003: 9) note with their equation of piracy resembling that of banditry, increasing during times of financial and political instability. This line of reasoning was also shown by Hobsbawn (2003: 35) who states that ‘the first and probably the most important source of bandits is in those forms of rural economy or rural environment which have relatively small labour demands, or which are too poor to employ all their able bodied men.’ This line of theory can be seen in practice as Dillon (2000) shows in reference to piracy in Southeast Asia, noting that the recent increase in piratical incidents in the area is a result of the Asian financial crisis and political instability predominantly in Indonesia and Thailand, leading to the unemployment of thousands. Further to this, it has also been shown that similar problems in Somalia, notably a lack of central government and thus health and welfare structures in a country engaged in a civil war for over two decades and with an average age of 17 have led to widespread engagement in piracy (BBC, 2009; Chiarugi and Archibugi, 2009).

Therefore, such a lack of means necessitating the need to engage in illicit ventures in countries with a lack of natural or financial sources to exploit has seen the thieves target passing cargo vessels (Chiarugi and Archibugi, 2009). This social and economic situation further validates the dissertation ‘experienceable crime’ hypothesis that previously learnt legitimate skills, most notably fishing in the case of contemporary piracy, are utilised by those facing social and economic ruin in order to commit the theft of CVIT and sustain a viable income. This targeting of international cargo vessels was chosen particularly due to their vulnerability, as many ships are not armed due to ship owners not being willing to shoulder the cost of hiring mercenaries on board their vessels, although the practice of placing armed mercenaries on board cargo vessels is increasingly occurring globally (Chiarugi and Archibugi, 2009). Such practice therefore sees the act of piracy as a one-sided affair, with the pirates easily overcoming the on-board preventative measures in place on many occasions.

**How Do Pirates Attack Cargo Vessels?**

Making use of technological advances in communication, weaponry and navigation, many contemporary pirates use sophisticated means of detection (IMB, 2009; Wilson, 2006; Jones, 2009). Pirates often board vessels after monitoring port communications so as to establish the best targets to select and through use of satellite navigation, are able to approach the large vessels relatively unnoticed at high speed (Wilson, 2006). Upon approaching the vessels, the pirates often fire automatic weapons and rocket propelled grenades in order to try and succumb the ship to surrendering peacefully (IMB, 2009).
Then through use of ladders and grappling hooks the pirates board the ships brandishing copious amounts of heavy firepower (Wilson, 2006), often including automatic weaponry, grenades and rocket propelled grenade launchers (Jones, 2009). It is the great deal of weaponry, and increasingly the potential willingness to utilize it (IMB, 2008) that necessitates an immediate response from the authorities involved to reduce such an escalating problem.

**Opportunity Reduction**

Since the resurgence of maritime piracy some 20 years ago, the international community ‘was caught unprepared at both operational and juridical levels’ (Chiarugi and Archibugi, 2009). This lack of foresight therefore saw a preference for prevention rather than the cure, with the deployment of various countries war ships to safeguard vessels of particular interest (Chiarugi and Archibugi, 2009). Such preventative measures have only recently become effectively implemented and have resulted in numerous international efforts to reduce piracy, including the NATO led Allied Provider Mission in which numerous international navies escort convoys of ships carrying the World Food Programme and that of the US led Combined Task Force 151, in which navies from over twenty nations target piracy detection and prevention in the Gulf of Aden, one of the largest piracy hot spots traversed by many international cargo vessels (Chiarugi and Archibugi, 2009). Such international led prevention is key to combating piracy, as Johnson and Pladdet (2003: 8) state, it is in direct correlation with the UNCLOS articles 105 to 107, stating that ‘navies of all countries are entitled to seize a ship taken by pirates and arrest them’. Further to the increasing patrols of naval ships, the IMB set up a 24 hour manned piracy reporting centre for vessels to report to in any cases of actual or attempted piracy in 2008 (IMB, 2008) which has since been furthered to include the establishment of the Internationally Recognised Trade Corridor (IRTC) in 2009, the strip of water between the Horn of Africa and the Arabian Peninsula and a major piracy hot spot, in which naval and air military assets will be strategically deployed to protect and support merchant ships (IMB, 2009).

**Target Hardening**

At an immediately situational level, several crime preventative procedures are currently implemented, though not consistently by every vessel, with varying degrees of success. Key to this lies in the implementation of a product called ‘Secure-Ship’, a non-lethal, electrified fence surrounding the entirety of the ship in order to prevent thieves boarding at sea (CCS, 2009b). Further preventative techniques implemented include the trailing of cargo nets, which could prevent small boats approaching from the stern, and the use of unused dunnage to help prevent entrance passages onto the ship (CCS, 2009b). Many shipping companies have adopted the securing of the perimeter of a ship internationally, with many implementing razor wire along the vessels deck railings (Saul, 2009). In order to deter pirates who may actually gain access to the vessels, some ships are now hiring armed mercenaries to ride on board as security, such as those as the ‘Ghurkha International Manpower Service’, a team of ex-British Ghurkhas (McDaniel, 2005). Further advice given to ships includes that of ensuring blind spots are lit up, regular deck watches and patrols are taken in pairs, keeping fire hoses pressurised ready to shoot at attempted boarding’s, avoiding discussing a ships contents or route whilst in ports and primarily, to report any instances of piracy and sounding alarms as soon as is possible (CCS, 2009c;
Wilson, 2006).

**What More Could Be Done To Prevent Piracy?**

As Reinhardt (2009) states, ‘As long as there is reward and no punishment, there will always be these and other piracies. Further, piracies will expand and grow if rewards, without any penalties, are perceived.’ So it must be therefore widely acknowledged that much more must be done to reduce the prevalence of maritime piracy so as to reduce the theft of CVIT. Such increased measures must include greater use being made of heavily armed military protection for vessels sailing in known piracy hot spots. Further use must also be made of piracy detection, through increased use of air patrols such as that already used throughout the Internationally Recognised Trading Corridor near the Horn of Africa, in order to help prevent the onset of piracy (Reinhardt, 2009). Possibly one of the most effective forms of crime prevention techniques yet to be adequately implemented on the majority of vessels traversing known piracy hot spots lies in the arming of merchant ships as a form of defence from piracy (Reinhardt, 2009). However, such a technique has been discouraged by many due to the presumption that the presence of weapons on board may lead to attackers to respond with violence where before they may not have (Wilson, 2006).

In addition to the immediately situational preventative procedures that are currently lacking, a much wider and tougher stance toward anti-piracy must be adopted globally, particularly as this is something that the dissertation has shown to be consistently effective throughout history when coupled with increased rates of detection and capture (Tilley, 2009: 44). Such contemporary procedures must include stricter, tougher, uniform penalties for those captured and convicted of piracy (Reinhardt, 2009) as currently many of the nations charged with the trying of pirates have neither the political impotence nor an adequate criminal justice system in place to deal with such offences (Jones 2009). Increasingly harsh penalties would however, only be effective if the pirates themselves perceived the risk of capture as increasing, this is due to a wealth of criminological evidence supporting claims that indeed, the biggest deterrent for crime appears to be increasing the perceived level of detection and capture (Tilley, 2009: 44).

**Chapter 8 – Discussion, Conclusion and Way Forward**

This dissertation has indeed found evident a common typology of effective crime prevention techniques that might assist knowledge and better focus efforts in reducing the incidence of future thefts of valuables in transit. Furthermore, it has been shown that indeed a timeline of seemingly transpositional criminal target selections has proven evident throughout history due to a form of displacement occurring once targeted transportation becomes universally target hardened.

A further key finding by the dissertation lies in the construction of the ‘experienceable crime’ hypothesis. Stating that history has continually shown that those who identify new forms of vulnerable transport to rob often utilize legitimately acquired knowledge and skills from previous lawful job or life experiences to commit illicit forms of CVIT theft in order to survive has been shown for historical piracy, highway robberies, train robberies and for
the most part, contemporary piracy. It has been shown that the individuals committing the theft of CVIT both contemporarily and historically often make use of their environmental and learnt knowledge in order to overcome the under protected forms of transportation, with the exception of CIT vans (Vallar, 2003; Wilson, 2006: 3; Contemplator, 2002; SAD, 2009; Evans, 1859: 491; Chiarugi and Archibugi, 2009; Dillon, 2000). Such knowledge often puts the CVIT thieves at a distinct advantage over the lack of capable guardians in charge of protecting the targeted transportation, utilizing more technologically advanced modus operandi and thus committing the act of CVIT theft.

One of the key reasons for individuals to engage in the theft of CVIT both historically and contemporarily, with the exception of CIT van thefts; correlates closely to a period of economic, social or political downturn, leaving many seeking illicit forms of income in order to survive (Wilson, 2006: 3; Hobsbawm, 2003: 10; Johnson and Pladdet, 2003; SAD, 2009; Weiser, 2006; IMB, 2008; Dillon, 2000), as the ‘experienceable crime’ hypothesis has shown. Such a turn to crime sees goal-orientated behaviour seeking to exploit security weaknesses and devising elementary countermeasures to overcome the existing target hardening measures in place (Newman, 1997: 6; Ekblohm, 2005: 231). Notably, the thieves target selection will involve the highest possible reward for the minimal perceived level of effort, as Gill (2001: 281) states, ‘robbers will consider a robbery successful if the financial gains meet or exceed their expectation.’ Therefore, history has consistently dictated that the movement of cash and valuables has always taken new forms, all of which are drastically lacking adequate target hardening capabilities and this has been constantly exploited by willing thieves.

It has also been shown that several key distinctions can be made between what has historically prevented CVIT thefts across numerous forms of transportation and furthermore, what has begun to reduce the incidence today. Predominantly, history has dictated that in order for CVIT thefts to be prevented, target hardening must be consistently implemented throughout the duration of the transportation of cash and valuables to a higher degree than the modus operandi utilized by the thieves (RNM, 2002; Contemplator, 2002; Prassel, 2006: 50; Siegel, 2008: 347; LOG, 1996b). In order for this to be possible, a micro level analysis of all weaknesses must be accomplished in order to satisfy a consistently suitable crime preventative approach is implemented (Clarke, 1992: 10). This consistent approach to target hardening throughout the transportation of cash and valuables is only recently becoming to be implemented on CIT vans and international cargo vessels, but with limits to such an approach currently, namely parking restrictions in city centres for CIT vans and an unwillingness to enlist armed capable guardians on cargo vessels for some companies, any reductions in CVIT theft rates currently will be very limited (BSIA, 2005; Reinhardt, 2009). Further to these immediately situational measures, the dissertation has also shown that perhaps one of the most effective forms of crime prevention to reduce CVIT thefts lies in that of wider social level aspects (Prassel, 1996: 114; Wilson, 2006: 5; Krystek, 1998). As it has been shown, tough laws designed to target those committing or liaising with CVIT thieves have shown very effective results historically with regards to piracy, highway robberies and train robberies and have again only recently began to be implemented on CIT van theft and piracy, with a reasonable degree of effect (BSIA 2008a; IMB, 2009).
Such findings have therefore led the dissertation to make several key recommendations based on what has been shown so far: Primarily, it is in the opinion of the dissertation that in order to satisfy a greater reduction in the rate CVIT thefts from CIT vans and maritime piracy, efforts to target harden transportation at an immediately situational level must be taken much further in order to ensure that they are consistently implemented throughout the duration of the transportation process. This process must take account of the micro level problems that face CVIT and mandatory implementation of the latest technological advances must be made. Furthermore, as history has shown, through increased costs to international cargo haulers, the presence of armed capable guardians on board the ships may invariably lead to a reduction in CVIT thefts.

In addition, this dissertation recommends that in order for a drastic reduction in CVIT rates to occur for both CIT vans and cargo vessels, a much greater perceived level of capture must be evident. Through more acute placement of policing and military agencies in order to reduce the opportunity for crime, a far higher chance of detention and apprehension would prove evident, something that has been consistently shown to effectively reduce crime (Tilley, 2009: 44). In the case of maritime piracy, the dissertation asserts that much clearer international guidance must be given as to how to deal with the global problem of piracy, and a subsequent uniform coalitionist tackling of piracy should take place in order to reduce the opportunity CVIT thieves currently have.
Appendix A

- Map of CIT Van Attacks (2007)
Appendix B

- Map of Piracy 2010
Appendix C

- Letter of recommendation

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**International Christian Maritime Association**

Mr Robert Ford  
robert.ford@live.com  
10 March 2010  
Dear Sir,

**DISSERTATION ON THE PREVENTION OF MARITIME PIRACY**

The International Christian Maritime Association welcomes efforts to better understand and ultimately to curb maritime piracy. While much effort focuses on cargo delays and losses, the risk of violence, complex ransom negotiations, and the potential for adverse publicity, ICMA’s concern is for the welfare of seafarers.

ICMA believes that the shipping industry’s trained response to piracy incidents promotes seafarer safety and protection in the short term and strengthens crew morale, company identity and positive publicity. It is in the interest, therefore, of the maritime industry that research identifies and creates resources for addressing crew stressors such as vessel transit through high-risk shipping lanes or evading attempted piracy attack.

ICMA welcomes efforts, such as the research of Mr. Robert Ford, to produce recommendations on crime prevention procedures that can help prevent future incidents of maritime piracy.

Yours faithfully,

Hennie la Grange  
General Secretary: ICMA
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